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Abstract 
 
As the listing of armed groups as ‘terrorist organisations’ mushroomed following 
9/11 a logical result would be a reduction in the number of settlements negotiated 
with these targets of proscription. Instead, peace negotiations have continued in 
parallel with the rapid expansion of listing. However, there is little understanding 
of how international proscription affects negotiations and peace processes, and in 
particular how it affects the process by which conflict parties get to the 
negotiation table.  
 
This thesis explores the effects of proscription on pre-negotiation at both the 
symbolic and material level. By comparing the processes through which the 
Colombian government and the FARC arrived at the Caguán negotiations (1999-
2002) and the Havana negotiations (2012-2016), and treating 9/11 and the 
international proscription of the FARC as a critical juncture, this research reveals 
the effects of proscription on the way in which peace processes are initiated.  
 
The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First, it proposes an innovative 
framework for how to study the effect of proscription on the inception of peace 
processes, highlighting the central importance of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’. In 
doing so, it critically revisits and extends central dynamics of the pre-negotiation 
literature: vilification, symmetry and ripeness.  Second, it applies this framework 
to the Colombian pre-negotiations with the FARC, drawing on primary data from 
over 50 personal interviews with key actors involved in the negotiations and the 
qualitative discourse analysis of 20 years of statements by both conflict parties. 
Finally, it draws together insights from the framework and the case studies and 
their applicability to other, similar cases. 
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Chapter	One	
Introduction 
 
Introduction  
During a speech given to the Colombian army on 8 September 2003, President 
Álvaro Uribe used the words “terror”, “terrorism”, “terrorist”, “terrorists” and 
“antiterrorist” 59 times to describe the threat of the armed groups in Colombia.1 In 
the same speech he proclaimed: 
Here we have been dominated by terrorism for decades, a terrorism 
hidden in our big cities and in more than 300 thousand kilometres of 
jungle, terrorism financed by drug trafficking. I do not believe that in 
the history of my generation, a richer, more powerful terrorism has 
been faced in the world, a more aggressive terrorism, more dangerous 
than the one we have faced in Colombia. 
 
Fast-forward exactly twelve years later to September 2015 and we see 
President Juan Manuel Santos shaking hands with the leader of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia People’s Army (FARC for its Spanish acronym), 
Timoleón Jiménez (aka Timochenko). This unprecedented event took place in 
Havana, Cuba in the middle of the peace process between the Colombian 
government and the FARC to sign an agreement on the issue of transitional justice 
and the establishment of the ‘Special jurisdiction for peace’. 
These two vignettes colourfully illustrate the contradiction that lies at the 
heart of this thesis, namely that contrary to what they claim in public, politicians 
often do end up negotiating with ‘terrorists’ (Kurth Cronin 2009, Pettyjohn 2009, 
Powell 2014). One study by RAND (Jones and Libicki 2008) shows that military 
force has rarely been the primary reason for ‘terrorist’ groups to end their 
activities. The study concluded that in the largest proportion of cases, it was 
because the ‘terrorist’ groups joined the political process. Governments are 
currently exploring negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Communist 
People’s Party-National Democratic Front in the Philippines and the National 
																																																								
1 Speech given by President Álvaro Uribe in honour of the new commander of the Colombian Air Force, 
General Edgar Alfonso Lesmez, Uribe, A., 2003, ‘Discurso del president Álvaro Uribe en la posesión del 
nuevo comandante de la FAC’, 19 September. 
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Liberation Army in Colombia. All these armed groups are proscribed 
internationally or listed as designated terrorist organisations.  
International proscription is a widespread phenomenon, with an estimated 
214 blacklists worldwide (de Goede 2011). Though there are discrepancies across 
proscription regimes and they vary in the details, the logic behind proscription 
regimes is the same worldwide. Countries and organisations initiating proscription 
regimes use them to contain what they see as security threats. The rationale is that 
by raising the costs of pursuing terrorist activities and reducing their support they 
will force individuals and groups to abandon them. Or, that it will be easier to 
isolate them, as their support will have been considerably narrowed. As the US 
State Department explains on its website about Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO): “FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against 
terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities 
and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.”2 
Of the forty-armed conflicts active in 2014, all, bar one, were being fought 
within states (Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015). These armed intrastate conflicts 
tend to be asymmetrical in nature, pitting the state against one or more non-state 
armed actors. More than fifty per cent of these internal armed conflicts involved 
armed groups proscribed in one of the lists of designated foreign terrorist 
organisations drawn up by the United States, the United Nations, European Union 
or other Western governments.3 Following the World Trade Centre attacks on the 
11 September 2001 (9/11) and the inception of the ‘war on terrorism’ one might 
have expected to see a reduction in the number of negotiated settlements, but 
“surprisingly perhaps the peace agreement phenomenon shows no sign of abating” 
(Bell 2008:211). In 2014, ten peace agreements were concluded, part of a 
continued positive trend in the number of peace agreements over the years 
(Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015).  
So, one does not seem to preclude the other. Both the listing of armed 
groups as a terrorist organisation and negotiation and peace processes are present 
at the same time, both have different effects, each has a justification. Yet, there is 
little understanding of how international proscription affects negotiations and 																																																								
2 US State Department, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Accessed on 28 July 2018 at: 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
3 Of the groups mentioned by Pettersson & Wallensteen (2015) from the Uppsala data set for 2014 and 
comparing it to the US, UN, EU lists of designated foreign terrorist organisations. 
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peace processes, and in particular how it affects the process by which conflict 
parties get to the negotiation table. This is what this thesis explores. It sheds new 
light on the questions surrounding the effects of proscription on peace processes. 
Given the breadth of the topic, it is useful to narrow the scope of the thesis to a 
more specific research question: how has proscription affected the inception of 
peace negotiations?  
While proscription as a counter-terrorism measure has been rather neglected 
in academic literature (Jarvis and Legrand 2016, de Goede 2018, Kirkpatrick 
2018b), there has been a recent focus on the constitutive side of proscription with 
authors looking at how and why the listings have emerged (Jarvis and Legrand 
2016, 2017, 2018, Kirkpatrick 2018). Less has been written on the effects of 
proscription. Practitioners have been the most prolific when it comes to assessing 
the effects of international listings on human rights and civil society (Howell 
2006, Browring 2010, Sullivan and Hayes 2010, Sentas 2014, Sentas 2018), 
humanitarian work (Patuliano et al. 2011) and peacebuilding (Helgesen 2007, 
Dudouet 2010, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2011, Boon-Kuo et al. 2015). The 
scholarly work on the effects of proscription on peace process is in its infancy 
(Haspeslagh 2013, Birkeland 2014, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015) and has 
mainly focussed on the effects on third party actors. This emerging body of work 
has so far concluded that proscription has deeply influenced the type of 
peacebuilding work that is possible and had significant negative effects on the 
possible roles played by third party actors. While this thesis confirms these 
findings, it also highlights the innovative roles played by civil society actors in 
particular despite proscription. Moreover, the thesis goes beyond the focus on 
third parties to explore how international proscription has affected the conflict 
parties themselves and their interaction through key pre-negotiation dynamics. In 
doing so it offers an analytical framework for a systematic analysis of the effects 
of proscription on pre-negotiations. 
9/11 and the passing of UN Security Resolution 1373 was a turning point 
which embedded proscription regimes deeply in the international system. The 
global reframing of a whole range of protracted armed conflicts as wars against 
terrorists has affected local conflict dynamics and their possible resolution. As 
Chapter 3 goes on to explain, this shift did not emerge overnight and there were a 
number of antecedent concepts that laid the ground for it, but it was the first UN 
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Resolution to invoke the right to self-defence (Article 51 of Chapter VII) against a 
non-state armed group. Moreover, this Resolution encouraged all member states 
to develop lists of terrorist organisations with no geographic boundaries or 
definition of what should be considered terrorism. 
So, while the labelling of opponents in conflict has been going on for 
centuries and reflects one conflict party’s opinion, the thesis argues that 
international proscription has solidified this judgment by creating a category and 
has both symbolic and material ramifications. It has embedded a characterisation 
that one side, the non-state actor, is illegitimate and violent, and the other side, the 
State is legitimate and should be supported in its fight against ‘terrorists’. This 
symbolic shift has material implications as it not only affects the type of war 
being fought, but also the power relations between the parties making the 
possibility of concessions towards the listed armed group appear impossible. 
The thesis is squarely rooted in the peace and conflict literature to 
understand the effects of proscription on pre-negotiations. It notably shines a new 
light on the classic conflict resolution paradigm of ripeness. While one would 
assume that international proscription would help ‘ripen’ a conflict by hurting 
listed armed groups and pushing them to the negotiation table, the empirical depth 
of the thesis shows that while the listed armed group undeniably suffered, 
international proscription actually postponed the two central elements of ripeness, 
the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out, from emerging. Proscription of 
the armed group bolstered the state to such an extent that it clouded its perception 
of a mutually hurting stalemate as well as blocking the way out as it delegitimised 
any possibility of dialogue with the listed entity.  
The thesis also builds on critical approaches to terrorism studies in placing 
the study of terrorism in the context of conflict and peace studies (Toros and 
Telledis 2013, Telledis and Toros 2015) which helps explain how proscription 
legitimises certain practices and de-legitimises others. The thesis confirms that the 
terrorist framing forestalls non-violent approaches (Toros 2008, 2012), but it also 
goes beyond this by showing how this happens through the mechanisms of pre-
negotiations, as well as how negotiations with internationally proscribed entities 
are still taking place. The idea of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ developed in the thesis 
goes some way in explaining why certain conflicts remain stuck in the terrorism 
framing while others emerge from it. The Colombia case illustrates how the 
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‘linguistic ceasefire’ becomes a necessary pre-condition, deepening our 
understanding of the timing and sequencing of pre-negotiations in the context of 
proscription.  
This first chapter proceeds as follows. The first section draws on conflict 
and peace literature and critical terrorism to clarify the terminology used in this 
thesis. The second section lays out the research design, methodology and the case 
selection criteria used. The third section gives a brief background to the 
Colombian conflict with the FARC. The fourth section gives an overview of the 
structure and the chapter concludes by highlighting the thesis’ overall 
contribution. 
 
I. Terrorism and peace: clarifying concepts 
While the next chapter will explore the existing literature and situate the thesis in 
on-going debates, this section simply clarifies certain central concepts used.  
1. Terrorism not terrorists 
Few words are as contested as ‘terrorism’. So much so, that the United Nations 
has been unable to agree a common definition of this term for decades. Scholars 
have not been immune to this trend either. Schmidt and Youngman (1988), in 
their seminal work on political terrorism, cite 109 different definitions of the 
word. Some define terrorism based on the targets of the attacks (Ganor 2011) 
others look at the goals of the violence pursued (Hoffman 2001). Some central 
elements that come up repeatedly in these divers definitions are: the use of 
violence and/or force, the political intent, the objective of instilling fear, the use of 
threats and the systematic nature of attacks (Schmidt and Youngman 1988). 
Though the word terrorism has been used for over two hundred years, “it 
was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that it emerged as a major category 
within discussions of political violence (Jackson et al. 2011:100). Though 
historically, the largest-scale terrorizing violence was carried out by state actors, 
such as eighteenth century Jacobin France, today, terrorism is largely associated 
with non-governmental sub-state agents (English 2009: 7). The use of terrorism as 
a strategy is emblematic of asymmetric warfare pitting non-state armed groups 
against government forces: “Terrorism is, after all, the weapon of the weak and 
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the tactic of desperation, in the absence of success with other tactics” (Zartman 
and Faure 2011:13). 
It is important to differentiate between using the word terrorism to describe 
a type of violent strategy and using the word terrorist to describe a type of armed 
actor. Scholars in the field of terrorism studies tend to see the words ‘terrorist’ and 
‘terrorism’ as “useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary” (Jones and Smith 2009). 
These terms are often used interchangeably. Once an actor is described as a 
‘terrorist’ it is then a “terrorist, not only (…) regardless of what it does but also 
sometimes in spite of what it does” (Gearty 2008: 558). Onlookers will: 
identify any act by a group labelled ‘terrorist’ as automatically and 
necessarily a terrorist action. It does so because by encouraging 
onlookers to see terrorism as something tied to specific organizations, 
anything those organizations do can therefore be viewed through this 
lens – whether or not their actions accurately fit the definition being 
employed. (Jackson et al. 2011: 111) 
 
So, actors will still be regarded as ‘terrorist’ despite being involved in specifically 
non-violent actions. Groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, for example, can be 
political parties engaged in electoral politics and nevertheless are understood as 
just terrorists. 
It is this tying of the terrorism label to a specific actor that is being 
investigated. In accordance with critical terrorism scholars, it is more useful to 
move away from a definition of terrorism towards attempts at describing the 
phenomenon (Jackson et al. 2011). The use of the word terrorism is indeed useful 
to describe types of actions in a broader repertoire of warfare. These would 
include actions such as hijacking, bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hostage 
taking and suicide attacks against civilian targets. However, the use of the word 
terrorist to describe an actor is more laden. Gearty highlights the evolution of “the 
term terrorist from the description of a kind of violence to a morally loaded 
condemnation of the actions of subversive groups regardless of the context of 
their actions” (Gearty 2008: 559).  
By understanding terrorism from the perspective of critical terrorism 
studies, the thesis is able to question this de-contextualisation and to re-
contextualise actors. It also allows for the transformation of state and non-state 
actors engaged in terrorism: 
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Re-embedding acts of terrorism and those who perpetrate them in their 
temporal context discredits the absolutism and essentialism of the 
commonly used phrase ‘once a terrorist, always a terrorist’. Re-
embedding them in their social context, moreover, discredits the use 
of the label ‘terrorist’ to describe groups or human beings altogether – 
leading us, the authors to reserve the term strictly for describing 
specific acts. (Toros and Gunning 2009:97) 
 
By not taking the ‘terrorist’ label at face value, this study explores how 
international proscription, by solidifying this judgement, creates material and 
symbolic effects, which in turn affects perceptions and behaviour, the nature of 
the armed conflict and the possibility of its resolution.  Central to this is the 
conceptualisation of peace processes, which the chapter now turns to. 
2. Peace processes: the importance of pre-negotiation 
This thesis is focussed on peace processes in protracted armed conflicts as first 
described by Azar (1986:36):  
Such conflicts linger on for substantial periods of time, sometimes 
interrupted by relatively low-level coexistence and even cooperation. 
On the other hand, they play a significant role in reshaping the 
societies involved, and have a considerable spill-over effect into 
international society. 
 
A peace process consists of “initiatives intended to help reach and 
implement a negotiated agreement to end an armed conflict and create the basis 
for a new political settlement” (Ricigliano 2005: 6). Peace processes are 
understood as dynamic and non-linear, where the main relationship is focussed on 
the conflict protagonists but it also leaves room to understand the roles played by 
other internal and external actors. The term ‘peace process’ was initially used 
during the US Secretary of State Kissinger led shuttle diplomacy effort in the 
wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 by Harold Saunders and his colleagues 
(Saunders 1999: Preface xix) and was understood as “the operational framework 
for peacemaking”. Peace processes defy neat categorization. It is more of a “stop-
go dynamic and complex choreography sequencing of initiatives and concessions” 
(Darby and Mac Ginty 2008:2).  
While the notions of stages and phases do not fit neatly onto the reality of 
peace processes they are useful and an important analytical tool to understand 
how a peace process is initiated, moves forward (or backwards).  Most of the 
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literature categorises peace processes in three phases: pre-negotiations, 
negotiations and post-negotiations (Zartman 1991, Höglund 2008, Mitchell 
2008).4 Of particular relevance to analyse the effect of proscription on peace 
processes is the pre-negotiation phase. Indeed, proscription and the terrorist label 
appear, on the surface, to preclude the possibility for direct negotiations between 
the state and its proscribed opponent because of its highly polarising effect on the 
primary stakeholders and the public at large (Haspeslagh & Dudouet 2015). 
Exploring pre-negotiation allows us to study how, when and why parties get to the 
negotiation table and explore how proscription has affected these dynamics. 
Pre-negotiation as a concept has received less attention than the negotiation 
or peacemaking phase itself or even the post-negotiation/implementation/ 
peacebuilding phase. Leading scholars such as Harold Saunders (1985), Janice 
Gross Stein (1989), and I William Zartman (1989) started to develop an 
understanding of pre-negotiation in the late 1980s. Pre-negotiation is a particularly 
challenging phase, so much so that Saunders argued that “persuading parties to a 
conflict to commit to a negotiated settlement is even more complicated, time-
consuming and difficult than reaching agreement once negotiations have begun” 
(Saunders 1985: 249).  
Because pre-negotiation happens before official negotiations take place it is 
often sensitive or secretive in nature. To look at how proscription has affected 
efforts at engaging with and talking to armed groups through secret or indirect 
channels, for instance, leads to an understanding of peace initiatives in a broad 
way as “informal or formal, public or private, subject to popular endorsement or 
restricted to elite level” (Darby and Mac Ginty’s 2008:3). This also enables the 
thesis to take into consideration the role of third party actors who play a crucial 
role in contexts of proscription “because of the acute social distance between 
adversaries, which makes it potentially harder to develop inter-party empathy and 
trust, that are essential for lasting conflict resolution” (Haspeslagh & Dudouet 
2015: 105). 
																																																								
4 Similarly, international negotiation literature defines international negotiations as consisting of a search 
for the diagnostic, the formula and the details (Zartman and Berman 1982:9). One notable exception is 
Guelke (2008), who breaks these phases down further, particularly the pre- and post-negotiation phases, 
identifying seven phases: pre-talks, era of secret talks, opening of multilateral talks, negotiating to a 
settlement, gaining endorsement, implementing its provisions and institutionalisation of the new 
dispensation. 
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This thesis highlights three dynamics as being central in the pre-negotiation 
stage: the passage from vilification to de-vilification, the move from asymmetry to 
symmetry and the emergence of ripeness through the mutually hurting stalemate 
and the way out. First, the pre-negotiation phase involves changing the public 
image of the adversary (Zartman 2008:121). The concept of villainising non-state 
armed groups adapted by Spector (2003) from his work on villainising states 
(1998) is particularly relevant for this thesis.  Villainising, he explains, is the 
process of demonizing and dehumanizing the enemy and it needs to be reversed 
for official negotiations to be able to take place. The thesis will develop the idea 
of a ‘linguistic ceasefire’ to explain how the villainisation was reversed in the 
context of proscription. 
Second, the introduction to this chapter made the point that a majority of 
conflicts today are intra-state as opposed to inter-state. Most of those can be 
classified as asymmetric. The use of terrorism, as a strategy, is also emblematic of 
asymmetric warfare pitting non-state armed groups against government forces. As 
Louis Kriesberg (2009:4) pointed out, “Asymmetries in conflicts deserve attention 
because they exist in some degree in all conflicts and often are obstacles to 
resolving or transforming a conflict equitably and endurably.” Asymmetry is a 
major obstacle for the inception of peace negotiations. A central feature of the 
pre-negotiation phases is the need to move from a situation of power asymmetry 
to establishing a sense of symmetry between conflict parties. 
Last but not least, the most dominant concept in the peace and conflict 
literature on the question of timing or the when question of pre-negotiation is the 
process through which conflict parties become ready or ripe for negotiation. I. 
William Zartman (2000) argued that two conditions are necessary but not 
sufficient for a conflict to be ripe: the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out 
(Zartman 2008b). Parties perceive a mutually hurting stalemate when both sides 
think the costs of continuing the struggle exceed the benefits. Similarly, they also 
need to perceive a sense of a way out, meaning that both sides need to see a 
negotiated solution as possible. These two concepts are based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, so a rationalist understanding of actor’s decision-making processes, but 
the element of perception is also central to these mechanisms. 
These three dynamics, central to the pre-negotiation phase of peace 
processes, will form the basis of the analytical framework and will be engaged 
	 20	
with critically and in depth in the analytical framework. Having clarified the 
terminology used, the chapter turns to addressing the research question at hand 
and setting out the methodology used to answer it. 
 
II. Research design, scope and methodology 
To answer the question of how proscription has affected pre-negotiations, the 
research design is based on a deep exploration of one particular context, that of 
pre-negotiations with the FARC in Colombia.  The comparison of two phases 
of pre-negotiations in the same context before and after 9/11 will allow for the 
complexity of the context to be understood and contingency explanations to be 
assessed. Moreover, an in-depth exploration based on extensive fieldwork and a 
qualitative methodology will unearth the particular dynamics of proscription 
thereby refining our conceptual understanding of pre-negotiations and 
proscription.  
1. Research design and scope 
To explore what difference proscription makes in terms of pre-negotiation 
dynamics, the main research design will be based on a ‘before and after’ 
comparative case study with 9/11, and the consequent international listing of the 
armed group as a terrorist organisation, constituting the pivotal moment or critical 
juncture. This thesis will look at a single longitudinal case study divided into two 
sub-cases as described by George and Bennett (2005). The first sub-case will look 
at a period of pre-negotiation before 9/11 and the second sub-case will look at pre-
negotiation afterwards. Variation will thus focus on the central conceptual issue at 
hand: international proscription.  
This study will follow Zartman’s (2005:8) advice that “The simplest way to 
achieve comparison is to examine multiple instances in the same case”. Using one 
case should help hold other features constant making it easier to isolate and 
identify the explanatory factors. This is a condition termed “structured, focused 
comparisons” (Zartman 2005:7). This is not to deny the variation that can happen 
over time, especially in the context of protracted armed conflicts, which by 
essence change and reshape societies. Nonetheless, the hope is that by applying 
the analytical framework on a single case and trailing the way in which 
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proscription has affected the dynamics of pre-negotiations, this should leave room 
for the careful analysis and weighing of alternative explanations.  
The intensive study of one case can help us understand a larger class of 
cases (Gerring 2004, 2009). This study is relevant to a broad number of possible 
case studies. The introduction to this chapter noted that all, bar one, on-going 
armed conflicts are intra-state and involve armed groups according to the Uppsala 
data set, most of which have been internationally proscribed as terrorist 
organisations since 9/11. However, to narrow down the scope so as to fit the 
research design, it is important to have a case with the following four 
characteristics: 
• Protracted national internal armed conflict 
• Armed group proscribed by a foreign government or inter-governmental 
organisation 
• Presence of a peace process with the armed group before and after 
international proscription 
• Distinct peace processes taking place before and after 9/11 
 
The study focuses on national intra-state protracted conflicts as opposed to 
internationalized armed conflicts.  So, it will not include cases of inter-country 
conflict such as the one between India and Pakistan over Kashmir or cases of 
internationalised conflicts 5  such as Afghanistan where the government is 
supported by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that 
in 2014 included troops from 34 different countries. Nor will it include cases 
where the armed group is or has become regional or global in its ambitions, such 
as the Lord’s Resistance Army, or has formally affiliated itself with transitional 
movements such as Al-Qaeda, like the GSPC in Algeria. 
There are potential cases that are not currently included in the Uppsala data 
set because they have reached a settlement, through a peace process or other 
means, or because they no longer produce 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar 
year6. Some of these are nonetheless relevant to this study because they involve 																																																								
5 Uppsala Conflict Data Program growing number of internationalized armed conflicts, that is, “conflicts 
in which one or more states contributed troops to one or both warring side” (Pettersson & Wallensteen 
2015: 536) 
6 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program “An armed conflict is defined as a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two 
parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Of these two parties, at least one has to 
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internationally proscribed armed groups. For example the case of Sri Lanka and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or the case of Spain and Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) over the Basque conflict both fulfil the four criteria. But more 
historical examples such as the Northern Irish conflict and the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) or the South African one with the African National Congress (ANC) 
are not directly relevant here because they were settled before 9/11 so they would 
not fulfil the criteria of having peace processes before and after 9/11. Here is a 
sample of possible cases that fit the research design: 
Table 1. Possible cases 
 
Case criteria Possible Cases 
Protracted 
national internal 
armed conflict 
 
Spain  
 
Basque 
conflict 
with ETA 
Colombia 
 
Conflict 
with FARC 
Colombia 
 
Conflict 
with ELN 
Sri Lanka 
Conflict 
with LTTE 
Turkey 
 
Conflict 
with PKK 
Philippines  
 
Conflict 
with 
CPP/NPA 
Armed group 
proscribed by a 
foreign 
government/ 
Inter- 
governmental 
organisation 
ETA 
 
US (’97) 
EU (’01) 
UK (’01) 
FARC 
 
US (’97) 
EU (’02, 
suspended 
2016) 
ELN 
 
US (’97) 
EU (’02) 
LTTE 
 
US (’97) 
EU (’06) 
UK (’01) 
PKK 
 
US (’97) 
EU (’02) 
UK (’01) 
CPP/NPA 
 
EU (’02) 
US (’02) 
Presence of  
peace process 
before / after 
international 
proscription 
 
1989 
 
1998-99 
 
2004- 
2006 
1982-87 
 
(1991-92) 
 
1999-2002 
 
2012-2016 
(1991-92) 
 
1994-95 
 1997-98 
 
1999-2002 
2017- 2018 
1983- 
 
1994-95 
 
2002- 2006 
on/off 
 
99/2002- 
2004 
 
2013-15 
1995-98 
 
2001- 04 
on/off 
 
2004-10 
on/off 
 
2016-17 
 
Moreover, to be able to address some of the particular challenges raised in the 
literature on ‘terrorist’ groups, the case selection can be narrowed further based on 
the core characteristics of terrorist organisations identified in the literature. The 
case should therefore be a national internal armed conflict where the armed group 
is: 
• seen as non-negotiable/irrational (extreme demands, revolutionary and/or 
ideological); 
• seen as criminal; 																																																																																																																																																			
be the government of a state. For intrastate conflicts, the location is a country.” (Pettersson & Wallensteen 
2015: 536) 
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• fighting a state considered as democratic by the international community. 
The case of the negotiations between the Colombian government and the 
FARC appears to fulfil all these criteria. Colombia offers a good case study to 
explore the questions raised as both international proscription and efforts at 
engaging armed groups in peace processes are present. Furthermore, the FARC 
offers a strong case of an armed group seen internationally as a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation, having lost touch with its political agenda, involved in human rights 
violations and criminal activities and fighting a democratic state with a seemingly 
un-negotiable stance. Choosing a case from Latin America will also fill a vacuum 
identified in the literature on terrorism by Silke (2004: 202) when he noted that “It 
is somewhat disconcerting though to note that regions such as Latin America – 
which are acknowledged to have relatively high levels of terrorist violence and 
where terrorists are much more serious threats to established regimes – have 
received such paucity of attention.”  
Moreover, the case of Colombia fits neatly with the proposed research 
method of a before and after case study. Two clear and distinct phases of pre-
negotiations can be identified either side of 9/11. Looking at the pre-negotiation 
processes that led to the Caguán negotiation (1999-2002) between the Colombian 
government and the FARC, in a pre-proscription era, allows us to analyse a 
‘normal’ context. In contrast, the lead-up to the Havana negotiation (2012-2016) 
between the Colombian government and the FARC allows us to analyse a post-
proscription context and how this affected the pre-negotiation dynamics.  
A more mundane but nonetheless important reasons also made the choice of 
the Colombian conflict with the FARC an obvious one. My language skills and 
pre-established knowledge and contacts in Colombia were important factors in 
terms of the quality of the data collected for this research. 
2. Methodology 
The thesis is based on a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. The 
premise of the project is deductive in that it explores a gap in the scholarly 
literature and tries to understand how proscription impacts peace processes. 
Thereby developing a set of research questions and drawing out existing 
literature to build an analytical framework to understand the possible effects of 
proscription on pre-negotiations. At the same time, because there is little 
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scholarly work on this topic, the approach was rather open ended. It does not 
for instance test out hypothesis. Instead, the data that emerged out of the 
fieldwork helped in developing and refining the theories and concepts used to 
understand pre-negotiations and the effects of proscription. In that sense, the 
project is also inductive. Both approaches were used at different points in the 
process. Some have described this as an ‘abductive’ approach (Dubois and 
Gaade 2002, Thomas 2010, Kersten 2014), I see it more as a natural process of 
theory and empirics talking to each other during the life-span of the thesis.  
To explain this process it is useful to look at a concrete example. The 
concept of the ‘linguistic cease-fire’ developed in the thesis for example 
emerged through deductive and inductive reasoning. While the initial literature 
review explored the dynamics of vilification and de-vilification, it rapidly 
became apparent that there was the need for a transition phase, a step between 
extreme vilification and de-vilification, but there was no specific theory or 
concept to use or test on the data. At the same time, strong evidence emerged 
from the fieldwork pointing towards this intermediary stage. The idea of a 
‘linguistic cease-fire’ emerged both from the personal interviews and the 
discourse analysis conducted. Here it is important to acknowledge the 
analytical contribution of interviewees, particularly in a context like Colombia 
where there is excellent analysis.7 As I go on to explain in Chapter 5, several of 
my interviewees noted that from early 2011 President Santos had shifted his 
rhetoric towards the FARC considerably. They described it as a “ceasefire”8 or 
a “disarming of words”.9 This was confirmed by the discourse analysis I did of 
official government statements. After fleshing out this idea and defining its 
main components inductively from the Colombian context, I then also briefly 
tested it deductively on the Basque case, where it helped explain how pre-
negotiations have got stuck in the context of proscription.  
This back and forth between theory and empirics helped in generating 
concepts and theory, but also in shining an analytical light on an empirical 																																																								
7 Pearce (2010b) pointed out for example that in Latin America the history of social mobilisation fostered 
close relations between social activists and intellectuals so the thinking and analysis is not just contained 
within academic institutions. 
8 Virginia Bouvier, Director of the Colombia Program, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Personal 
interview, February 2014, Washington D.C.; Mauricio García-Durán, Former Executive Director of the 
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), Personal interview, January 2014, by phone. 
9 Carlos Velandia, Former commander of the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN) and appointed 
‘Peace Manager’ by the Santos administration, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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reality that had not yet received much scholarly attention. To do this, it was 
essential to use a qualitative methodology that could pick-up on this granular 
reality. The thesis is based on two main strands of data, beyond the usual 
review of primary (news) and secondary (articles and books) sources: 
statements by the conflict parties and personal interviews.  
First, the thesis draws on the review of twenty years of statements and 
communiqués by successive Colombian governments and the FARC: 207 
statements during four Colombian Presidencies (Gaviria, Samper, Pastrana, 
Uribe, Santos) and 128 communiqués by the FARC.10 Public statements made 
by the conflict parties themselves are analysed rather than mediated statements 
such as press accounts or commentary to examine the language used, the 
associations made and how those evolved at different moments and over time 
during the two pre-negotiation phases leading up to the Caguán and Havana 
negotiations. Mapping the representations made by the two sides through an in-
depth qualitative discourse analysis of the texts, rather than a data mining 
process that automatically selects words, allowed the terms used to be 
understood within the context written. It also made sense because sometimes 
the absence of words or the fact the conflict opponent is not even mentioned 
can be very telling particularly in the case of the (de)vilification dynamics 
explored in Chapter 5.  
Second, as the pre-negotiation phase and the issue of engaging with groups 
listed as terrorists is not one that is often discussed publically, a central feature 
of the data collection was based on personal semi-structured interviews with 
key actors  (mainly elite-level) from the government, the armed group, third 
parties and conflict analysts. These interviews were essential in efforts to 
understand the effect of proscription on the perception of the actors themselves. 
Approximately fifty people were interviewed in different locations.11 After a 																																																								
10 The collection of these materials came from a range of sources. Historical statements made by the 
Colombian government regarding the FARC had already been collated in the series edited by A. 
Villarraga Sarmiento ‘Biblioteca de la Paz’ 1994-1998 and 1998-2002. The Statements made by President 
Uribe (2002-2010) and President Santos (2010-2012) were retrieved from the archives of the Colombian 
Presidency website and President Uribe’s personal website (2002-2006): 
http://historico.presidencia.gov.co/; http://www.alvarouribevelez.com.co   
2007-2010: http://historico.presidencia.gov.co/discursos/index.htm; 2010-2012: 
http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Discursos/). The most recent FARC statements came from the FARC-EP 
website (http://www.farc-ep.co) and the historical statements, that were not systematically accessible in 
the public domain, were sent to the author directly by email from the FARC’s own archives. All 
statements are in Spanish and translated into English directly by the author.  
11 A full list of interviewees can be found as an Appendix to this thesis. 
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series of initial exploratory interviews done via Skype and in person in 
Washington DC, USA between January and April 2014, a month was spent at the 
peace initiative project of the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular 
(CINEP) in Bogotá, Colombia over May and June 2015. A field trip to Havana, 
Cuba also took place during that time, specifically aimed at interviewing members 
of the FARC who were there negotiating with the Colombian government. A 
subsequent follow-up field trip took place in October 2015 in Bogotá, Colombia. 
Moreover, in order to interview third party actors with direct experience of the 
two pre-negotiation phases interviews were conducted in Norway in February 
2015, and in London sporadically over the course of the thesis.  
Being non-Colombian, Spanish-speaking, and having worked and lived in 
Colombia previously, allowed for a wide range of contacts and good access to 
different spheres making the exploration of a sensitive topic in a polarised 
environment easier. Being based at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science somewhat helped when it came to accessing Government interviewees as 
it is President Santos’ alma mater. To widen my pool of would-be interviewees 
and gain access to groups that are harder to reach, such as the military and the 
FARC in particular, I used a ‘snowballing technique’ whereby people interviewed 
or contacted then put me in direct contact with others through personal 
connections. This technique has been used widely in sociology for example to 
interview hidden or difficult to locate populations (Salganik and Heckathorn 
2004).  
Having access to the listed armed group to understand their perspective was 
essential to this research, but getting access to the FARC was challenging for 
three main reasons. The first reason, which is closely linked to the topic at hand, 
was the risk of criminalisation in Colombia if I were to meet with the group. I 
therefor contacted and got approval from the Colombian government, through the 
Colombian embassy in London, to meet with the FARC in Cuba, but not in 
Colombia. The on-going nature of the peace process during the research period 
made the FARC accessible for interviews (in Cuba) for the first time in over ten 
years.  The second hurdle was to get clearance from the University’s ethics 
committee for the project as a whole and for interviews with members of the 
FARC in particular. Here, the fact that the UK government did not proscribe the 
FARC made access to the group not directly problematic in terms of UK Counter-
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Terrorism law for a researcher based in a UK Higher Education setting. This 
could have been impossible with a different armed group. The third issue was to 
establish direct contact with the FARC. Having had no previous contact with the 
armed group it took me over six months to establish an initial connection through 
a range of channels (social media, friends, other interviewees). 
All interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the two pre-
negotiation processes under investigation. I strived to have an adequate balance of 
perspectives, governmental, non-governmental, armed group, as well as historical 
and current perspectives as I was covering a wide time frame. Some interviewees 
had been involved in both pre-negotiation phases. The interviews were managed 
in a semi-structured way. They followed a regular pattern of questions while at the 
same time leaving room for other issues and topics to emerge from the 
conversation. All interviews were recorded through note taking and some were 
audio recorded with the interviewees consent. When requested, quotes used from 
the personal interviews were sent back to interviewees to check their accuracy.  
A number of interviewees requested for their identity to be kept anonymous. 
Because of the secretive nature of pre-negotiation, I was particularly sensitive to 
these concerns. I made certain interviewees anonymous while still giving a sense 
of their role or position. Moreover, because of the potential risks to interviewees 
linked to the possible criminalisation of individuals in contact with proscribed 
entities, I was very careful to keep certain things said to me off the record and 
choose not to include them in this thesis. Where I could, I made referenced to 
material that was already in the public domain.  
The subject matter of this thesis is deeply intertwined with the methodology 
used. To understand the effects of proscription on pre-negotiations, it was 
essential to opt for an in-depth, qualitative case study approach based on field-
work that allowed for the careful assessment of different perspectives and was 
nuanced enough to manage the complexities of this project. The core of the thesis’ 
empirical chapters analyse the path to two rounds of negotiations between the 
Colombian government and the FARC either side of 9/11 using qualitative 
methods. To contextualise this work, we turn to a brief historical background on 
Colombia. 
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III. Background on Colombia 
This is by no means an attempt at an exhaustive historical account of the 
Colombian conflict. The objective of this section is merely to contextualize the 
three empirical chapters on the pre-negotiations between the Colombian 
government and the FARC.  
1. Complexity and the Colombian conflict 
There is no consensus on the nature and origin of the armed conflict (González 
2004).12 The conflict is complex and is broader than the war between the 
Colombian government and the FARC. It involves other left-wing armed groups13 
and took on an increasingly violent turn with the emergence of right-wing 
paramilitary groups which later merged under the umbrella United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) in the 1990s. 14 
Moreover, drug trafficking has made the war in Colombia more multifaceted, 
introducing new interests and actors, extending the space internationally by 
becoming a threat to global security (Medina Gallego 1999: 261).  
There is a well-established body of scholarly literature in Spanish focussing 
on the violence and the conflict in Colombia. These authors are known as the 
violentologos, Colombian historians and sociologists such as Germán Guzmán 
Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna (1962), Francisco Leal 
Buitrago (1999), Gonzalo Sánchez (2009), Marco Palacios (2006) and French 
sociologist Daniel Pécaut (1991, 2001, 2006, 2013) amongst others. There is also 
a body of work emerging on the subject of peace in Colombia. Robert A. Karl 
(2017) for example has recently foregrounded the idea of peace and how it 
emerged in Colombian history. While much of the work on peace processes has 																																																								
12 Indeed building one understanding of the conflict, apart for not being the focus of this thesis, would also 
be incredibly challenging. One interesting resource in this regard is the report produced by the Comisión 
Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas (2015). The Commission was tasked by the Colombian government 
and the FARC to “report on the origins and the multiple causes of the conflict, the main factors and 
conditions that have facilitated or contributed to its presence, and the most notorious effects and impacts 
of the population”(Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas 2015: 13). The Commission set-up in 
August 2014 was made up of twelve experts and two rapporteurs. Finding it impossible to agree on one 
common understanding of the conflict, they wrote twelve separate essays each sharing their perspectives 
on the root causes and development of the conflict in Colombia and its impact. 
13 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the FARC was one of a number of new, small guerrilla groups, 
including the National Liberation Army (ELN), founded in 1964, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), 
founded in 1967, and the M-19, founded in 1970. 
14 Paramilitary groups grew exponentially between 1997 and 2003. They received a “level of tolerance 
and support from wealthy sectors and the authorities” in Colombia and became a key part of the State’s 
fight against the guerrilla (Romero 2007:450-451). The paramilitaries were responsible for over 60% of 
massacres in Colombia (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013:48). In 2001 the number of massacres 
committed by paramilitaries exceeded 200 (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013). 
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looked at the national level (Édgar Téllez, Óscar Montes and Jorge Lesmes 2002; 
Camilo Gonzalez Posso 2004; Cristina Rojas and Judy Meltzer 2005; Marc 
Chernick 2007, 2012), some authors such as Mauricio García-Durán (2004, 2006), 
Virginia Bouvier (2009), Saramineto Santander (2011), Esperanza Hernández 
Delgado (2012) and Chris Mitchell and Cristina Rojas (2012) have also traced the 
mobilization of civil society across the country and their role in building peace in 
Colombia.  
While there is little consensus on the root causes of the conflict, there is 
more agreement on its negative consequences. Sixty years of protracted armed 
conflict have led to high levels of violence and a deep humanitarian crisis in 
Colombia – with the armed conflict started being described as a “war against 
society” (Pécaut 2001:288). According to the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013: 
20), between 1958 and 2012, 220,000 people died because of the armed conflict, 
over 80% of which were civilians (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013: 32). 
Colombia is also the scene to one of the biggest displacement crisis in world. 
Estimates range from 4.7 Million to 5.7 Million (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 
2013) people – roughly meaning that up to 15% of the Colombian population has 
been displaced. Of this displaced population, about one third is of African 
descent, more than half are women, and half are under the age of 15 (Bouvier 
2009).  
There have also been deep governance and democratic challenges leading 
some Colombian specialists to argue that “Colombia is a democracy without the 
people” (Pearce 1990: 207). Fernán Gonzalez and Silvia Otero (2011) developed 
the notion of ‘differentiated governance’ to explain some of the huge disparities 
and inequities found in the country. Contradictions in Colombia are striking. In 
parallel to the violent armed conflict, the country also has strong institutions and 
an incredibly progressive constitution, which emerged from previous peace 
negotiations in the 1990s. Colombia is deeply fragmented and while parts of the 
territory bear the brunt of the conflict, the rest has been able to continue 
modernizing (Pécaut 2008).  This understanding of Colombia as a place where 
‘order and violence’ (Palacios 2006) coexist is well established: “order and 
violence, stability and turbulence are not contradictory, but two sides of the same 
history” (Pécaut 2008: 16).  
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The principal division of conflict in Colombia are more closely related 
to class, rather than ethnicity, nation, or race. To a remarkable degree, 
the insurgency has represented a prolonged rural rebellion in a rapidly 
modernizing and urbanizing society. Second, to an unusual degree, 
Colombia’s conflict has become intertwined with the international 
narcotics trade. (Chernick 2007: 51) 
2. Background on the FARC 
The actual emergence of the FARC can be traced back to the period known as la 
Violencia (1948-1953), the war between the conservatives and liberals that flared 
following the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in April 1948. The FARC 
arose from a liberal self-defence group in Southern Tolima created by Antonio 
Marín, aka Manuel Marulanda, who would lead the FARC until his death in 2008. 
When both the conservatives and liberals chose General Rojas Pinilla as President 
of Colombia (1954-58) he declared an amnesty with the objective of disarming 
and demobilising guerrilla groups active during la Violencia. But the amnesty did 
not include the communists. The communist party was declared illegal in 1955 
and regions in which communists were supported were declared war zones 
(Pearce 1990). At a time when a number of left-wing armed groups emerged, the 
FARC were formed under the umbrella of the Colombian Communist party in 
1961 – the armed struggle was to be subordinated to a broader political strategy 
(Pearce 1990). The idea was to combine ‘all forms of struggle’ (Pécaut 2008). 
Though the FARC later broke away from the communist party, the armed group 
still defined its struggle as Marxist-Leninist, Bolivarian and communist, fighting 
for the rights of poor peasant-farmers (FARC-EP 2013). 
Though the FARC has been a highly hierarchical armed group, Manuel 
Marulanda led it with a collegial style of leadership. The decision-making body of 
the FARC is the Estado Major Central (EMC) composed of 25 members and 
especially the Secretariat (Secretariado), elected by the EMC, composed of seven 
members.  The National Conferences set the general orientation of the FARC. 
After its gruelling defeat in the battle of Marquetalia in 1964 the FARC moved 
from a defensive to an offensive guerrilla force. Between 1975 and 1982, the 
group went from having 5 to 24 fronts (Pécaut 2008). In 1982, during the 7th 
National Conference, the FARC decided to double its number of fronts and set its 
aim on ‘taking power’ (toma del poder). At the same time, the FARC added ‘EP’ 
to its name for ‘the people’s army’ (Ejercito del Pueblo). The FARC became the 
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FARC-EP and the class-based struggle was focussed on seizing power in 
Colombia (Saramiento Santander 2011). When the army in La Uribe, Meta, 
attacked the headquarters of the FARC in 1991, the armed group renounced its 
sedentary strategy, which had allowed them continuous contact with 
representatives of government and society (Pécaut 2008: 56).  
The FARC remained Colombia’s largest active left wing armed group, until 
their recent demobilization15, with an estimated 8,000 troops across seven regional 
armed blocs that each had five to fifteen fronts and 4,000 militias. Since 1985 
women have been recruited as regular fighters not just in support roles. Women 
represented roughly 40% of the armed group. The FARC was organised in 
battalions and had control of territory. In that sense, guerrilla and conventional 
warfare formed a big part of its armed strategies. But the FARC also used terrorist 
tactics such as hijacking planes, assassinations, bombing police stations and 
shopping malls, and is estimated to have kidnapped 8,578 Colombians and 
foreigners (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013: 67). 
The FARC’s funding came from internal sources, mainly through 
kidnapping, taxation and the control of the lower part of drugs trade (Chernick 
2007). Unlike some other armed groups, it never benefitted from financial support 
from an international diaspora. Income derived from illicit crops became the 
FARC’s principal source of funding (Arias et al. 2014:21-22) and made the armed 
group more autonomous as it no longer depended on its integration with rural 
communities (González 2004). This allowed the armed group to increase its 
recruitment and offensive capacities in the 1990s.  
 
3. Negotiating with the FARC 
As Vera Grabe, the co-founder of the M-19 movement which she led until 1990, 
said “No peace process can be understood in isolation, and in each process the 
previous ones appear: as light or as shadow.” (Grabe 2004: 38). So, to understand 
the background to the Caguán and Havana peace negotiations with the FARC, it is 
useful to also briefly sketch out previous attempts at negotiating with the armed 
group.  																																																								
15 The FARC do not use the term demobilization, they prefer seeing it as a political remobilization, 
Marcos Calarcá (Luis Alberto Albán Burbano), Member of the FARC negotiation team and International 
Secretariat, Personal interview, May 2015, Havana, Cuba. 
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Before the Caguán negotiation, there were two previous attempts at 
negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC that were significant. The first 
substantial effort to launch talks with the FARC happened in 1982, when 
President Betancur granted the armed group amnesty and offered to free political 
prisoners. As part of the peace negotiations, the FARC and the Colombian 
Communist Party created the Unión Patriótica (UP) political party in 1985. The 
UP achieved significant electoral success. But 3,000 members of the UP were 
killed in subsequent years, “victims of a systematic campaign of elimination at the 
hands of paramilitaries and the death squads, the objective of which was the 
annihilation of the UP as a political force” (Gonzales Posso 2004: 48). The FARC 
had at that stage not yet renounced the combination of all types of struggles and 
drew the conclusion from this episode that the only viable path was military 
(Pécaut 2008). The extermination of the UP was to cast a dark shadow over future 
peace negotiations.  
The next substantive peace talks took place in Caracas (1991) and Tlaxcala 
(1992), negotiations hosted by Venezuela and Mexico between the Gaviria 
administration (1990-1994) and the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordination Body 
(CGSB for its Spanish acronym). The CGSB was an umbrella organisation 
consisting of the FARC, the ELN and the EPL. While the CGSB struggled to 
develop a common agenda for negotiations, the government was more focussed 
on reaching an agreement with other guerrilla groups (M-19, PRT, and Quintín 
Lame) and forming a Constituent Assembly to develop the new Constitution. The 
government believed that a strategy that combined partial democratization through 
the Constituent Assembly and military pressure “would force the CGSB onto the 
defensive and oblige it to either seek reintegration or face marginalization” 
(Gonzales Posso 2004: 48). After the talks broke down, President Gaviria called 
for an integral war against the guerrillas. While the CGSB negotiations had a 
more positive effect on one sector of the ELN, known as the Socialist Renewal 
Current (Corriente de Renovación Socialista - CRS), which later signed a peace 
agreement with the government in 1994 (Grabe 2004). It had a more negative 
effect on the FARC. This failed negotiation experience with the CGSB pushed the 
armed group in the direction of opting for a military strategy. During its 8th 
National Conference in 1993 the group decided to reorganise its military structure 
to ensure they would have the capacity to overwhelm the army. The FARC during 
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the 1990s switched to an all-out war strategy, leaving politics aside until the 
Caguán negotiations.  
While the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations will form an important part of 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, it is also helpful to briefly understand how and why the 
negotiation itself failed as it cast a shadow over the Havana negotiations. Though 
the Caguán peace negotiations were formally launched on the 7th of January 1999 
the negotiations got bogged down in procedural discussions and were deeply 
affected by violent actions on all sides. Certain people closely involved with the 
process describe the negotiations themselves more like a process of pre-
negotiations. According to the former UNSG’s Special Envoy “The process 
became the substance and took endless amounts of time. (…) we never got 
beyond talks about talks right until the end”.16 But most importantly, during the 
Caguán, the armed conflict actually got worse while the negotiations were taking 
place (Egeland 2008) and military relations started shifting. As the FARC 
continued its slow numerical growth, the paramilitary groups achieved supremacy 
in important agricultural and strategic corridors for drugs and arms trafficking and 
the government security forces were able to modernize their equipment with new 
technology through the Plan Colombia with the United States (Gonzales Posso 
2004). There was a deep problem with the negotiations - both parties were playing 
politics and war at the same time. These violent interactions deeply eroded the 
legitimacy of the negotiations and deepened the war (González, Bolívar and 
Vásquez 2003).  
The FARC in particular lost a huge amount of credibility nationally. In sight 
of everybody, the armed group used the despeje, the demilitarised area that 
covered 42.000 km2 in five municipalities of the Caguán (Caquetá), as a rest and 
training ground. The armed group also used the zone for recruitment, kidnapping 
and to control drug production.17 Not only did the FARC recruit 4.000 combatants 
during the actual negotiation, they also promulgated a decree know as the “ley 
002” on 4 April 2000 to tax people whose patrimony exceeded 1 million US$. 
This infamous “ley 002” was seen by many as a generalised kidnapping threat 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013). People felt betrayed, the FARC 																																																								
16 Interview Jan Egeland (UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Colombia between 1999 and 2001), 
Oslo, Norway, 18 February 2015. 
17 Coca cultivation in the despeje went from 16.000 to 25.000 hectares during the Caguán negotiations 
(Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002: 376). 
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had shown no ‘will for peace’ (voluntad de paz) and had used the Caguán 
negotiations only to get more power and territory.  
Yet the FARC were not the only actor committing acts of violence during 
this period. As there was no cease-fire, both sides stepped-up armed actions. 
Similarly to the FARC, the Colombian government led a dual strategy. On the one 
hand negotiating with the FARC, and on the other investing heavily in 
modernising the military through Plan Colombia negotiated with the US 
government during that same period as President Pastrana (2013) himself 
admitted in his memoir. The approval of Plan Colombia in the middle of the 
negotiations, in mid-2000, increased the distance between the parties and affected 
the trust established (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013: 169). Some argue that 
the Pastrana government used the negotiation to legitimise its military strategy 
(Ferro and Uribe 2002). 
Moreover, the exponential growth of paramilitaries over the same period 
deepened the conflict and increased the levels of violence. The AUC went from 
4,000 to 8,000 fighters during the first three years of the Pastrana administration 
(Chernick 2007). Paramilitaries were the principal perpetrators of massacres. Of 
the 1.982 massacres committed between 1980 and 2012, the paramilitaries were 
responsible for 59%  (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013: 47). The number of 
massacres peaked during the Caguán negotiations. In 2001 for example, the 
number of massacres exceeded 200 (Rojas 2005).  
All armed actors committed acts of violence and the conflict itself steadily 
got worse during the Caguán negotiations. The key to the process became for each 
side to get out of the negotiation while convincing public opinion that the 
opponent had been the intransigent one (Ferro and Uribe 2002:162). In this 
regard, the government was more successful as the country blamed the FARC for 
the collapse of process. The particular abuses committed by the FARC in the 
demilitarised zone shocked the Colombian population deeply and were to set the 
stage for their extreme vilification. It also cast a long shadow over the Havana 
negotiations. 
President Uribe was elected on the back of this disappointment. During his 
campaign he had harshly criticised the FARC’s behaviour in the despeje. But, 
while some were expecting a full declaration of war in his inauguration speech, 
many were surprised when he asked for international mediation and the support of 
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the United Nations to reopen the possibility of dialogue.18 According to Édgar 
Téllez, Óscar Montes and Jorge Lesmes (2002: 380) the President’s speech was 
well received by “experts and public opinion”. This shows that while the FARC’s 
behaviour during the Caguán negotiation deeply affected the armed group’s 
standing politically, in the very early days of President Uribe’s administration the 
possibility of dialogue with the group had not completely disappeared before the 
terrorist framing really took hold.  
The three empirical chapters pick up the thread on the FARC from here. 
One last thing to highlight is the broad changes in the international environment 
since the FARC’s emergence.  
4. Evolving international understanding of the FARC 
There have been three, sometimes overlapping, international paradigms shaping 
the geopolitical space in which the Colombian conflict with the FARC has 
evolved and been understood (Bouvier 2009). Each of these have largely been 
influenced by the US.  
The first was the Cold War and approaches to counterinsurgency emerging 
in the 1950s. The fight against communism and counterinsurgency turned into the 
Alliance for Progress launched in 1961 by President John Kennedy. The Alliance 
for Progress was aimed at increasing the legitimacy of Latin American 
governments through the adoption of anti-poverty policies with the idea of 
preventing the spread of Communism (Fajardo 2003:2). The FARC, as the armed 
expression of the Colombian Communist Party, became a key focus in the US’ 
efforts at supporting the Colombian government’s counterinsurgency capacities. 
The second was the US war on drugs in 1980s in the Andean producer 
countries. From the mid-1980s, the US downplayed the social and political 
dimensions of the Colombian conflict and focussed on the narcotics element 
(Chernick 2007:69). It was the then American Ambassador to Bogotá, Lewis 
Tambs, who first coined the term ‘narco-guerilla’ to describe the FARC in 
1982 (Scott and Marshall 1991). Though experts derided the term (Scott and 
Marshall 1991), it was broadly employed in Washington to suggest that the 																																																								
18 “I have asked the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, for the good offices of the 
institution to seek useful dialogue through the cessation of hostilities to give relief to society. In this 
framework, we will explore humanitarian solutions, free hostages, that come from agreements that 
envisage definitive peace as something possible”, Uribe, Á., 2002, ‘Retomemos el lazo unificador de la 
ley, la autoridad democrática, la libertad y la justicia social’, Bogotá, 7 August. 
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guerrillas were major drug traffickers and that counterinsurgency and 
counternarcotics operations were one and the same thing (Vargas 1999). It 
became an important basis for the increasingly militarized US war on drugs and it 
is in this context that the US included the FARC in its list of designated terrorist 
organisations in 1997. 
The third was the war on terror post 9/11.  Following the World Trade 
Centre attacks on the 11 September 2001, the understanding of the Colombian 
conflict became subsumed in the global fight against terrorism. The designation of 
the FARC as a terrorist organisation in the US took on a sharper meaning as the 
funds geared towards counter-narcotics could now be channelled towards counter-
terrorism operations. It is also in this context that the FARC were included in 
2002 in the European Union list of persons, groups and entities involved in 
terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures. 
Two things are worth noting. One is that the first two paradigms, the Cold 
War and the War on Drugs, seem to have had little effect on the way the 
Colombian government itself typified the conflict or the FARC. This becomes 
apparent in Chapter 5 when the language and discourse of both parties is analysed. 
It only shifts noticeably post 9/11 with the advent of the terrorist label. Second, 
while all these shifts took place at the international level and the FARC has been 
characterised in different ways, the FARC’s actual demands have remained 
constant and focussed on land and political reform:  
despite the extraordinary change in the dynamics of the internal war 
and the profound changes in the geopolitical context – from cold war 
to drug war to war on terror – the grievances and demands of the 
guerrillas, particularly the FARC, have been remarkably consistent.  
(Chernick 2007:52)  
 
IV. Structure of the thesis 
To understand the effects of proscription on pre-negotiation, this thesis explores 
the existing literature and draws out useful ideas and approaches for the analysis, 
delves into the historical background to proscription and the details of different 
regimes, develops an analytical framework to study the effects of proscription, 
then applies it thematically to the two sub-cases of pre-negotiation with the 
FARC. Before concluding on the thesis’ contribution and future research 
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framework to the Colombian cases and assesses its applicability to other similar 
cases.  
Chapter 2 situates the thesis in the neighbouring scholarly literature. 
Drawing on sanctions, (critical) terrorism studies, constructivism and labelling, 
securitization and the peace and conflict literature, the chapter highlights key 
arguments, ideas and approaches that will be relevant to this investigation. The 
chapter also reviews the emerging literature on the effects of proscription on 
peacebuilding and peace processes and argues that this work has had a limited 
focus on third party actors.  It has so far failed to explore how proscription has 
affected the conflict parties themselves and the processes that lead them towards 
negotiations.  
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at international proscription. First it discusses 
the history of proscription, how it came about and developed. By exploring 
antecedent concepts and pre-conditions that led to the emergence of international 
proscription, the chapter argues that 9/11 is a critical juncture when it comes to the 
study of proscription. The chapter also includes an explanation of what 
proscription entails by describing the main current international proscription 
regimes. By highlighting its symbolic and material features, the chapter starts 
teasing out certain key elements for the study of proscription, which will be 
central to the analytical framework. 
Chapter 4 sets out an analytical framework to explore how the international 
listing of armed groups as ‘terrorists’ might affect the process through which 
conflict parties get to the negotiation table. After having described the possible 
material and symbolic effects of proscription, it turns to exploring how the 
different actors might be impacted. By mainly drawing on the peace and conflict 
literature, the chapter then turns to detailing the three key dynamics that are 
needed for conflict parties to start negotiating: 1) going from a position of 
vilification to de-vilification; 2) moving from a situation of asymmetry to 
establishing a perception of symmetry; 3) feeling a mutually hurting stalemate to 
envisioning a way out. Revisiting the key concepts in turn the chapter assesses 
how proscription might affect these central processes. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, are the empirical heart of the analysis. By taking each 
of these dynamics – vilification/devillification, asymmetry/symmetry, mutually 
hurting stalemate/way out - in turn, the chapters explore how these dynamics  play 
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out empirically in the two sub-cases. Looking at the pre-negotiation processes that 
led to the Caguán negotiation (1999-2002), in a pre-proscription era, allows us to 
analyse a ‘normal’ context. In contrast, the lead-up to the Havana negotiation 
(2012-2016) allows us to analyse a post-proscription context and how proscription 
affected these pre-negotiation dynamics. 
Chapter 8 brings together the analysis of the three empirical chapters by 
assessing the overall impact of proscription on the dynamics of getting to the table 
in the case of Colombia.  This chapter also explores how these findings resonate 
with another case study of initiating a peace process with a proscribed armed 
group, that of ETA in the Basque country. The chapter ends by assessing the 
strength of the analytical framework and its applicability to other (similar) cases.  
Chapter 9 concludes with a reflection on the contribution of this research 
and the implications for future research avenues as well as what this implies for 
policy and practice.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter started with the puzzle that despite the growing international trend of 
proscribing armed groups as ‘terrorists’ since 9/11, the phenomenon of peace 
negotiations with these groups shows no sign of abating. It also unpacked useful 
concepts for this research and laid out the research design and the case-selection 
process used.  
By not taking the ‘terrorist’ label at face value, this thesis proposes to 
explore and analyse the effects of proscription both at a symbolic and material 
level. By comparing the processes through which the Colombian government and 
the FARC got to the negotiation table in the Caguán and in Havana, and thereby 
treating the international proscription of the FARC as a critical juncture, this 
research hopes to uncover the effects of proscription on the way in which peace 
processes are initiated.  
The contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First it proposes an innovative 
framework for how to study the effect of proscription on the inception of peace 
processes, highlighting the central importance of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’. In 
doing so, it critically revisits and extends central dynamics of the pre-negotiation 
literature: vilification, symmetry and ripeness.  Second, it applies this framework 
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to the Colombian pre-negotiations with the FARC drawing on primary data from 
over fifty personal interviews with key actors involved in the negotiations and the 
qualitative discourse analysis of twenty years of statements by both conflict 
parties. Finally, it draws together insights from the framework and the case studies 
and their applicability to other, similar cases. 
This research is a first step toward understanding the effects of proscription 
on pre-negotiations. The findings that emerge are obviously provisional, as more 
case studies would need to be developed. Nonetheless, the analytical framework 
having been refined through the case of Colombia will then be reviewed through 
an initial exploration of the case of Euskadi ‘ta Askatasuna (ETA which roughly 
translates as ‘Basque Freedom’) in the Basque country allowing the analysis to 
generalise some of the findings to the broader class of peace negotiations with 
proscribed entities. The next chapter explores the existing literature in 
neighbouring scholarly work to situate the project and draw out ideas that will be 
relevant to this thesis. 
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Chapter	Two	
Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter laid out how the thesis would address the question of the 
effects of proscription on pre-negotiation: through a comparative case study of 
two pre-negotiations having taken place on either side of 9/11. Having identified 
the Colombian conflict with the FARC as its main case, Chapter 1 gave some 
background on Colombia. It also laid out the structure of thesis. While the 
previous chapter also drew on existing work to clarify key concepts used in the 
thesis, it did not delve into reviewing the existing literature. This is the focus of 
this chapter, the objective being to situate the thesis in scholarly debates. 
Analysis and discussion of the interplay between proscription and peace 
processes has mainly been produced within the practitioner realm (Helgesen 2007, 
Dudouet 2010, Dudouet 2011, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2011; Boon-Kuo et al. 
2015); it is only recently that it started receiving academic attention (Haspeslagh 
2013, Birkeland 2014, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015). However, there are a 
number of other strands of scholarly literature in neighbouring fields of work that 
are relevant for this study, such as sanctions, (critical) terrorism studies, 
constructivism and labelling, securitization and the peace and conflict literature. 
As will become evident, each has limitations when it comes to the study of the 
effects of proscription on peace processes. 
The chapter explores this existing literature to situate the thesis and draw 
out some of the arguments and approaches that will be useful to the investigation. 
The chapter reviews each strand of literature in turn. Starting with the work on 
sanctions, it then covers the full gamut from classical terrorism studies to critical 
terrorism studies, before exploring the realm of constructivism and the labelling 
literature. The chapter then turns to the concept of securitization before assessing 
to what extent the peace and conflict literature has engaged (or not) with the topic 
of proscription or related concepts. The chapter then explores the existing work on 
proscription regimes, particularly the nascent literature on proscription and 
peacebuilding before concluding. 
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I. Sanctions literature 
Proscription is a type of targeted sanction against non-state actors. There is an 
established body of scholarly work on the effects of sanctions which has 
developed in tandem with efforts at refining the sanctions ‘tool’ for the policy 
environment. The sanctions literature has moved from an initial critique of 
sanctions as too comprehensive highlighting the humanitarian cost of sanctions, to 
more focussed assessments of targeted sanctions regimes. The main focus has 
been on measuring the effectiveness of the ‘tool’ in terms of policy and 
behavioural change of the ‘target’ or ‘recipient’. Building on the work of 
Alexander George (1991) and coercive diplomacy literature, many of the 
arguments analyse the effectiveness of sanctions through a bargaining model. 
Sanctions is seen as a tool of persuasion by increasing the cost of defiance while 
offering benefits for cooperation, which translates into common parlance as the 
‘carrot and stick’ model (Wallensteen 2005).  
Even though proscription is very much a product of the 1990s ‘sanctions 
decade’ (Cortright and Lopez 2000), and the evolution towards more targeted 
sanctions, the sanctions literature does not address the impact of sanctions on non-
state actor targets nor does it consider the effects on peace process dynamics. The 
‘target’ being analysed is invariably the state. When the literature does turn its 
attention to assessing initiatives to counter terrorist financing, such as 
proscription, the focus remains on state actors. Moreover, the approach to listing 
is uncritical, it see it as invariably a good thing, which allowed the international 
community to coordinate efforts in the fight against terrorism finance. It measures 
success in terms of the multiplication of regimes by, for example, counting the 
numbers of regulations and laws that mushroomed post 9/11(Biersteker, Eckert 
and Romaniuk 2008). This lack of a critical approach is probably linked to the fact 
that this strand of literature has evolved hand in hand with the policy tool itself, 
which means that it is of limited value to this study. It fails to question the regime 
itself and evaluate the effects proscription has on state and non-state actors or 
peace processes. The one aspect where this literature has been slightly more 
critical is on the impact of listing on human rights and the rule of law, but here 
again it is done in an effort to adjust the tool, mainly to argue for reforms to the 
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UN proscription regime to ensure a clear and fair listing and de-listing process 
(Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk 2008, Bierstecker and Eckert 2009).  
Though this field of work is of limited value to assess the effects of 
proscription on peace processes, there are some findings that are worth salvaging 
for the purposes of this study. The central question addressed in the sanctions 
literature is whether or not sanctions work. The response from scholars has been 
“diverse, cautious, and qualified” (Cortright and Lopez 1995:7). While early 
scholarship on sanctions tended to focus on statistical generalisations of sanctions 
episodes (Institute for International Economics 1990) giving an overall success 
rate of 35 per cent, more recent scholarship is more nuanced in how to measure 
effectiveness. Instead of focussing on the primary objectives of sanctions, scholars 
argue that multiple objectives should be assessed even the most inexplicit ones. 
As Cortright and Lopez (1995:7) argue:  
Sanctions often serve multiple purposes, each of which needs to be 
assessed when calculating impact. The official or publicly declared 
purpose of sanctions, usually defined as a specific policy change in the 
targeted state, is often considered the primary goals. Yet other 
objectives can always be identified, among them establishing 
deterrence, demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents, 
and sending symbolic messages.  
 
More recently, scholars have summarized the objectives of sanctions as 
three-fold: 1) to coerce, 2) to constrain or 3) to signal and/or stigmatize the target 
(Giumelli 2009; Biersteker, Eckert and Tourinho 2016) in an effort to be more 
specific in their assessment of success or failure. Of relevance to this study, much 
of the literature concludes that, very often, the principal outcome of sanctions is 
symbolic, and is more about naming and shaming rather than about extracting 
direct behavioural changes or impeding activities  (Cortright and Lopez 2000, 
Cameron 2005, Eriksson 2009, Griffiths and Barnes 2008, Biersteker, Eckert and 
Tourinho 2016). But even when assessing the effects of signalling/stigmatizing, 
authors see the mere fact of an agreement by the international community to 
impose sanctions as a marker of success (Cortright and Lopez 2000). They pay 
little attention to understanding the actual effect of sanctions on the recipient and 
overlook what those targeted actually care about, need or perceive. This literature 
fails to analyse sanctions as a dynamic process. 
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Though this literature is limited for our purposes, it will be useful to bring 
forward a more nuanced understanding both of the objectives and the way in 
which one should measure the effectiveness of a type of sanction. The findings 
that sanctions have more symbolic effects rather than practically impeding 
activities or changing behaviour is relevant to the discussion on the possible 
effects of proscription which will be explored in the analytical framework. 
 
II. From classical terrorism studies to critical terrorism studies 
If the sanctions literature has focussed on the effect of sanctions on state actors, 
then orthodox or classical terrorism studies literature has mainly focussed on 
terrorism by non-state actors. An important focus of the work has been on 
defining and trying to understand the ‘terrorist’ threat (Schmidt and Youngman 
1988, Hoffman 2001, Hoffman 2006, Crenshaw 2011) or the demise of ‘terrorist 
organisations’ (Kurth Cronin 2008, 2009). Authors in this field approach terrorism 
from a state-centric perspective, the state being the ultimate entity to be secured. 
Much of the research has been driven by policy concerns with authors defending 
liberal democratic society and seeing their role as fire fighting and needing to 
combat terrorism (Brannan, Esler et al. 2001, Silke 2001). Though some authors 
(Silke 2005) have explored how the state’s reaction to terrorism could in itself be 
a potential driver of terrorist campaigns through a desire of revenge, the field of 
terrorism studies has been mainly concerned with the effects of terrorism and how 
to deal with it rather than exploring the effects of counter-terrorism policies such 
as proscription.  
Because of the state-centric focus of the work, the general approach is 
uncritical and scholars take the word ‘terrorist’ at face value (Jones and Smith 
2009) rendering this strand of work of little utility for our purposes. The methods 
and research approaches used are also questionable - there appears to be a dearth 
of primary research and fieldwork, which is compounded by the idea that 
researchers should not meet or talk to ‘terrorists’. In the 1980s, Schmid and 
Longman (1988) argued that most research in the field was not producing 
substantively new data or knowledge. Writing before 9/11, Silke (2001: 68-69) 
was of the view that “terrorism research is not in a healthy state. It exists on a diet 
of fast-food research, quick cheap ready-to-eat and nutritionally dubious”.  
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1. The critical turn 
Critical terrorism studies emerged as a reaction to the traditional terrorism field. 
As early as 1996, Zulaika and Douglas questioned the dominant discourses around 
terrorism that took centre stage in the United States following the World Trade 
Centre attack in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1996.  They 
underscored the narrative dimension of terrorism: “Once something that is called 
“terrorism” – no matter how loosely it is defined – becomes established in the 
public mind, “counterterrorism” is seemingly the only prudent course of actions.” 
(Zulaika and Douglas 1996: I Preface). Scholars who critiqued classical terrorism 
studies for the pro status-quo nature of much of its research and its lack of focus 
on historical and social context developed an alternative way of looking at 
terrorism. Critical terrorism studies take humans rather than states as its ultimate 
point of reference. One central tenet of this critical approach is to place terrorism 
in its context, thus inextricably linking the study of terrorist violence to counter-
terrorism violence (Toros and Gunning 2009).  
It allows for the analysis of proscription as a counter-terrorism tool. It also 
offers a way of looking at terrorism as conflict and thus at the tools of conflict 
resolution to investigate responses to terrorism violence (Toros and Telledis 
2013). Critical terrorism studies lend itself more easily to an overlap with peace 
and conflict studies. Indeed, Telledis and Toros (2015) argue convincingly that the 
study of terrorism should be resituated in the field of conflict and peace studies. 
As Toros notes, “conflicts involving terrorist violence need to be understood as 
conflicts rather than as a terrorist anomaly.” (Toros 2015:221) She goes on to 
point towards potentially productive avenues for further research and policy 
engagement notably around how the terrorist label may further entrench conflict 
and how it can be discursively avoided. This is exactly the space that this thesis is 
exploring.  
Unlike classical terrorism studies, critical terrorism questions the usage of 
the terrorist label. They argue that it is reductionist and potentially counter-
productive to define a movement by its terrorist acts. As Toros (2008: 422) 
convincingly argued, “Reducing a group or a movement to its terrorist acts, which 
often do not even represent the main activity of the group, limits the group’s 
possibilities of being anything but a ‘terrorist group’”. This goes to the heart of 
what this study is investigating: how particular ways of conceptualising 
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‘terrorism’ and the use of the ‘terrorist’ label serves to legitimise certain practices 
while delegitimising others. Scholars in this field have also analysed how 
terrorism discourses are used to discredit opposition groups and legitimise state 
policy (Gunning 2007) and even to justify a global campaign of counter-terrorism 
(Jackson 2005) and why the naming of a group as ‘terrorist’ can forestall 
nonviolent responses to terrorism (Toros 2008, 2012). Similarly, Kirkpatrick 
(2018a) looked at how processes of criminalisation and de-criminalisation have 
affected peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and South Africa. 
From the literature on terrorism, this study draws on the more critical 
approaches when it comes to defining and understanding terms such as ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘terrorist’ as was explained in Chapter 1. It also embraces the idea of having 
more linkages between the study of terrorism and the study of armed conflict and 
conflict resolution.  Though Toros’ work in particular is relevant, it has been more 
focussed on how and whether talking can transform terrorist violence and has not 
explained how the use of the terrorist label itself affected conflict transformation 
or peace processes which is the focus of this study. 
 
III. Constructivism and the labelling literature 
As we have seen with the critical turn in terrorism studies and the work of Toros, 
Gunning, Kirkpatrick and Jackson, a number of scholars have been reflecting on 
the effect of labelling and naming of ‘terrorists’. Similarly, the labelling literature 
builds on a constructivist understanding of terms and labels as socially 
constructed which shape reality (Bhatia 2005, Renner and Spencer 2012). These 
scholars argue that the application of the term ‘terrorist’ involves an “inherent 
notion of illegitimacy” (Renner and Spencer 2012:5). Terrorism is a social 
construction, the terrorist actor is a product of discourse and ascribing the 
‘terrorist’ label is not value free. Indeed, ‘terrorist’ is “a discursive label with 
normative implications” (Renner and Spencer 2012:7).   
The idea that the label can shape reality is important when it comes to 
proscription. Central to the labelling literature is the understanding that a name 
will place emphasis on certain characteristics while neglecting others and thus 
lead to a more limited set of responses. Already in 1991, Hicks explored how 
terrorism was described during the Reagan and Bush administrations in the United 
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States, what metaphors were used and how they then fundamentally structured 
subsequent US foreign policy in the Middle East in particular. One example Hicks 
points to is how the idea that we cannot negotiate with terrorists was used to deny 
the efficacy of that particular course of action. He concludes that:  
By emphasizing repression in its rhetoric, Reagan foreign policy 
makers placed themselves in a policy straightjacket. Rather than 
creating an atmosphere that facilitated a 'strong, flexible' response to 
dissident terrorism, this policy advocacy actually inhibited the range 
of potential responses at the administration's disposal, and in the 
process encouraged the appearance of incoherence and disorganization 
which challenged the credibility of America's self-appointed role as 
leader in the 'war' against terrorism. (Hicks 1991: 29) 
 
Though there has been little academic work on the effects of proscription on 
peace processes per se, one area that has received some attention in a special issue 
of Third World Quarterly of 2005 is the politics of naming in armed conflict. As 
Bhatia (2005) wrote in his introductory article of the issue, discourse is “a tool for 
armed movements and a battleground and contested space in contemporary 
conflicts”. Bhatia (2005) argued that the politics of naming the opponent has two 
primary functions: 1) to recruit supporters; and 2) to justify action. He went on to 
argue that since the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror became the new dominant 
framework transplanted on local conflicts. Similarly to the Cold War before, the 
war on terror led to local variations and contexts to be understated compared to 
one big meta-narrative.  
Two articles in the special issue, one on Sri Lanka and one on Chechnya, 
look at how naming affected attempts at political reconciliation and peace 
negotiations to a certain degree. On Russia, Russell (2005) focused more on 
explaining the evolution of the labelling of the Chechen conflict and how 
President Putin was able to subsume the Chechen insurgents as a threat in the 
broader war on terror post 9/11. He went on to argue that the demonisation of the 
Chechens had become a major obstacle to reaching a political solution because it 
excluded all moderate forces.  
On Sri Lanka, Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah (2005) explored how the 
international and national rhetoric on terrorism affected the conflict with the 
LTTE. They argued that the rhetoric of terrorism had: 
(T)hree distinct benefits for the Sri Lankan state: it de-legitimised 
(Tamil) agitation for political independence (with which terrorism has 
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been conflated) thereby enabling the ‘securitisation’ of the issue; it 
mobilised Sinhala sympathy for the regime and its actions; and, 
international criticism of rights abuses notwithstanding, accomplished 
the same abroad. (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005:91).  
 
They concluded that the terrorist labelling had important discursive impacts and 
became a serious impediment to reaching a political solution, by masking the 
broader questions at the heart of the conflict, and delegitimising the Tamil 
political project. In a later article on Sri Lanka, Nadarajah (2018: 283) argued that 
terrorism proscription is “first and foremost an intervention for preferred (i.e. 
liberal) outcomes to violent political contestation in distant spaces.” 
From this literature on labelling, it will be useful to bring forward this 
understanding that a name or label can shape action particularly when assessing 
the more symbolic effects of proscription. But, it is limited for our purposes 
because it stays focussed on the symbolic effects of labelling and does not 
consider proscription or its possible material consequences. Moreover, this 
literature does not offer an explanation of how labels lead to certain actions or 
non-actions.  
 
IV. Securitization literature 
The concept of securitization refers to the process of presenting an issue in 
security terms. The Copenhagen school has done much to develop an 
understanding of how security is socially constructed (Buzan et al., 1998: 31) – 
seeing security as a “speech act” (Waever 1995:55). As Buzan and Hansen 
(2009:214) argue, “Security has a particular discursive and political force and is a 
concept that does something – securitise – rather than an objective (or subjective) 
condition.” The securitization of an issue or object is the “move” that takes it 
beyond politics: ““Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established 
rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as 
above politics.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23) It can no longer be debated as a political 
question, the “issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” 
(Buzan et al 1998:24).  
Securitization is mainly preoccupied with explaining the constitutive side of 
the story i.e. how and why an issue is framed in security terms. For example, 
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Corey Robinson’s (2017) article on the Sun Sea, a Thai cargo ship carrying Sri 
Lankan asylum-seekers, successfully explains the process through which irregular 
migration was securitized in Canada. Similarly, and closer to the topic at hand, 
Buzan (2006) explored the war on terror as an example of ‘macrosecuritisation’. 
He argued that the securitization move worked because  “It has been successfully 
tied in to some pre-existing securitizations and has achieved a broad acceptance 
within international society.” (Buzan 2006: 1106) So, while this approach can 
help shine a light on how the war on terror became accepted internationally, it 
does not help to explain the effect of this re-framing which is the focus of this 
thesis.  
This literature has not looked at securitization in the context of peace 
processes nor has it explored the issue of proscription as a securitization move per 
se. However, one author that has explored the nexus between security and listings 
more broadly is de Goede (2012). She convincingly traced the securitization of 
terrorist finance by explaining “how the financial domain became one of the war 
on terror’s prime avenues for banal pre-empting.”(de Goede 2012: XXV). Though 
her work remained centred on the constitutive questions of terrorist finance, there 
are some relevant findings on the securitization of charitable donations for 
example that can be of use to this study. She argued that “the post 9/11 pursuit of 
charities in effect amounts to a new governing of transnational spaces of 
donations and political affiliations.” (de Goede 2012:27) By exploring the cases of 
the Holy Land Foundation and Interpal, two Muslim charities investigated for 
providing material support to listed organisations, she showed that this 
securitization goes beyond the issue of money to include political affiliation and 
what types of political discourse are deemed acceptable or not.  
Other strands of de Goede’s work also highlight the productive power of 
lists – i.e. how they in effect materialise and organise the categories they set 
themselves out to describe (de Goede and Sullivan 2016) and the importance of 
the symbolic nature of blacklisting – describing asset freeze as a type of modern-
day exile (de Goede 2012). While this strand of work offers helpful insights in 
terms of the possible symbolic and productive effects of lists, it has focussed on 
its individual impact – i.e. on the cases of individuals listed such as the Mr. 
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Nada19 or Mr. Kadi20 not on the case of armed groups or on dynamics related to 
peace processes. Indeed, though Buzan et al wrote in 1998 that international 
security is a relational matter, there is little in securitization theory that helps 
illuminate the relational dynamics between actors.21  
Securitization as an approach is relatively one-sided and focussed on 
understanding how one actor or an issue is securitized or de-securitized. It does 
not look at the relationship between these actors or how this evolves. Because the 
relationship between conflict parties is what lies at the heart of peace processes, 
securitization as a lens is of limited use to this study, though certain insights from 
de Goede’s work in particular can be brought forward to understand the potential 
symbolic effects of lists.  
 
V. Peace and conflict literature 
The argument in this thesis is grounded in an analysis of the effects of listing 
armed groups as ‘terrorists’ on peace processes in the peace and conflict literature. 
While this literature will be covered in detail in Chapter 3 as it forms the heart of 
the analytical framework, the following section briefly highlights the way in 
which the peace and conflict literature has engaged (or not) with the topic of 
proscription, terrorism labelling and with similar concepts. 
1. Negotiating with ‘terrorists’ 
One branch of the peace and conflict literature, working within a conflict 
management and negotiation perspective, explored tactics for dealing with 
‘terrorist organisations’ (Zartman 2003, Goerzig 2010, Zartman and Alfredson 																																																								
19 Youssef Nada lived in an Italian enclave in Switzerland. Nada and the Al Tawaqwa Islamic Investment 
Bank he was heading were initially listed by the US, then placed on the 1267 UN Al Qaeda and Taliban 
list in 2001 and therefore subject to an asset freeze, and travel ban, which made it effectively impossible 
for him to leave his 1.6 km2 enclave of Campione as Switzerland was obliged to deny him entrance. The 
European Court of Human Rights found the situation in violation of his right to private and family life, 
enshrined in article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (Nada v Switzerland 12 September 2012). 
20 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation had been added to the US Treasury 
department OFAC list in 2001, and shortly after that by the UN 1267 sanctions committee as associated 
with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Kadi and Al Barakaat were then also designated by the EU, since the EU 
directly implements the UN’s consolidated list.  Kadi and Al Barakaat filed a legal challenge at the EU 
level saying their fundamental rights were being infringed, “in particular the right to a fair hearing and the 
right to property” (Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission 2008). 
21 Indeed, Huysmans (1998), in a helpful early overview of five seminal texts of the Copenhagen school, 
points out that the approach initially tried to straddle boundaries between security studies and peace 
research but the peace research element was moved to the background in the early 1990s to focus on 
security. 
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2010, Höglund 2011, Zartman and Faure 2011). This literature tried to make the 
distinction between what it saw as ‘absolute terrorists’ - for whom the terrorist act 
is an end in itself and with whom negotiations are impossible - versus ‘contingent 
terrorists’ or ‘engageable’ terrorist – for whom the act is a means to an immediate 
goal (Zartman 2003; Zartman and Faure 2011). Scholars and policymakers have 
found this sub-categorization into ‘types’ of terrorists useful, particularly in 
understanding the ‘tactical question’, i.e. why or when does a government decide 
to negotiate with ‘terrorists’ and vice-versa (Zartman and Alfredson 2010). 
However, this strand of work still used the ‘terrorist’ label to describe armed 
groups unquestioningly. Similarly, Goerzig’s (2010) work on the contagion effect 
and whether engaging ‘terrorist’ groups only serves to reward other ‘terrorists’ 
very self-consciously chooses to use the terrorist vocabulary arguing that it is 
necessary to do so in order not to ghettoise her research – otherwise, she argued, it 
risked remaining unnoticed by terrorism scholars.  
The difficulty with this body of literature is that it takes the ‘terrorist’ label 
at face value without questioning how the label itself affects efforts at engagement 
and is thus of limited value to this analysis. 
 
2. From spoilers to ‘terrorists’ 
One concept from the peace and conflict literature, which has potential relevance 
as a parallel concept to proscription, is that of ‘spoiler’ developed by Stedman 
(1997).   In his seminal article Stedman defined spoilers as factions or leaders who 
are willing to use violence to end a peace process they see as opposed to their 
interests. 
The concept itself is of limited usefulness to this research but the debates 
around the effects of the spoiler label offer some useful insights. Zahar who has 
helped add nuance to these debates warned against the "danger of demonizing 
certain types of actors dubbed extremists and therefore excluded from the political 
processes surrounding peacekeeping and peacebuilding" (Zahar 2003: 268). Zahar 
argued that the spoiler concept should be able to account for the possible 
transformation and change in tactics of actors depending on the opportunities 
offered by a peace process (Zahar 2003). Her rational being that actor's propensity 
to use violence depends on their capability and their opportunity structure.  
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Since 9/11 and the onset of the ‘war on terror’ insurgents and other non-
state actors are more likely to be labelled ‘terrorists’ rather than ‘spoilers’ 
according to Newman and Richmond (2006). There has been little dialogue 
between the peace and conflict literature and discussions on terrorism apart from 
recent efforts by some critical terrorist scholars and post-liberal peace theorists 
(Toros and Telledis 2013; Toros and Telledis 2015; Richmond 2003; Richmond 
and Franks 2009; Franks 2009; Richmond and Tellidis 2012). These fields of 
study have very different ontological and epistemological approaches to studying 
violence by non-state armed groups.  The authors who critique the liberal 
peacebuilding model argue that liberal peace rests on “the exclusion of terrorist 
actors as well as perceived ‘non-liberal’ actors, at least until they renounce 
violence” (Richmond and Tellidis 2012). Drawing for example on the 
international community’s refusal to accept Hamas’ election results in 2006, they 
show the liberal peace’s inability to engage in dialogue with actors seen as 
unacceptable. They further contend that states’ readiness to equate whole 
communities with ‘terrorists’ made the realisation of liberal peace even more 
remote. By neglecting the root causes of conflict, orthodox understanding of 
terrorism leads to an understanding of peace-as-security as opposed to peace-as-
social-justice according to Richmond and Telledis (2012).  
Richmond and Franks (2009: 214) looked at the interaction between 
orthodox terrorism discourse and the establishment of ‘liberal peace’: “Liberal 
peacebuilding and formal peace processes co-exist with terrorism and political 
violence: both impede and also influence each other”.  They found that conflicts 
where orthodox terrorism discourse was being deployed to explain violence 
tended to be those where there was little interest in dealing with the root causes of 
the armed conflict (Richmond and Franks 2009). Terrorism language was being 
used as a pejorative term by hegemonic states to legitimate the use of state 
violence and avoid negotiations and compromise with non-state armed actors. 
Looking at five cases studies (Sri Lanka, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Kashmir, 
Nepal, and Northern Ireland) they concluded that Northern Ireland is the only case 
that illustrated a clear shift away from orthodox terrorism and securitised 
discourse and where an alternative discourse about peace was able to emerge and 
later dominate. In a major oversight, the authors do not reflect on the fact that 
Northern Ireland is the only case study they explore in which the peace 
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negotiation, which led to the Good Friday Agreement, took place pre-9/11. In 
doing so, the authors miss an opportunity to asses whether this change in the 
global environment and the shift in what it meant to be branded a terrorist post 
9/11 is actually what led the other cases to remain stuck in orthodox terrorism 
discourses. 
This literature points out that the ‘terrorist’ label erects barriers for peace 
processes and closes important channels of communication but it does not explain 
how it does it, nor does it explain how and why governments still negotiate with 
armed groups that have been labelled ‘terrorists’ which is what this thesis is 
exploring.  
 
VI. Proscription Regimes  
As Jarvis and Legrand (2016, 2018), de Goede (2018) and Kirkpatrick (2018b) 
noted, proscription as a counter-terrorism measure has been neglected in the 
scholarly literature. The limited work that has explored this phenomenon has 
mainly focussed on the constitutive questions regarding proscription (Jarvis and 
Legrand 2016, 2017, 2018, Kirkpatrick 2018b).  In the context of the United 
Kingdom Jarvis and Legrand (2016) show how proscription served instrumental, 
cooperative and symbolic functions.  In an analysis of Parliamentary Questions on 
the issue of adding groups to international proscription lists, Jarvis and Legrand 
(2017) show how audience can shape security policy. More recently, Jarvis and 
Legrand (2018) edited a special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence 
focussed on proscription at a global level, which helpfully compares and contrasts 
some of the main proscription regimes and their emergence, construction and 
some of their consequences. In that special issue for example, Bourne (2018) used 
securitization theory to explain how the proscription of ETA as a terrorist 
organisation was extended to social and political organisations that operate in the 
same political spheres as ETA, known as the Izquierda Abrazale. This strand of 
literature is mainly interested in exploring and critiquing why and how 
proscription regimes are developed which is not the focus of this research. 
Of more relevance is the work by human rights and humanitarian activists 
and researchers, lawyers and peace practitioners who have been the most prolific 
on the effects of proscription to date. There has been work on assessing the impact 
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of counter-terrorism legislation more broadly and proscription more specifically 
on human rights (Bowring 2010; Sullivan and Hayes 2010), on self-determination 
movements and migrated diaspora  (Sentas 2014), on the justice for stateless and 
other dispossessed peoples (Sentas 2018). There has been quite a bit of work on 
the effects of proscription on humanitarian actors (Pantuliano et al. 2011) and on 
the space for civil society to operate (Howell 2006, Cortright et al 2011). Authors 
find that counter-terrorism provisions such as proscription can criminalise 
humanitarian action and undermine humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. This strand of work received some media and policy attention in the 
wake of the 2011 famine in Somalia and the realisation that the US proscription 
regime, particularly its material support clause, which will be detailed in Chapter 
3, was affecting the flow of aid reaching southern Somalia and the populations 
under the control of Al-Shabab, a proscribed armed group. 
 
1. Proscription and Peacebuilding 
Of more direct relevance to this thesis is the developing literature on the effect of 
proscription on peacebuilding and peace processes.  This was initially explored by 
individuals or organisations directly involved in third party mediation or 
peacebuilding with proscribed organisations (Ricigliano 2005, Philipson 2005, 
Helgesen 2007, Santos 2010, Dudouet 2010, Dudouet 2011, Haspeslagh and 
Dudouet 2011, Gross 2011, Haspeslagh 2013, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015, 
Dumasy and Haspeslagh 2016), or political activists close to listed groups 
(Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015). These studies have tended to be workshop reports or 
articles focused on a number of case studies (Maoists in Nepal, LTTE in Sri 
Lanka, IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque country, MILF in the 
Philippines). They all highlighted the significant negative effects that proscription 
appears to have on the dynamics of peace processes and armed groups.  
Helgesen wrote in 2007 from the perspective of a practitioner as a former 
Norwegian deputy minister for foreign affairs (2001-2005). He was responsible 
for the government’s ‘peace diplomacy’ including Norway’s involvement at the 
time in mediation between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.  Helgesen 
sees deep problems with how terrorism expressed in national contexts has been 
subsumed within global terrorist networks and argues that the practice of terrorist 
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listing disabled European Union member states from playing active roles in 
certain conflict resolution processes. In the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka for 
example, he argued that the international community’s lack of contact with the 
LTTE, particularly with the group’s leadership, led to a range of miscalculations 
on the part of the armed group. 
Similarly, in a series of workshop reports and policy briefs produced 
between 2009 – 2011 (Dudouet 2010, Chatham House and Conciliation Resources 
2010, Dudouet and Haspeslagh 2011) a number of peacebuilding organisations, 
notably Conciliation Resources, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Berghof 
Foundation, and the United States Institute for Peace explored how the US, UK 
and EU proscription regimes were affecting third party mediation in peace 
processes. They all pointed towards the negative impact of proscription on efforts 
by peacebuilding organisations, but the analysis was anecdotal rather than 
systematic and was not grounded in a theoretical approach.  
From a more legal perspective on the impact of the US proscription regime, 
Bialostozky (2011) highlighted the legal uncertainties faced by organisations 
having contacts with listed entities. Gross (2011) explored the challenges around 
the listing of the Maoists in Nepal. He argued that following the proscription of 
the Maoists by the US in 2003 “the terrorist label became the primary lens 
through which the US perceived the conflict in Nepal and intervened to mitigate 
its effects.” (Gross 2011:44) He went on to argue that the lack of contact and 
connections with mid-ranking Maoist cadres affected the possibility of the US 
wielding any influence on the process. However, neither Bialostozky nor Gross 
developed a specific framework for analyzing the effects of proscription. 
Several more recent articles have delved a bit deeper into the subject matter. 
One was my own analysis from a conflict practitioner perspective (Haspeslagh 
2013). The article offered an analytical framework for assessing the effects of 
proscription on third party actors by clarifying the key roles they play, namely 
understanding armed groups, influencing how the group sees itself, affecting the 
group’s strategic calculations and organising training in conflict resolution and 
negotiation. It also assessed how proscription influenced access and trust as two 
pre-conditions for third party actors to play these roles. By using this framework 
on a series of short cases ranging from engagement with Hamas to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan the article  
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[M]ade apparent that the listing of armed groups as terrorist 
organisations has narrowed the possibilities for third parties to 
effectively understand groups, influence them, affect their strategic 
calculations and train them in conflict resolution. (Haspeslagh 
2013:17) 
 
This framework was later used by Birkeland (2014) in his Masters thesis on 
the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. He found that the listing of the LTTE hindered 
the work of third party actors:  
The proscriptions prevented contact between crucial actors such as the 
US and the EU to the LTTE, in addition to decreasing the levels of 
trust in the process. This reduced the ability of the third-party actors to 
affect the strategic calculations of the LTTE and move the group away 
from using violent means. The proscriptions thus seem to have had a 
negative effect on the framework for the peace process. (Birkeland 
2014:5) 
 
A chapter I co-authored with Véronique Dudouet in 2015 continued to 
explore the effects of proscription on peace practitioners. It looked at how the 
terrorism and counter-terrorism framework affected the work of conflict 
resolution practitioners in Colombia and the Basque country and was part of a 
broader project exploring the interaction between the study of critical terrorism 
and conflict and peace (Telledis and Toros 2015).  The chapter highlighted the 
intense polarisation that follows proscription and the stigma attached to the whole 
political social community associated with listed groups (Haspeslagh & Dudouet 
2015). It explored the particular challenges faced by insider mediators, or those 
actors that are closely associated to an armed group and often play and important 
role in coaxing armed groups to embrace non-violent paths (Haspeslagh & 
Dudouet 2015).  
In a report funded by the Berghof Foundation, Boon-Kuo, Hayes, Sentas 
and Sullivan (2015) took a systematic look at the impact of proscription on 
peacebuilding actors in three cases: Somalia, Turkey and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. The focus of the analysis remained on third party peacebuilding. They 
argued that the impact of listing is not just a question of unintended consequences 
but that it is in fact an essential feature of the international counter-terrorism 
framework which aims to disrupt and undermine “core elements of emancipatory 
peacebuilding work” (Hayes et al. 2015:3). The authors raise important questions 
on how proscription is transforming the nature of existing armed conflicts but also 
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how it has been changing operational practice and strategies of peacebuilding 
organization: “terrorist designation shapes the kind of peacebuilding possible” 
(Hayes et al. 2015:44). 
This thesis builds on this emerging body of work.  However, it will go 
beyond its limited focus on third party actors to also explore how proscription has 
affected the conflict parties themselves and the processes that lead them towards 
negotiations. It will also fill a scholarly gap by developing a theoretical 
framework grounded in academic work to assess the effect of proscription on the 
initiation of peace negotiations.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of proscription has been neglected in academic literature. While there is 
some work that has emerged looking at the constitutive side of the question to 
understand how terrorist lists emerge, little has been done to understand the 
productive effects of these lists. On the specific issue of how proscription 
influences peace processes there has been some work by peace practitioners that 
pointed to the difficulties it created in terms of engaging with proscribed armed 
groups. It is only very recently that the subject has been explored academically in 
the peace and conflict literature and, so far, it has been uniquely focussed on 
assessing the impact on third party and peacebuilding actors.  
Neighbouring strands of literature have limitations when it comes to the 
study of proscription, but some of their findings are helpful for this study. One of 
these is that the possible impact of proscription might be above all symbolic. The 
sanctions, the constructivist and the labelling literature come to the conclusion 
that it is the symbolic effects of the label or the sanction that is the most 
pronounced. Similarly, one securitization author, Marieke de Goede (2012), also 
highlighted the deeply symbolic power of lists as a type of modern day exile. This 
will be explored in the analytical framework alongside the material effects of 
proscription. 
While there is a strand of the peace and conflict literature which uses the 
‘terrorist’ label unhesitatingly, this thesis draws from insights of the critical 
terrorism literature instead. This strand of work placed the study of terrorism and 
the ‘terrorist’ label in the context of the conflict and peace literature, this allows 
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for an analysis of both conflict actors and their relationship and interaction. 
Building on the work of Harmonie Toros (2008, 2012) who argued that the 
terrorist framing forestalls non-violent approaches, this thesis adds to this work by 
explaining how this happens. It also sheds light on how negotiations do still take 
place with groups considered ‘terrorists’. The concept of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’, 
which will be developed in the analytical framework, helps explain how these 
challenges are overcome. But, before moving on to the analytical framework, the 
next chapter contextualises the study of proscription by giving background on this 
phenomenon, explaining its emergence, antecedent concepts, and main features. 
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Chapter	Three	
International Proscription 
 
Introduction  
Though international proscription regimes are a recent phenomenon, it is 
important to understand their genesis, how they emerged and what they entail 
before we turn to studying their effects on peace processes. As Chapter 2 made 
apparent, little has been written about proscription so far. Though there is plethora 
of work tracing the history of terrorism, a historical review of international 
proscription does not exist.22 The aim of this chapter is to address this gap and 
contextualise the study of international proscription on peace processes. How is it 
that a whole class of armed groups has been categorised and listed as ‘terrorists’ 
internationally? Did it not happen before 9/11? Are all proscription regimes the 
same? What does being on these lists actually entail? To address these questions, 
the chapter will explore the background to proscription’s emergence, bringing to 
light the antecedent concepts and pre-conditions that allowed the concept to take 
hold and spread. It will also describe the main proscription regimes and compare 
their similarities and differences.  
The development of proscription regimes has been event-led. In cases where 
states have been victim of terrorist attacks on their own soil, proscription has 
become an important tool for governments that need to be seen to be doing 
something in response to the public outrage. This was the case of the UK in 1974 
following the IRA pub bombings, which led the government to establish its first 
proscription regime a few weeks later, and of the US following the 11 September 
attacks. But the extent to which countries such as the US have been able to 
influence others to take on their own proscription agenda has been deeply affected 
by broader geo-political dynamics.  It was limited during the Cold War because 
many countries wanted to protect the rights of national liberation movements, and 
there was another global power that could balance US hegemony.  
The chapter argues that 9/11 was a turning point for the emergence of 
international proscription and should thus be considered a critical juncture for the 																																																								
22 For an example of a historical contextualization of a national proscription regime, see Kirkpatrick’s 
(2018b) excellent genealogical analysis of the discursive roots of proscription in Northern Ireland. 
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study of the phenomenon. 9/11 gave the US unprecedented legitimacy to call for 
global action. The key result was the passing of UNSC Resolution 1373, a sea 
change that set proscription regimes against non-state actors at the heart of the 
multilateral agenda. It was the first time Article 51 of Chapter VII on the right to 
self-defence23 was invoked in the context on an attack by a non-state armed group. 
Moreover, because the Resolution did not make reference to 9/11 or any 
geographic region, it was the first binding resolution addressing ‘international 
terrorism’ as a global phenomenon. By decentralising the definition of what 
terrorism is and who should be considered a ‘terrorist’ and encouraging all 
member states to setup their own proscription regimes, UNSC Resolution 1373 
allowed for the multiplication of international proscription regimes at a regional 
and national level. Conflicts between governments and armed groups around the 
globe have been re-framed as wars against ‘terrorists’.  
Though the objective of the chapter is not to be a comprehensive history of 
terrorism, the history of proscription regimes is closely intertwined with evolving 
concepts of terrorism and who should be considered a ‘terrorist’. The first section 
of this chapter follows a broadly chronological order but has grouped together 
events to highlight key trends and patterns to trace the emergence of proscription 
as a type of counter-terrorism measure. The second section of this chapter lays out 
the key features of the main international proscription regimes and explores their 
similarities and differences. 
 
I. A potted history of international proscription regimes 
It is often believed that international proscription regimes only came about in the 
context of what under U.S. President George W Bush became known as the 
‘global war on terror’. Though it is true that they spread significantly after 9/11, 
they built on existing national and international experiences and frameworks for 
dealing with non-state violence in the 20th century. 
 																																																								
23 Article 5, Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations (1945) says: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
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1. Anarchists and propaganda by deed 
The emergence of non-state terrorism24 is generally dated back to the second half 
of the 19th century and early 20th century, when a generation of anarchic 
subversives emerged following the failure of popular revolts across Europe in 
1848 (Gearty 1991). It was closely intertwined with the creation of the modern 
state. What was to be known as ‘propaganda by deed’ or anarchist terrorism 
became a European-wide, and then an international, phenomenon in the late 
nineteenth Century: “Anarchist assassinations and bomb-throwings occurred in 
sixteen countries on three continents: in Europe, Australia, and North and South 
America.” (Jensens 2009: 90). Attacks were widespread - between 1894 and 1912 
seven heads of state and monarchs, in Europe, Russia, and America, were 
assassinated by anarchists or former anarchists (Jensens 2009).  The anarchists 
also resorted to more indiscriminate acts of terrorism such as bombings in public 
spaces, including the bombing of a restaurant in Paris in 1892 or the Royal 
Observatory in Greenwich Park two years later.  
When the violence was at its most convulsive in the 1880s and 1890s, states 
began to pass anti-anarchist legislation. Thirteen countries for instance passed 
legislation against ‘propaganda by deed’, which included criminalising 
membership of anarchist associations and prohibiting public support for anarchists 
and incitement to commit anarchic acts (Jensen 2009). These laws set an early 
precedent for national proscription regimes, though states did not establish lists of 
banned anarchic groups. Instead they labelled as ‘anarchist’ whomever threw a 
bomb or assassinated a prominent person. It was the act that was criminalised, not 
the actor. 
States dealing with anarchism in this period also started to look to each 
other for cooperation and support in a way that foreshadowed international 
proscription dynamics. The 1898 International Anti-Anarchist Conference in 
Rome was the first attempt by states to coordinate law and policy to combat this 
type of violence (Romaniuk 2010). The focus was on making it harder materially 
for anarchists to pursue their strategies. They discussed prohibiting and punishing 
the use of explosives for ‘illegitimate purposes’ and membership of anarchist 																																																								
24 Historically, state actors carried out the largest-scale terrorizing violence. The word emerged in the 
eighteenth century to describe the ‘Reign of Terror’ under the National Convention led by Maximilien 
Robespierre and the Jacobins in France. The word “terreur” means fear in French. Today, terrorism is 
largely associated with non-governmental sub-state agents (Richard English 2009: 7). 
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associations. Significantly, they agreed that these types of acts should be treated 
as non-political crimes, meaning that anarchists would be subject to extradition 
agreements (Romaniuk 2010). By excluding a political defence for anarchists, 
states were trying to limit the possibility of them seeking refuge or political 
asylum in neighbouring countries. States feeling threatened by violence they 
considered illegitimate began a practice of quid pro quo to root out unwanted 
dissidents (Jensens 2009).  
While certain states were trying to symbolically de-legitimise anarchists as 
criminals who could not be protected by the political defence when it came to 
extradition, a number of countries with a tradition of giving refuge to political 
opposition figures, in particular Belgium, Britain and Switzerland, ended up 
refusing to extradite suspected anarchists or to renounce their right to grant 
asylum (The Economist 2005). But, the idea of terrorism being considered an 
extraditable offence returned in the League of Nations discussions on defining 
terrorism in 1937. Though the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism and its definition never entered into force, it is noteworthy that it 
specified terrorism could be considered ‘non-political’ and therefore extraditable 
(Romaniuk 2010). The efforts made by states to cooperate at an international level 
to deal with what were seen as anarchist or terrorist threats was mainly centred on 
getting consensus on the non-political nature of this type of violence, so that 
individuals using these methods and attacking states would not be granted 
‘political’ privileges by other nations. At a national level, the idea of criminalising 
the act of membership of a group or the incitement of public support for a group’s 
cause gained ground and would later become central tenets of national 
proscription regimes. 
2. National liberation struggles and the turn to terror tactics 
Following the Second World War, the decolonisation wars of the 1950s led to a 
number of successful national liberation campaigns in countries including in 
Aden, Angola, Cyprus, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique and Oman. Most 
liberation movements were initially guerrilla movements focussed on armed 
struggles in the countryside. At a global level, the rights of these national 
liberation struggles were established in international law through the 1960 UN 
General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
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Countries and Peoples. This ensured that most liberation movements ended up 
succeeding in their political aspirations.  
The more intractable conflicts were in places like Algeria, Northern Ireland, 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, where there were larger and longer 
established settler communities. As guerrilla tactics failed to produce rapid 
victory, independence fighters started turning to terrorist tactics, often inspired by 
Leninist-Marxist ideology and earlier national struggles (Chaliand and Blin 2007). 
An early example of this was the Algerian revolt against French rule between 
1954 and 1962, which was amongst the last of immediate post-war anticolonial 
struggles. The Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale 
– FLN) started a campaign of mass urban terrorism to coincide with the opening 
session of the UN General Assembly in 1957 (Hoffman 2007). These attacks 
provoked the French government into a crackdown that included a string of 
summary executions and the use of torture, which further mobilised internal and 
external support for the independence movement that eventually prevailed. The 
FLN’s tactics had a big impact on later ethno-nationalist campaigns such as those 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the African National 
Congress (ANC) (Hoffman 2007).  
Similarly in Latin America, in the late 1960s, insurgents transferred their 
guerrilla tactics to urban warfare. Carlos Marighella, the founder of the 
Revolutionary Communist Party of Brazil, believed in engaging in a strategy of 
provocation, forcing local authorities to react repressively (Chaliand and Blin 
2007b: 231). The idea was that if the state was provoked into reacting then its 
‘rottenness’ would be exposed for all to see (Gearty 1991).  
The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of new tactics such as hijacking 
and hostage taking and new targets including foreign nationals. Facilitated by 
technological advances in air travel and communication these struggles for self-
determination and national liberation started being played out internationally. It 
was now a global phenomenon. The Ustachi, for example, who wanted 
independence for Croatia, took over the Yugoslav mission to the UN in 1977 and 
also hijacked a flight of the American airline TWA (Gearty 1991). But, the 
conflict that ended up being played out most extensively on the international stage 
and was described by some as the birth of “terrorism as a publicity stunt” was the 
Palestinian conflict (Chaliand and Blin 2007: 98). Though this had already 
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emerged in the 19th century through the ‘propaganda by deed’ the rapid 
technological changes through the 1970s and 1980s gave the Palestinians a much 
wider audience. At the same time as Europe was facing heightened internal threats 
described below, Palestinian violence became increasingly internationalised in 
1970s and 1980s, reaching European capitals. After the humiliation of the Arab 
cause in the 1967 six-day war, the Palestinian movement launched a wave of 
aircraft hijack and attacks on civilians in European cities. The high point of this 
‘international terrorism’ was the assault by Black September on the Munich 
Olympics in 1972. 
In the first twenty years of the UN’s existence the institution paid scant 
attention to notions of terrorism and proscription (Romaniuk 2010).  When some 
of these national liberation struggles led to internationalised terrorist attacks the 
response of global fora like the UN was greatly influenced by Cold War 
dynamics. In the General Assembly, there was a group of countries that wanted to 
preserve the legitimacy of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and 
especially in the Middle East, and wanted to avoid having the use of violence 
towards such ends being labelled as ‘terrorist’ (Romaniuk 2010). This position 
united a broad coalition of non-aligned countries and Third World communists. 
The Soviet Union sided with this bloc. On the other side Western states sought to 
affirm the principle that certain violent tactics are not justified by any cause, as 
innocent civilians are the primary victims (Romaniuk 2010). The lack of 
consensus about what actually constituted terrorism deeply divided the Security 
Council.  
3. The emergence of national and regional proscription legislation in 
Europe 
During the 1970s and 1980s Western Europe became the theatre of attacks 
perpetrated by groups representing three different types of political violence: 1) 
nationalist and secessionist struggles such as Northern Ireland, Corsica or the 
Basque conflicts; 2) ideological and radical left-wing groups such as the Red 
Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof group; and 3) the internationalisation of the 
Palestinian conflict. This violence being played out in Western Europe led to 
states starting to develop national proscription regimes and to the beginnings of 
regional cooperation on terrorism. 
	 64	
Secessionist struggles in Northern Ireland, the Basque region and Corsica 
initially had a degree of domestic support. However, as groups started attacking a 
wider set of targets, it led to increased public alienation and the emergence of 
national proscription legislation. In Britain, the proscription regime was 
developed after the peak in attacks linked to Northern Ireland during the 1970s.25 
It is interesting to note that ‘terrorism’ as a subject did not appear in the index to 
the House of Commons debates until 1971 (Gearty 2008). The passage of 
proscription legislation in Britain was event-led and linked to the public outcry. 
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 was passed just 
a week after IRA pub bombings in Birmingham that killed 21 people and injured 
180 in November of that year. This Act prohibited membership of the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and later the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and 
made it a crime to arrange meetings with those proscribed groups. Still, 
proscription was “subject to much anxious consideration” as it was seen as a 
draconian measure even though the IRA had been waging a series of attacks in 
London and other British cities over the two preceding years (Gearty 2007: 356).  
In an empirical study of Irish people’s experience of the 1974 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, Hillyard (1993: 257) argued that the legislation and its powers of 
arrest, detention, exclusion and proscription in effect “all played their part in 
making the Irish living in Britain, or Irish people travelling between Ireland and 
Britain, a suspect community”. Symbolically, the Irish were tarred as a threat. 
Though Sinn Fein was a legal political party, they were very closely associated 
with the IRA and in 1982 exclusion orders were used to prevent the visit to 
Britain of three leading Sinn Fein members (Gearty 2008). The 1980s also saw a 
great reduction in the media coverage of Sinn Fein as the British government 
urged journalists not to give them airtime on the grounds that terrorists drew 
support from access to radio and television (Gearty 2008). 
Ideological groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction 
in Germany (also known as Baader-Meinhof Group), the Angry Brigade in 
Britain, Action Directe in France, the Communist Combatant Cell in Belgium, and 
the Weather Underground in the United States were radical left-wing groups that 																																																								
25 The first Stormont Government had proscribed the IRA in Northern Ireland after the establishment of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1922 (Kirkpatrick 2018b). After the rise in attacks on English soil, the 
IRA went from being seen as a problem contained in Northern Ireland to a national security threat 
(Kirkpatrick 2018b).  
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sought to draw out repression by the state. In response, Western European 
countries like France, Italy and West Germany reinforced their police response 
and often adjusted their criminal codes to make ‘terrorism’ an aggravating crime, 
but did not establish proscription regimes. In Italy, the government did not create 
a special legal regime but adjusted the criminal procedure code in 1979 and 1980 
to add the new crime of “belonging to associations with terrorist aims and 
subversion of the democratic order” (Weinberg 2007: 53). Similarly in West 
Germany, the criminal code was amended between 1974 and 1978 including 
sentences of up to five years for directly or indirectly participating in a terrorist 
organization (Chalian and Blin 2007b). Amongst these governments there was an 
increased awareness of the need to cooperate in dealing with what they saw as 
‘linked’ ideological movements.  
At the same time as Europe faced these heightened internal threats, 
Palestinian violence also arrived in European cities. At that time, “all the talk was 
of ‘terrorists’ and terrorism” (Gearty 2008: 560). European governments decided 
to take coordinated action and in 1977 signed the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism. It was the first time the Council of Europe dealt 
directly with the issue of terrorism (QCEA, Briefing Paper 12). Reminiscent of 
the anti-anarchic conference, this convention ensured that European governments 
would exclude political defence in its extradition policies. However, there was no 
attempt at developing a regional proscription regime at that stage. 
The year 1985 is considered to be a turning point in international opinion on 
terrorism due to the high number of terrorist attacks and states directly affected. 
As many as 782 incidents were recorded over the course of the year, including 
hijackings and hostage crises (Romaniuk 2010). A change in the tone of 
multilateral counter-terrorism rhetoric was reflected in UN Resolution 40/61 (9 
Dec 1985), which unequivocally condemns as criminal all acts of terrorism 
(Romaniuk 2010). An international consensus was slowly emerging criminalising 
the act of terror and thereby de-politicising groups committing these acts. 
However, governments wanting to be more active on terrorism in 1970s and 
1980s found they could not get sufficient momentum at the UN level because of 
Cold War dynamics and turned to regional bodies instead. This was the case with 
the 1977 European Convention, and the G-7 group of states that issued the Bonn 
declaration on International Terrorism (Romaniuk 2010).  
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4. The United States building a link between the Soviet Union and 
terrorism 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States was amongst the states that were 
particularly targeted by terrorist incidents in other countries, many linked to 
conflicts in the Middle East. The US embassy assault in Teheran in 1979 that led 
to 66 Americans being taken hostage was a watershed, and so was the October 
1984 attack against US Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 US soldiers.  
Though the Cold War had lost some of its significance in the Middle East, 
particularly since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 
US administration still used Cold War logic to understand the region, seeing 
friends and foes in Lebanon, Iran and Libya through a Cold War lens (Toaldo 
2013). This was also due to local players trying to present their agenda in terms 
compatible with Reagan’s Global Cold War. For example, the Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin described the invasion of Lebanon as a crucial victory 
in the fight against the Soviets (Toaldo 2013).26 Reagan’s presidency also saw the 
rise of conservative think tanks that ensured this issue stayed on the agenda and 
crystalized the idea that Soviet support for the Palestinian cause made it the 
“godfather of terrorism” across the world (Gearty 2008: 562).  
This Cold War logic in Reagan’s administration conditioned the elaboration 
of the US’ response and the development of its counter-terrorism policy. The key 
idea elaborated by Jeane Kirkpatrick, then US ambassador to the UN, and 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, the President’s main advisor on counter-
terrorism, was to differentiate between freedom fighters and terrorists depending 
on which side of the Cold War these insurgent groups were placed (Kirkpatrick 
1979 and Schultz 1984 quoted in Hicks 1991). Reagan’s government established a 
Task force on Combating Terrorism, which published a report in February 1986 
that was used to establish US counter-terrorism policy. The US portrayed 
“terrorists” thus: “seeking to destroy freedom and democracy, terrorists 
deliberately target noncombatants for their own cynical purposes. They kill and 
maim defenseless men, women and children.” On the other side: “Freedom 
fighters in contrast, seek to adhere to international law and civilized standards of 
conduct. They attack military targets, not defenceless civilians” (Bush 1988). In 																																																								
26 It is interesting to note that Menachim Begin, winner of the Nobel Prize in 1979 along with Anwar 
Sadat, had formed the right-wing Zionist group Irgun, which was behind the attack against the British 
administrative headquarters in the King David Hotel in 1946, which killed over 90 people.  
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November 1988, the government published a study to provide Americans with 
detailed information about the key ‘terrorist’ groups around the globe. Fifty-two 
groups were singled out as responsible for terrorism in the Middle East, Western 
Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa (US Government 1988). 
So, certain armed groups around the world were labelled ‘terrorists’ others 
were labelled ‘freedom fighters’. Though the US had not yet developed a 
proscription regime targeted towards non-state armed groups, the language 
developed by the Reagan administration over this period deeply influenced 
foreign policy and diplomatic relations. It also started embedding the symbolic de-
legitimation of ‘terrorists’. The US encouraged allies to follow their lead. None 
was more enthusiastic than the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, who in 
1984 expanded the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism prohibition to ‘international 
terrorists’, including groups such as the PLO and the ANC.  It was only in 1996 
that the US passed its first legislation authorising the Secretary of State to 
designate ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ through the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (80.S.C.1189) (Kurth Cronin 2003).  
Many of the attacks that occurred internationally in the 1970s and 1980s 
carried the hallmark of ‘state-sponsored terrorism’. Countries such as Syria, Libya 
and Iran were seen as having directly supported gun attacks in Rome and Vienna 
in 1985 and the blowing-up of the PanAm jet over Lockerbie in Scotland in 
December 1988 (Gearty 2008). This led the US to establish a list of ‘State-
sponsors of terrorism’ in 1979 through which the US Secretary of State provided 
Congress with a list of countries thought to have “repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism” (quoted in Kurth Cronin 2003:6). US Secretary of 
State George P. Shultz urged the employment of international sanctions at a 
global level “to isolate, weaken, or punish states that sponsor terrorism against us” 
(Luck 2004:90). However, the Cold War dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s made 
it impossible for the US to engineer coordinated action at the UN level. The 
USSR, for example, voted against sanctions in the case of the Iran hostage crisis. 
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed these dynamics. 
5. 1990s: the sanctions decade 
The UN Security Council became much more pro-active in leading coordinated 
action towards what it perceived to be threats to international peace and security. 
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During the 1990s one of the main avenues for doing so was through the 
imposition of sanctions. A tool that was only used twice in the first 45 years of the 
UN’s existence became so frequently used that the 1990s were termed the 
“sanctions decade” (Cortright and Lopez 2000). In the early part of the decade 
these sanctions tended to be comprehensive economic sanctions. But, as we saw 
in Chapter 1 when reviewing the sanctions literature, disillusionment quickly set 
in as cases like Iraq and Haiti seemed to show that economic and humanitarian 
pain outweighed political gain (Elliot 2005 and Doxey 2007). A series of reform 
processes sponsored by the governments of Switzerland, Germany and Sweden 
known as the Interlaken (1998-2001), Bonn-Berlin (1999-2001) and Stockholm 
(2001-02) processes influenced policy and practices regarding sanctions in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, “reflecting a broader normative shift away from 
comprehensive sanctions” (Biersteker T. J. and S. E. Eckart, A. Halegua, P. 
Romaniuk 2005:27). Throughout the decade, the UN moved sharply towards more 
limited measures, targeting elites and particular sectors. International proscription 
as a policy instrument used by the UNSC was later a product of this process of 
learning on sanctions and moving towards a more targeted approach – known as 
smart sanctions.  
Multilateral sanctions quickly became a key tool of cooperation on counter-
terrorism. Of particular interest in understanding the precursors of proscription are 
the cases of sanctions against Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan, where the issue 
addressed was ‘support for international terrorism’. In all three cases, the stated 
purpose was to encourage governments to end their support for ‘international 
terrorism’ and to turn over and extradite suspected ‘terrorists’ (Cortright and 
Lopez 2000). In the case of Libya, economic sanctions were targeted against the 
aviation and armament sectors and are often portrayed as a success because Libya 
ended up handing over the Lockerbie bombing suspects (Cortright and Lopez 
2000; Romaniuk 2005; de Jonge Oudraat 2004). In the case of Sudan, only 
diplomatic sanctions were imposed, though the US had tried to mobilise support 
for broad trade restrictions. The sanctions appeared to have little effect on 
Khartoum’s policy of hosting ‘international terrorists’ (Cortright and Lopez 2000; 
Romaniuk 2005). 
In the case of Afghanistan, UN Resolution 1267 imposed aviation and 
financial sanctions against the Taliban regime. These sanctions were imposed on 
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persons and entities designated by the sanctions committee by means of a 
‘blacklist’. This model was to become the basis for international proscription 
regimes with the two main material features being asset freeze and travel ban 
against listed entities. Under this mechanism the Security Council adopted a 
resolution and delegated the task of drawing up a list of blacklisted persons to a 
sanctions committee consisting of all members of the UNSC (Cameron 2005). 
The consensus procedure in the sanctions committee meant that once a name is on 
the list any UNSC member can veto its removal (Cameron 2005). The sanctions 
committees have often been put in a position of merely rubber-stamping 
individual states’ own blacklists “in particular the US anti-terrorist blacklists” 
(Cameron 2005: 184). This has been the case in particular with the Taliban list: 
“the main (or exclusive?) source of the names of the Afghanistan/Al-Qaida lists 
has been the US” (Cameron 2005: 184, Sullivan and Hayes 2010: 13). The first 
list of persons and entities subject to the freezing of assets was published by the 
Sanctions Committee on 8 March 2001, designating 162 individuals and seven 
entities (Sullivan and Hayes 2010).  
The ‘sanctions decade’ saw an increased willingness of powerful states such 
as the United States to use multilateralism selectively to advance their counter-
terrorism policies. The emphasis was put on norm building over the 
unacceptability of terrorism and the introduction of blacklisting as an acceptable 
tool to target incompliant governments. The sanctions regimes of the 1990s “were 
important in stigmatizing terrorism as an illegitimate activity that needed to be 
countered through international action” (de Jonge Oudraat 2004: 153). Thus 
establishing the symbolic de-legitimation that would become central to 
proscription regimes. Proscription regimes are derived from the learning that was 
done on broader sanctions, but also the norm building that made it seem an 
acceptable and useful tool of global foreign policy (Romaniuk 2010).  
While the sanctions decade illustrates how the US was able to influence 
other states to take on their anti-terrorism agenda in a post-Cold War scenario, it 
very much remained focussed on targeting state actors that were seen as 
sponsoring terrorism. When it came to non-state armed actors, the picture was 
rather different. During the Cold War many countries wanted to protect the rights 
of national liberation movements, and even afterwards there was real ambivalence 
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about branding certain armed groups as terrorist organisations. That is, until 9/11 
happened.  
6. 9/11 as a critical juncture27 
The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center was a key turning point for 
proscription policies around the world. As Booth and Dunne (2002, Preface) 
eloquently put it, “There are other and arguably more crucial issues in world 
historical terms (…) but when the victim of terror attacks of spectacular horror 
happens to be the greatest power on earth, the agenda is set”. The rejection of the 
attacks was widespread and world leaders across the globe rallied around America 
to express their solidarity. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair described it as an attack 
against the world:  “This was a declaration of war not just on the United States but 
all countries and peoples which treasured freedom, democracy and our shared way 
of life.” (Blair 2011). One direct result of the attacks has been the “public 
delegitimation of terrorism” (Keohane 2002:41 emphasis in the original). Being 
listed as a ‘terrorist’ organisation took on a whole different meaning post 9/11. 
Symbolically, being branded a ‘terrorist’ became an anathema.  
What followed was a broad coalition against terrorism based on US power 
but also on the perceived self-interest of other powerful states (Keohane 2002). 
The US took the opportunity to push its agenda through a multilateral approach, 
using multilateral fora like the UN as a source of collective legitimisation for its 
actions, and to push through the first global sanctions against non-state actors. The 
key result was the passing of UNSC Resolution 1373, a sea change that set 
proscription regimes against non-state actors at the heart of the multilateral 
agenda. The unanimous passage of UNSC Resolution 1373 broadened multilateral 
counter-terrorism on an unprecedented scale as it was passed under Chapter VII, 
making the provisions mandatory for all UN member states.28  
It was also the first time Article 51 on the right of self-defence had been 
invoked in the context of violence by a non-state actor. This was completely 																																																								
27 For a critical take on using or constructing 9/11 as a temporal marker see Toros 2017. She argues that 
this quasi-universal adoption has led to “an extension of US hegemony over world time” (Toros 2017: 
206). 
28 Making it also mandatory for countries to report on progress in the implementation of the Resolution. A 
direct side product of this was the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and later its 
reorganized version, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) which established 
a group of UN international civil servants focussed on counter-terrorism and working to “drive the 
counter-terrorism agenda into the heart of each member state” (Gearty 2013: 33). Before 9/11, the UN 
mainly had rapporteurs focussing on human rights and fundamental freedoms (Gearty 2013). 
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different to the sanctions imposed against governments under Chapter VII on the 
supporters of terrorism in the 1990s (Romaniuk 2005). It had previously been 
seen as controversial to say that terrorist attacks amounted to an armed attack or to 
invoke the right to self-defence in that context. The US had for example tried to 
invoke this right following the Berlin bomb attack when it bombed Tripoli, and 
Israel responded in similar fashion to attacks from the PLO. But, in the case of 
9/11, “few challenged the finding that the September 11 attacks constituted a 
‘threat to international peace’ and an ‘armed attack’” (Schrijver 2004:62). 
The other striking point about UNSC Resolution 1373 was that no specific 
reference was made to 9/11, or to attacks against the US. It was the first legally 
binding Security Council resolution “addressing international terrorism as a global 
phenomenon without referring to a particular state or region” (Schrijver 2004: 58). 
UNSC Resolution 1373 “imposed a blanket mandatory sanctions regime on all 
terrorists” (de Jonge Oudraat 2004: 157). This global proscription regime had two 
main effects. First, it clearly de-legitimised the use by non-state armed groups of 
terrorist tactics, meaning that while there had been some flexibility before in terms 
of how armed groups were perceived either as ‘freedom fighter’ or terrorists’, 
depending on which side of the Cold War divide they fell, now, symbolically, all 
would be considered terrorists. Second, as it did not specify persons or entities 
that should be listed it effectively gave states the right to blacklist at their own 
discretion to “prevent and supress the financing of terrorist acts” (UNSC 
Resolution 1373 2001). Coupled with the absence of a UN definition of what 
constitutes ‘terrorism’, the decentralised aspect of the regime allows states to 
identify terrorist suspects in light of their own national interests, and effectively 
encouraged states to create their own proscription regimes.29 A direct effect of this 
‘global’ endorsement of proscription against non-state actors by the UN has been 
governments’ reframing of their own internal conflicts in the context of the global 
war on terror.  
 
																																																								
29 In his first statement, Martin Scheinin, the first United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
counter-terrorism, said: “Calls by the international community to combat terrorism, without defining the 
term, can be understood as leaving it to individual States to define what is meant by the term” (Scheinin 
2005, para 27).  
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II. International proscription regimes post 9/1130 
The figure given by de Goede (2011: 499) of 214 blacklists includes a mix of 
international proscription regimes such as the UN Security Council 1267 
Sanctions List and the EU financial sanctions lists, but it also includes 
proscription regimes developed by individual governments like the US, or the 
UK. Proscription now exists in countries as varied as “Australia, Belarus, China, 
Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malaysia, Russia, Syria, 
Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe” (Muller 2008: 115) and beyond. Some lists only 
include individuals, others include whole groups, and some include both. They 
can also include the military wings of armed groups, the political wings, or both. 
In all this complexity it is important to briefly understand what is entailed by 
some of the main international proscription regimes and explore their similarities 
and differences. 
This thesis is aimed at understanding the effects of proscription regimes that 
are targeted towards armed groups, not individuals, so this will be the focus of this 
section. As we saw in the historical background, proscription regimes first 
emerged in Western Europe, particularly in Britain, and it was after the United 
States got the idea embedded through the United Nations post-9/11 that they 
spread internationally. So, this section will focus on the main regimes, namely the 
United States, the United Nations, the European Union and the United Kingdom. 
1. United States 
In the US there are two main lists. The US Department of Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has a list of Specially Designated and Blocked 
Persons, which includes individuals, groups, and entities, considered to be 
terrorists, narcotics traffickers or acting for or on behalf of a sanctions targeted 
country (OFAC, 2012). The US State Department has a specific list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organisations, which is the one I will focus on as it designates non-US 
based organisations as terrorist organisations. The US list includes sixty-four 
prominent non-state armed groups such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, the 
CPP/NPA, Al Shabab, the PKK, ELN, FARC and the LTTE (US Department of 
State). 																																																								
30 Certain parts of this section have been published in Haspeslagh, S. 2013. ‘”Listing terrorists”: The 
Impact of Proscription on Third-Party Efforts to Engage Armed Groups in Peace Processes – a 
Practitioner’s Perspective’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 6 (1): 189-208. 
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Individuals and groups who are considered to belong to these groups are 
subject to asset freeze and travel bans. Furthermore, it is unlawful for a person in 
the US or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide "material support or 
resources" to a listed organisation. Material support is defined as: "currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
expert advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious 
materials" (US Patriot Act, 2001). 
In June 2010 the Supreme Court, in a ruling known as the 'Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project' case, clarified that certain activities directly relevant to 
the support of peace processes are considered as material support to listed entities. 
It was made explicitly illegal to provide “expert advice”, “service” or “training in 
human rights enforcement or peaceful conflict resolution” to armed groups that 
are listed as foreign terrorist organisations (US Supreme Court, 2010):  
Though it is important to note that the ruling was very narrow and 
does not address all forms of peaceful speech and advocacy, the 
Court’s rationale suggests that it would uphold criminalization of most 
actions intended to engage armed groups in peace processes. For 
example, the Court considered training that imparted a “specific skill” 
to these groups “frees-up” other resources that a group could then put 
to “violent ends”. The Court emphasized that such actions require 
“coordination”. They also considered that engagement provides these 
groups with “legitimacy” and would put a strain on US foreign policy. 
(Carl and Haspeslagh 2010)  
 
As the US law is extra-territorial it also applies to non-Americans. The only 
loophole is that third party actors like US State Department staff, US embassy 
staff or NGOs can apply for waivers at the State Department before engaging with 
groups. This is known as an OFAC license. This OFAC license allows them to 
interact with designated armed groups, subject to limitations or conditions stated 
in the license. 
2. United Nations 
There are three types of proscription regimes at the United Nations level. The first 
is the list established by UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1988 and 1989 in 
relation to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Secondly there are other UN Security 
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Council resolutions imposing sanctions on armed groups in specific conflicts. One 
example is the case of Somalia, in relation to which the UN has had a tailored 
sanction regime since 2002 – further tightened in 2011 to include specific 
individuals and entities identified as threats to peace and security (UN Security 
Council SC/10348, 2011). Thirdly, UN Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540 
and 1624, require states to take various steps against non-state armed groups, 
including criminalising terrorism.  
As we saw above, Resolution 1373, which was passed after 9/11, is the core 
document in the UN’s counter-terrorism regime (UN Security Council SC/7158, 
2001). UN member states both enforce those lists and add to them through their 
own national regimes. The resolution calls on all states to freeze assets, ban travel 
and have an arms embargo against listed individuals and groups.  
3. European Union 
The EU’s proscription regime stems directly from measures it took to transpose 
UN Resolutions 1267 and 1373 into EU law.  Common Position 2002/402/CFSP 
and EC Regulation 881/2002 led the EU to directly implement UN Resolutions 
1267,1333 and 1390 and the Taliban and Al Qaeda list. In addition, based on UN 
Resolution 1373, the EU decided to also establish an autonomous list of terrorist 
entities through Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and EC Regulation 2580/2001. 
The EU list comprises of two sub-lists: one for groups operating within the EU, 
and one for groups operating outside the EU in non-member state countries. There 
are twenty-one designated groups on the EU external list such as Hamas’ armed 
wing, CPP/NPA, PKK, LTTE, ELN and FARC31  (European Council 2017). 
Members of these groups are subject to travel bans, visa denials, asset freezes and 
other financial restrictions, and arms embargoes (European Council 2017). 
As the EU is not a member of the UN it is not subject to UNSC Resolutions 
from the standpoint of international law, so the EU was not legally required to 
adopt measures in order to develop its own proscription regime.  Leonard and 
Kaunert (2012) argue that we should understand the EU’s decision in the context 
of the bloc’s general preference for multilateralism when it comes to international 
security issues. Moreover, de Goede (2012) argued that the EU prioritised the 																																																								
31 On 13 November 2017, a year after the peace agreement was signed between the Colombian 
government and the FARC, the armed group was removed from the European list, European Council 
Decisions (CFSP) 2017/2072 and (CFSP) 2017/2073. 
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pursuit of assets because it saw it as the less violent alternative to other counter-
terrorism strategies. 
Unlike the UN and other multilateral fora, the European Council did 
develop a common definition of terrorism, through its Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism published on 13 June 2002  (2002)/475/JHA). Reminiscent 
of the anti-anarchist Convention of the late nineteenth Century, these efforts to 
establish a common legal definition of terrorism have also been seen as an attempt 
by member states to eliminate the ‘political offences’ exception in relation to 
‘terrorism’. This had been coupled with measures to exclude ‘terrorists’ from 
asylum and refugee protection (Muller 2008). This is a notable departure from the 
period in the mid-1990s when, following a wave of attacks in France in 1995 and 
1996 by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA), the UK and Sweden had 
refused to extradite suspects of the attacks (Shapiro 2007). The common 
definition of terrorism and the agreement on removing the political offences 
exception have rendered this impossible as Member States now automatically 
recognize each other’s judicial decisions. 
The EU legislation requires member states to prevent ‘the public’ from 
offering support to individuals and entities listed as terrorists. In practice this 
means that all Member States have had to introduce their own national criminal 
regimes for the breach of EU blacklisting provisions (Sullivan and Hayes 2010). 
France is an interesting case in this regard. It had been one of the countries most 
affected by both national and international terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 
1990s, but had never developed a proscription regime, choosing instead to focus 
on police, intelligence, foreign policy and judicial mechanisms to combat 
terrorism (Shapiro and Suzan 2003). Following the EU’s Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP and the establishment of the EU’s own autonomous list, France 
now has to implement this common policy and enforce decisions on all the parties 
concerned, and on its citizens.  
4. United Kingdom 
Today, in the UK the basis for the proscription regime is the Terrorist Act of 
2000. Seventy-four armed groups are proscribed as ‘international terrorist 
organisations’ under this act, such as Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, the PKK, ETA, the 
LTTE, Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing (Home Office 2017).  
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The Terrorism Act subjects listed organisations to asset freezes and travel 
bans. It also criminalises membership of a ‘foreign terrorist group’. Activities 
such as inciting support for such a group, or wearing clothing or displaying 
articles that could arouse suspicion of being a member or a supporter can incur 
penalties of up to ten years in prison (Terrorism Act 2000). Moreover, arranging 
or assisting in organising a meeting with members of proscribed groups is a 
criminal offence, unless this activity is considered to be “genuinely benign” 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2000, Annex of 2000 Terrorism Act). This 
terminology “genuinely benign” caused some confusion. As a result of 
engagement by UK peacebuilding and humanitarian charities, and contra Holder v 
HLP, the Government clarified that such meetings are those “at which the terrorist 
activities of the group are not promoted or encouraged, for example, a meeting 
designed to encourage a designated group to engage in a peace process.” (Dumasy 
and Haspeslagh 2016; Home Office 2015). 
5. Commonalities and differences 
The cornerstones of these regimes worldwide are to criminalise membership of 
listed groups and imposing administrative and legal sanctions that will disrupt 
groups’ activities. This can be done through material provisions such as restricting 
their freedom of movement, access to weapons and fund-raising capacity through 
travel ban, arms embargoes and asset freezes. Another more symbolic objective, is 
to stigmatise and isolate the group by narrowing support for it. The US State 
Department (2012) lists as among the “effects of designation” the fact that it 
“stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally (…); 
heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations; signals to 
other governments our concern about named organizations”. These material and 
symbolic objectives of proscription will be further investigated and assessed in the 
theoretical framework. 
In all these legal regimes, the power of proscription by the executive is 
discretionary. In the UK and the US, for example, the Foreign Secretary or the 
Secretary of State is not required to proscribe an organization just because it meets 
the statutory conditions. The decision made on whom to include on a list of 
terrorist organisations is a political one. It has “more to do with geo-politics and 
diplomatic relations between states than with genuine threats to a particular 
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country’s national security and the strict application of law in relation to 
terrorism” (Muller 2008: 125).  
These lists include a wide variety of groups with different objectives and 
methods, from the trans-national Al-Qaeda, to local outfits such as Colombia’s 
FARC, who have signed a peace agreement, to dozens of almost unknown leftist 
and anarchist groups in Greece and Italy. Groups included differ notably from list 
to list. Hezbollah is a good example of these discrepancies. The whole group is 
listed by the US but only its military wing is listed by the UK, whilst the EU has 
only very recently listed its military wing despite repeated earlier statements that 
they had no intention of doing so. 
Delisting procedures also vary greatly. The UN lists appear to be the most 
flexible, as illustrated by the separation of the Al Qaeda and Taliban list in June 
2011 into two separate lists: 1) UN Resolution 1989 for Al Qaeda and 2) UN 
Resolution 1988 for the Taliban. At the same time, 14 Taliban members were 
removed from the list. At the European Union level listed groups can now submit 
a request to the European Council at any time, asking for their designation to be 
reconsidered.  However, delisting still requires unanimity among the 27 member 
states (Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2011).  
There are also discrepancies on the question of whether to explicitly 
criminalise third party engagement with listed groups. The US proscription 
regime is currently the one that most explicitly criminalises engagement of third 
party actors. The UN and EU proscription regimes, on the other hand, do not 
explicitly address this issue. In closed doors seminars, UN and EU diplomats say 
there have been situations where, even though engagement with listed groups is 
not made illegal per se, they chose not to engage with a listed organisation (UN 
report unpublished; Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2011). It is also important to bear in 
mind that a number of governments, such as Australia, Canada, the UK and the 
US insert specific counter-terrorism clauses in all levels of development funding 
agreements to ensure that partners do not provide direct support to listed 
organisations. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter helped re-contextualise and provide the historical background for 
international proscription. The chapter explored how the precedent of states 
dealing with anarchic violence at the turn of the 20th century started establishing 
the idea that violence by these non-state actors should be considered non-political 
and therefor extraditable. Similarly, in European countries dealing with nationalist 
and secessionist struggles during the 1970s and 1980s, national proscription 
legislation started to emerge as well as cooperation between Europe countries. 
The bedrock of this cooperation was also to exclude the political defence vis-à-vis 
extradition requests when it came to terrorist offenses. So, even though the 
political aim or intent lies very much at the heart of the definition of terrorism 
itself, as we saw in chapter 1, the precursors to proscription were very much based 
on the idea that groups using terrorist tactics should not be considered to be 
engaging in political acts and should instead be considered criminal. This would 
become a central plank of the symbolic aspect of proscription.  
In contrast, during the national liberation movements, a multiplicity of 
perspectives on armed movements was able to thrive thanks to the fact that the 
rights of these groups were enshrined in the 1960 UN General Assembly 
Declaration. A number of countries were very much against the idea of labelling 
armed groups as ‘terrorists’.  The Reagan administration later succeeded in 
somewhat shifting the rhetoric embedding a certain understanding of freedom 
fighters versus terrorists depending on which side of the Cold War divide an 
armed group was situated. But this labelling did not translate into multilateral 
action or proscription regimes because of the Cold War dynamics. 
After the Cold War ended, the US’ ability to dominate the global agenda led 
to the emergence of sanctions regimes in the 1990s that established the tool of 
targeted sanctions, the precursor to international proscription regimes. The 
stigmatizing of terrorism as illegitimate set the stage for the norm building which 
made sanctions and blacklisting seen as an acceptable tool of foreign policy. But 
this was still a tool focussed essentially on states (supporters of terrorism), not 
armed groups. The main shift towards armed groups took place after 9/11. That is 
why it is crucial to understand 9/11 as the turning point when proscription against 
armed groups became deeply embedded in the international system through UN 
SC Resolution 1373. This is important when it comes to how we study 
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proscription because it means 9/11 should also be considered a critical juncture 
for the analysis of the phenomenon as well.  
Today international proscription is widespread, and while this chapter 
showed that regimes vary in terms of who they list, how easy it is to be taken off 
the lists, and whether third party actors are allowed to be in contact with listed 
entities, it also illustrated that they share key characteristics. These shared material 
and symbolic objectives of proscription will form the basis of the analytical 
framework to explore how the listing of armed groups as ‘terrorists’ might affect 
the process through which conflict parties get to the negotiation table. This is what 
the next chapter turns to. 
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Chapter	Four	
An Analytical Framework 
 
Introduction 
The naming and labelling of opponents has been a hallmark of armed conflicts 
worldwide. But, as Chapter 3 made apparent, following 9/11, the development of 
international proscription regimes has solidified the judgement that a whole class 
of armed groups should be understood as ‘terrorists’. Little is known about the 
effects of these international proscription regimes. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explore how we should study them. It proposes an analytical framework to 
explore why and how international proscription affects the process of getting to 
the negotiation table. Though the chapter draws on elements of the sanctions, 
critical terrorism, securitisation, constructivism and labelling literature to 
understand the possible effects of proscription, it is anchored in the peace and 
conflict literature to asses how these effects might influence the inception of peace 
negotiations both in terms of the central processes at play and the main actors 
involved. 
The nascent literature on the impact of proscription on peace processes has 
so far concluded that it has had significant negative effects. Not only has it 
disabled possible roles played by third party actors, such as understanding armed 
groups or influencing their strategic calculations, it appears to have led to 
increased isolation and cases of severe miscalculation on the part of the armed 
groups themselves. It has also attached a stigma on whole socio-political 
communities associated with listed groups and appears to have fundamentally 
shifted the type of peacebuidling work deemed possible. But as Chapter 2 argued, 
this literature has not so far produced a systematic analysis of the effects of 
proscription on peace processes. It has been mainly focussed on the role of third 
party actors be it inter-governmental actors, mediators, international or local 
peacebuilding NGOs and only to a much lesser degree looked at the effects on the 
armed groups themselves. It has not looked at the effects on the government or on 
the dynamics between different actors. It is only by developing an analytical 
framework that takes into consideration the different actors involved, the 
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dynamics between them and the main processes at play in pre-negotiations that a 
systematic and thorough analysis can be made.  
The chapter is structured in two main parts. First, it looks at international 
proscription and develops an understanding of how to assess its effects. It then 
explores their main characteristics and develops a model to study them based on 
their material and symbolic effects on the main actors involved. The chapter then 
turns to assessing how these effects influence the three central dynamics of pre-
negotiation: the passage from vilification to de-vilification, the move from 
asymmetry to creating a sense of symmetry and the emergence of ripeness. Taking 
each dynamic in turn, the chapter engages with the existing literature critically and 
adds to the concepts by developing new ones and honing in on the possible effects 
of proscription. One central idea developed in this chapter, which cuts across the 
thesis as a whole, is the ‘linguistic ceasefire’. It helps us explain how parties are 
able to initiate negotiations even in the context of proscription.  
 
I. Proscription: how to study it?  
As Chapter 2 noted, though there are variations amongst proscription regimes and 
some are more stringent than others it is important to bear in mind that when 
armed groups are listed they tend to be listed by multiple actors. It would be 
somewhat meaningless to try and separate the effects of the particular listings as if 
they operate in isolation. I agree with Hayes et al. (2015: 7) that listings need to be 
“analysed in relation to each other rather than in isolation as distinct 
jurisdictions”. Similar to overlapping circles, each proscription regime brings with 
it different consequences some of which intersect and some do not, but they 
reinforce each other materially and symbolically.  Our first task is to explore these 
material and symbolic effects of proscription and assess how they will influence 
the main actors involved, namely the government, the armed group and third 
parties. Our second task is to identify the key processes at play during pre-
negotiations and see how these dynamics are influenced by proscription. Doing 
this, a framework to study the effects of international proscription on pre-
negotiation starts to emerge (See diagram 1.) 
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Diagram 1. How to study the effects of proscription on pre-negotiations 
 
1. Material effects 
It is important to recall that the difference between labelling a group ‘terrorist’ and 
proscribing a group as a terrorist organisation leads to a number of direct practical 
and legal consequences and thus material effects. The sanctions literature points 
out the role that sanctions play in ‘constraining’ their targets (Biersteker, Eckert, 
Tourinho et al 2013). Applying this to proscription regimes entails denying armed 
groups access to needed resources and cutting off their means of waging war. 
Asset-freeze and travel bans are the two practical keystones of international 
proscription regimes. Because this is a one-sided dynamic, of the sanction’s 
‘sender’ towards the target, this section will focus on the material effects on the 
target, in this case, the proscribed armed group. 
i. Asset-freeze 
Proscription regimes are aimed at preventing the financing of listed groups. As 
Eckert (2008:103) put it, financial sanctions are ostensibly “aimed at denying 
targets access to the international financial system”. The European Union for 
example states that "no funds or economic resources shall be made available, 
directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of" listed groups (European Council 
2001). Assets of listed organisations and individuals are frozen and it is illegal to 
transfer funds to a listed entity so this could have a direct effect on their ‘fund-
raising’ ability.  
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Have they been effective? There is little data on the freezing of assets, but 
the figures that do exist show the impact to be rather small. De Goede (2012) who 
explores the securitization of terrorist finance concludes that the freezing of assets 
are widely acknowledged to have been minimal. On the US legislation following 
9/11, Pillar said that results have been meagre “no assets having been frozen 
under the new legislation, and few prosecutions” (Pillar 2003: 151). According to 
US Sate Department, by January 2005, US$147 million of asset had been frozen 
worldwide, but the most significant part of this amount was attributed to the 
Taliban and has since been returned to the Afghan government (cited in 
Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk 2008: 245). Exploring the impact on Islamic 
Charities, Gunning showed that even though a dozen had been under intense 
scrutiny for alleged ties with listed groups, the number of charities who actually 
provided funding to Hamas or Al Qaeda was relatively small (Gunning 2008: 
111).  
As noted in Chapter 2, the sanctions literature has mainly focussed on the 
impact of financial sanctions on state actors and little attention has been paid to 
non-state actors. But some of the findings of this literature are relevant here. For 
asset-freeze to have a chance of success in the case of sanctions against states, 
Eliott (2005) argues that the targeted regime leaders must hold assets abroad, the 
assets must be identifiable and that the assets must form a large enough proportion 
of targeted individual assets. He also points out that if “targeted leadership can 
replenish their assets through additional theft and corruption then asset freeze may 
have little impact” (Eliott 2005:12). Extrapolating this thinking to the case of 
armed groups, the argument can be made that financial sanctions against armed 
groups will have an impact on the group if they depend on resources in the 
international financial market.  
Proscription can disrupt the activities of an armed group, for example, by 
limiting its ability to fund-raise or by disrupting potential supportive links the 
group has with states (Chatham House 2010) or diaspora communities. So, for 
instance, the LTTE, the IRA and the PKK are generally seen as examples of 
armed groups that have been heavily dependent on raising funds through their 
	 84	
diaspora. 32  As a consequence they have depended on international money 
transfers, unlike armed groups such as the FARC, for example, who’s funding has 
come from domestic sources such as war tax, kidnapping or tax levied on drug 
production as we saw in Chapter 1.  
Two other points to highlight on funding are the armed groups’ possible 
alternative funding sources and how much money they actually need to operate. 
De Jonge Oudraat (2004:153) argued that “sanctions regimes have little effect on 
non-state terrorist actors” because their funding is increasingly diversified and 
hence more difficult to control. So the ability of an armed group to diversify or 
switch its sources of funding should also be considered. Margaret Doxey (2007), 
the doyenne of the sanctions literature, pointed out that terrorist attacks do not 
cost much money. She estimated the cost of organising the Madrid bombing in 
2004 was a mere US$10,000. Whether or not listed armed groups necessarily 
launch terrorist attacks is not the focus of our discussion, but this point illustrates 
that depending on their modus operandi, different armed groups will have 
different financial needs. Some groups such as the FARC aim to finance seven 
regional armed blocs that each have five to fifteen fronts which is considerable, 
whereas a group like the Lord’s Resistance Army for example needs far less 
money to operate. To be effective, policies would need to be tailored to individual 
circumstances but proscription regimes “stresses uniformity rather than variation” 
(Pillar 2003: 150). 
ii. Travel bans 
All proscription regimes impose travel restrictions for listed entities. The 
sanctions literature seems to reach the conclusion that in material terms, travel 
bans have a mixed record, as there are many instances of violation or evasion 
(Cosgove 2005). The extent to which these bans are implemented worldwide is 
hard to judge but the point is that these bans make it harder for armed groups to 
travel as members of these groups are physically unable to visit certain countries 
whether it is because they cannot get on a plane (because they are on a no-fly list) 
or cannot enter a country (because of a visa ban). Armed groups vary in terms of 
how important travelling is in their operational necessities. So, for instance, 																																																								
32 The case of the IRA funding is generally used to show how diaspora money has supported armed 
groups. What is less often highlighted is the role played by the Irish-American diaspora in encouraging 
Sinn Fein into negotiations and the IRA towards a ceasefire (Darby and Mac Ginty 2000, Cochrane 2007). 
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transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda, that plan attacks in multiple countries 
might be more affected by these restrictions than armed groups with a more 
national agenda. 
 But even groups with a more national agenda can be affected by the travel 
ban when it comes to meetings with foreign sponsors or attending peace talks. 
Two examples of this are the impossibility of the LTTE representatives traveling 
to the USA for a meeting on development aid which has been described by some 
as an important missed opportunity in the peace process (Philipson 2005) and the 
counter-example of the case of the United States overriding the ban on visas for 
Gerry Adams which has been described as an important building block towards an 
IRA ceasefire and the Good Friday Agreement (Spector 1999, Cochrane 2007). 
In material terms, it appears that travel bans have been relatively 
insignificant. But authors have highlighted their symbolic dimension. Cortright 
and Lopez (2000:244) argued that they could be a potent “psychological tool for 
isolating and denying legitimacy to targeted individuals and groups”. Cosgove 
(2005) for instance highlights the case of Liberia where the travel ban is thought 
to have created stigma for certain individuals. Similarly, Eliott (2005:11) argued, 
that “targeted travel and transportation sanctions are likely to be useful primarily 
as symbolic or punitive measures”. This leads us to consider the other symbolic 
effects of proscription. 
2. Symbolic effects 
As noted in Chapter 2, recent sanctions literature comes to the conclusion that the 
main impact of sanctions is actually symbolic (Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho et al 
2013). Similarly, de Goede’s work on the securitization of terrorist finance also 
discusses “the highly symbolic nature of blacklisting as a modern political 
practice”(de Goede 2012: 157). Her argument that listing has to be understood as 
“societal exclusion and symbolic banishment of the affected persons” is highly 
relevant to understand the possible effect on armed groups. Though her work is 
focussed on individuals it can be extrapolated to the whole group. The symbolic 
effect of proscription can lead to stigma, to the shame and the exclusion of the 
targeted entity.  
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But this is not a by-product; it appears to be part and parcel of the 
proscription strategy. Pillar (2003) reflecting on the US proscription regime 
argued: 
Probably the greatest advantages are the symbolic ones of calling 
attention to terrorist groups as objects worthy of opprobrium, putting 
the United States formally on record as opposing their terrorist 
activities, making it clear that the United States is closely monitoring 
and assessing those activities, and sustaining attention to 
counterterrorism in general. (Pillar 2003:152) 
 
Similarly, James R. Clapper, U.S. Director of National Intelligence during the 
administration of President Barack Obama from 2010–2017, said the symbolic 
value of proscription as a policy instrument was paramount: “Well, for me it [the 
FTO list] had a much more symbolic than intrinsic value.(…) I think it had much 
more to do with calling out these groups, that if a group made the U.S. terrorist 
list, that this was a bad group. I think there was important symbolism, both 
domestically and internationally, to listing terrorist groups.”  (quoted in Legrand 
2018: 363) 
Along the same lines, the UN Working Group on Terrorism states, “labeling 
opponents and adversaries as terrorists offers a time-tested technique to de-
legitimize and demonize them” (quoted in Toros 2008: 412). The issue of 
legitimacy is central here.33 Through international proscription, the state wins the 
stamp of approval and the listed armed group loses legitimacy (Helgesen 2007). 
Martha Crenshaw (1983) had long argued that legitimacy is central to the analysis 
of terrorism. The state defends its legitimacy by de-legitimising the ‘terrorist’ 
challenger (Crenshaw 1983). The understanding is that the armed group forsakes 
its legitimacy by using terrorist tactics. As Liz Philipson (2005) pointed out, it is 
the idea that those who practice terrorism lose any right to their cause being heard. 
It is a “means of condemning forms of violence seen as illegitimate or immoral.” 
(Jackson et al. 2011:103)  
International proscription will also affect the overarching conflict narrative; 
the way the conflict is understood and framed. The ‘terrorist’ label allows for a 
country’s problems to be framed as “an attack by terrorists on a legitimate 																																																								
33 For an in-depth review of the issue of legitimacy in the context of talking to ‘terrorists’ see Toros 
(2008). 
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democracy” (McCartney 2006:10). This will affect the way the conflict is 
described, how the root causes are understood and whether or not the presence of 
the armed conflict is even acknowledged. In the UK for example, the war in 
Northern Ireland was euphemistically described as ‘The Troubles’ and in 
Colombia, under President Uribe, the conflict was described as a ‘war against 
narco-terrorists’. By choosing one form of label, you automatically exclude 
another: “whenever we use language to understand a process or event, we 
necessarily exclude alternative language – and thus alternative understandings – 
of the same occurrence” (Jackson et al. 2011:113).  
This framing has much to do with who shapes the meta-narrative. As Jabri 
noted, “Singular subjectivities and monolithic identities are, however, always 
constructed through hegemonic discourses which contributes to a dominant form 
of identity” (Jabri 1996: 183).  At an international level, Keen (2008:221) pointed 
out that by labelling conflict and extreme violence as ‘evil’ or ‘other’ or ‘terrorist’ 
it allows us (the West) “to escape our own responsibilities in unfolding processes 
of violence.” But, more importantly for this study, proscribing an armed group 
crystallises a judgment that one side in the conflict should be considered a 
‘terrorist’; this becomes embedded in the meta-narrative and shapes the 
understanding of the conflict.   
Moreover, the inclusion of names of armed groups side by side on the same 
list can have deep symbolic significance. This homogeneity creates a new reality, 
which also has material effects. As de Goede and Sullivan (2015:69) argued in 
their exploration of security lists34, “list as a knowledge form has the capacity to 
do things”. So, lists are productive in that they ‘‘assemble elements that that do 
not necessarily fit together into some larger scheme.’’ (Law and Mol 2002: 7, 
quoted in de Goede and Sullivan 2016). Lists are also productive in that it 
becomes far easier to treat them in a way that would otherwise be deemed 
unacceptable (Jackson et al. 2011):  
The contemporary understanding of terrorists as inherently evil, for 
example, functions to legitimize particular forms of counter-terrorist 
response at the same time as it delegitimizes others. Once someone is 
labeled an evil-doer and depicted as lacking an identifiable political 
agenda, reasoning or negotiating with them becomes taboo: instead, 																																																								
34 They look at a range of lists, including: targeted sanctions blacklists, private risk management databases 
and counterterrorism watch lists. 
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they need to be pursued aggressively and quickly. (Jackson et al. 
2011:114) 
 
So, the framing of an armed group as a terrorist is deeply symbolic, but can 
also have direct material consequences in terms of the war being fought against 
them.  As Vivienne Jabri eloquently put it in her book on Discourses on Violence: 
What would previously have been blurred social boundaries become 
sharpened primarily through a discursive focus upon features, both 
symbolic and material, which divide communities to the extent that 
the desire for destruction of the enemy is perceived to be the only 
legitimate or honourable course to follow. (Jabri 1996:5)  
 
Similarly, it can also have material effects on the type of peace pursued with 
the listed group. Much of the literature on labelling and peace processes 
concluded that the ‘terrorist’ label “automatically excludes the possibility of 
engagement”, therefore policies that require engagement such as negotiation and 
reconciliation fall outside of the options that are considered (Renner and Spencer 
2012:7). Moreover, Lanz (2011:284) in his analysis of factors of exclusion and 
inclusion in negotiation processes concludes that the terrorist label “excludes such 
groups from international negotiations based on the belief that negotiations would 
generate goodwill for alleged terrorists”. 
So, in effect if you choose to negotiate with a group listed as a ‘terrorist’ 
you would legitimize them and thus incite more violence and “weaken the 
democratic quality of states and likely only serve to incite more violence.” (Toros 
2008: 408). Here again we see that the symbolic effects are not merely symbolic 
but also productive and appear to have material implications. Both the material 
and symbolic effects of proscription reinforce each other. They thus need to be 
analysed in interaction.  
To understand how the material and the symbolic interact the best place to 
look is the actors themselves. It is widely understood that protracted armed 
conflicts are complex and dynamic: “The rules and expectations governing 
relations between the parties shift, and along with them the range of possible and 
solving outcomes” (Zartman 1995:12).  This chapter turns to developing a better 
understanding of the two main protagonists: governments and armed groups 
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before turning its attention to third party actors. For each actor the possible 
material and symbolic effects of proscription will be sketched out by mainly 
drawing on the broad peace and conflict literature. This is followed by an analysis 
of the effects on the peace process focusing in particular on the pre-negotiation 
phase. 
3. Actors 
i. Armed groups  
In the peace and conflict literature, the most relevant strand of scholarly work 
focussing on armed groups comes out of the study of political violence (Kalyvas 
2006, Weinstein 2007, Mamphilly 2011, Staniland 2014, Arjona 2017), 
particularly, the recent strand of work that highlights the internal dynamics of 
armed groups (Pearlman 2010; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012; Brenner 
Forthcoming; McLoughlin and Pearlman 2011; Gallagher Cunningham, Bakke 
and Seymour 2012; Berti 2013; Cunningham 2014). Though this work focuses on 
understanding strategies of violence and non-violence and not necessarily on 
decisions to enter into negotiations per se, it is useful to tease out the possible 
effects of proscription on armed groups.  There are two key points that come out 
of this literature that are worth highlighting in particular. First is the huge 
diversity when it comes to armed groups. They vary in type, nature, structure, 
hierarchy, modus operandi and relationship to their ‘constituency’. As Staniland 
incisively put it, there are “dramatic differences” even between armed groups that 
are fighting the same state with regards to their strategies, capabilities and social 
bases (Staniland 2014: 4). These differences, Pearlman and Cunningham (2012:7) 
argued need to be taken into consideration “in determining how opportunity and 
incentives for violence are created and maintained”. So, we should expect the 
material and symbolic effects of proscription might vary considerably depending 
on the ‘type’ of armed group.  
We have already seen from the sanctions literature how, particularly in 
material terms, armed groups might be impacted differently based on how they are 
funded and by whom, how they operate and the extent to which they travel. So, a 
group that has bank accounts abroad, depends on diaspora support or has 
offices/representations in different countries might be more significantly 
impacted. However there is much less that is understood or written about the 
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symbolic effect of proscription or how armed groups might react to the label. One 
author who has explored how stigmatization works in world politics is Rebecca 
Adler-Nissen (2014). Though her work focused on state actors and norm 
development, it can be applied to armed groups. She argued that states that are 
stigmatized should not be seen as mere passive recipients of these labels. She said: 
[S]tates that are unable or unwilling to conform to “normal” standards 
are not merely objects of failed socialization. Rather, they are active 
agents, able to cope strategically with the shame they are subjected to 
and, in some cases, may even challenge a dominant moral discourse 
by wearing their stigma as a badge of honor. (Adler-Nissen 2014:145).  
 
Adler-Nissen (2014) developed a typology of coping strategies: stigma 
recognition, stigma rejection, and counter-stigmatisation. This diversity in 
reaction to a stigmatizing label can be envisaged in the case of proscription as 
well. While some armed groups have tried to explicitly reject the label imposed on 
them others have embraced it. The LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Maoists in Nepal 
for example made de-listing a specific pre-requisite for entering into peace talks 
with the government. Whereas, armed groups like Al-Shabab or Hamas used the 
labelling strategically to raise their status within their constituency and enhance 
their perceived victimhood (Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2011). Similarly, in the first 
broadcast interview by a member of Jabhat al-Nusra's leadership in Syria 
following the group’s proscription by the US, he said "When the US placed us on 
their list of terrorists, it did us no harm, it elevated our reputation. The Syrian 
people hate the American government. Thanks be to God, we consider this a 
medal of honour." (quoted in Wood 2013). 
So, proscription will sometimes be seen as an affront, a badge of honour, 
sometimes as a bargaining chip. The important point to highlight here is that 
labelling is a two way process. Going back to Adler-Nilsen’s point that 
stigmatised agents are also active agents and able to cope strategically with this 
stigma, these differences amongst armed groups will lead to different reactions 
towards proscription. Depending on who is doing the listing and their relationship 
to them, but also how the listing will affect its own community or relationship 
towards them.  
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Second, as well as there being a large variety between armed groups it is 
also important to note that there is also a huge diversity within armed groups. This 
raises an important point of armed group cohesion which is often assumed in the 
peace and conflict literature as being central to military struggle but also to 
conflict resolution efforts. This internal diversity has been put at the core of an 
exciting new research agenda on intrastate conflicts which treats the coherence of 
armed groups as a research questions as apposed to a given. Wendy Pearlman 
(2010) has been at the forefront of this research agenda by asking “precisely who 
within a movement does the choosing and how their choices influence those 
others within their own community.” (Pearlman 2010: 198) Her ‘composite-actor’ 
approach, differentiated between elites, aspirants and masses in armed 
movements. The choices made are seen as an evolving social process where others 
influence the choices made.  
Internal debate is central to this process. In an analysis done by armed 
groups themselves on their own transition from violence to non-violence they 
shared that “Internal consultation and debate that preceded, accompanies or 
follows back-channel and formal negotiations play a major role in influencing the 
move from militancy to negotiated transitions” (Dudouet and Planta 2012:246). 
The internal debate is described or thought of as a fight between hardliners and 
softliners or ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ in the peace and conflict literature. The point is 
often made that isolating mechanisms, such as proscription, will strengthen 
hardliners and sideline moderates. But, in fact, individuals will not always be a 
‘hawk’ or a ‘dove’, they can shift their stance based on an assessment of their 
alternatives. So, rather than having fixed individual preferences, it is more helpful 
to think of it as a shift in the “the balance of arguments at any one time” which 
“favours the analysis of one or other group within the movement” (McCartney 
2005). McLauchlin and Pearlman (2011:42) thought of a movement as a 
‘‘institutional equilibrium’’ among actors: “Any movement has an institutional 
equilibrium constituted by the rules and relationships that distribute power and 
resources among its members. Intensification of state pressures can disrupt this 
equilibrium.” (McLauchlin and Pearlman 2011: 42). So, any external factors, such 
as proscription, would have a significant influence on the credibility of any set of 
arguments or ‘institutional equilibrium’ at a given time.  Proscription as a type of 
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sanction will affect this internal-external dynamic of armed groups and can distort 
the motivations for engagement with adversary (Conciliation Resources 2008). 
ii. Government 
Much of the traditional literature on dealing with terrorism envisions engagement 
as “a means to transform the ‘terrorists’ so it either rejects or ignores the 
possibility of transformation of state actors” (Toros 2012:176).  Critical terrorism 
work and conflict and peace literature give more space to the possibility of state 
transformation. Yet it is somewhat surprising that though states are not treated as 
coherent entities when it comes to looking at inter-state conflicts, see for example 
the work of Putnam (1988) or Allison (1969), they are often assumed to be when 
it comes to intra-state conflicts. Similarly to the approach taken to understand 
armed groups, this thesis explores the diversity within state actors as well. 
The state should not be seen as a monolith, agencies and individuals within 
governments are bound to disagree over strategies to follow in relations to armed 
groups. Departments might be affected differently by the international 
proscription of a group. For example the military and security apparatus might be 
bolstered by the listing both in material terms (military aid) and symbolic terms 
(increased status and importance) which might lead to the army being either 
supportive or un-supportive of the government’s strategy. Pecastaing (2011) 
argued that there is a risk that the army or counter-terrorism personnel may feel 
betrayed by a possible reversal in strategy if the government decides to enter in 
negotiations with an armed group. Pecastaing illustrated this point by giving the 
example of the assassination attempt against President Charles De Gaulle of 
France in 1961 by a lieutenant colonel as he started negotiating with the Algerian 
FLN (Pecastaing 2011). 
Another point to note, which is a direct side-effect of the ‘terrorist’ label and 
the establishment of a no-negotiation stance over time, is that it can build-up 
resistance within the state’s constituents which would limit the state’s freedom of 
action (Hicks 1991, Pecastaing 2011). A government is answerable to its 
constituency i.e. its citizens who elected it. It is important to bear in mind that 
central to the nature of terrorism and terrorism labelling is the public. As the 
British government’s definition of terrorism states, terrorism involves “any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear” 
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(quoted in Gearty 2008: 430, emphasis added). The public can play an important 
role in terms of putting the government in a policy straightjacket, as it might not 
understand a sudden U-turn in policy. International listings will reinforce this 
trend and entrench an understanding of the armed group and the communities 
associated with it as un-engageable. This will also affect the space for manoeuvre 
the government has at an international level putting the government in a difficult 
position if they want to reverse their policy.  
iii. Third Parties 
Literature on third parties has shown that it has been more usual for adversaries to 
find themselves in need of assistance of a third party as a ‘go-between’, mediator 
or facilitator, to start, conduct and conclude a peace process (Mitchell 2008). 
Because the conflict parties are entrenched in their views, the role of third parties 
is seen as particularly crucial during the preliminary phase of a peace process 
(Darby and Mac Ginty 2000). Scholars in general have acknowledged that there is 
a plethora of third party actors and approaches that can have a high degree of 
complementarity for different tracks and stages of peace processes (Fisher and 
Keashly 1996). As Fisher and Keashly’s “contingency model” suggests, “different 
interventions will be appropriate at different stages of the conflict” (Keashly and 
Fisher 2008:240). Various typologies of third-party roles have been offered in the 
literature; Christopher Mitchell (2011) for instance identified thirteen ‘enabler’ 
roles by ‘agents of (resolutionary) change’. 
In the case of armed actors listed as terrorists, “Intermediaries are necessary 
as a first step toward communication – and often even as the last step of 
negotiation, behind the public view of strident statements” (Zartman and Faure 
2011c: 278). Going through a third party allows the government to deny contact if 
it becomes public or politically costly. Back channels carried out by NGOs are 
frequent as they give governments a level of protection by the “shield of 
deniability”” (Donohue and Cristal 2011:75). Diplomatic actors (government 
officials, UN and EU actors) work with a range of non-state actors as important 
partners in engaging with armed groups (Hottinger 2005). But, as Papagianni 
(2012) pointed out, because these activities are often confidential, it is hard to be 
precise and to quantify them. 
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Third party actors also often play roles training and educating armed actors. 
Negotiation skills can be an important element in the establishment and pursuit of 
effective negotiations between belligerents. Training armed groups in negotiation 
strategies can be an important factor in making negotiations ultimately effective 
(Hayson 2005), but it can also play a part in encouraging armed groups to pursue 
a political rather than violent strategy. Third parties can help ‘de-commit’ conflict 
parties from the violent path they are on (Barnes and Griffiths 2008). Parties 
become entrapped because they have made such enormous investments and 
sacrifices, making it difficult to admit failure by engaging in negotiations. Part of 
this process is the role third parties can play in enhancing the attractiveness of 
negotiation by creating alluring alternatives both mentally and practically. 
According to Barnes and Griffiths (2008:16) certain specific measures such as 
removing international proscription and other travel bans could “increase the 
prospects of engagement.”  
Local and international third parties who are seen as politically close to the 
armed group are known as ‘biased third parties’ or ‘biased mediators’ (Svensson 
2015). They can often play a pivotal role in influencing armed groups. Zartman 
and Faure (2011: 274) argued that “biased mediators are helpful when they work 
to deliver the party they are biased toward”. These actors who often play a key 
role in ‘delivering’ the party they have strong affinities with, are often particularly 
stigmatised by the terrorism/counter-terrorism framing accompanying proscription 
(Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015). 
The roles played by third parties when it comes to engaging armed groups 
can be grouped under four categories: 1) understanding armed groups, 2) 
influencing how the group sees itself, 3) affecting the group’s strategic 
calculations and 4) organising trainings in conflict resolution and negotiation 
skills (Haspeslagh 2013).35 But to be able to perform any of these roles, third 
parties need to have both access to the groups and have established a level of trust 
with the group. Proscription will affect these two pre-conditions of access and 
trust. Access to armed groups whether or not they are internationally listed is 
always complex. Bound in secrecy and uncertainty there has also always been a 
certain level of disapproval and little understanding of the need to contact and 																																																								
35 See Haspeslagh (2013) for more detail on the roles of third party actors in the context of engaging 
armed groups and how they might be influenced by proscription. 
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engage groups that use violent methods (Whitfield 2014). But proscription risks 
criminalizing third party actors, making it illegal for them to be in contact and 
thus affect access to the listed armed group in significant ways. 
There is also a wide variety amongst third party actors. Different kinds of 
intermediaries will be affected differently by proscription. So, international third 
parties that are nationals of the most stringent proscription regimes like the US 
might feel particularly bound not to contact listed groups. Similarly, there might 
be a significant difference between official and unofficial actors. So for instance 
unofficial actors might feel safer to be seen to contact listed groups as they carry 
less political weight. At the same time, it is also possible that official actors that 
receive a level of immunity or political protection might actually be more willing 
to take these sorts of risks than non-governmental actors that have little protection. 
Similarly, the trust that needs to be established with the armed group can be 
affected in different ways. In the case of governmental and inter-governmental 
diplomats acting as third parties, they can be engaging armed groups 
simultaneously while their governments or organisations might have also listed 
the group. Some see this as a case of ‘powerful’ third parties or ‘mediator with 
muscle’ weilding both the carrot and the stick by offering positive and negative 
inducements (Zartman and Faure 2011). Others see this as taking the risk of 
getting sucked into the conflict dynamics (Miall, Ramsbotham and   Woodhouse 
1999:161). The point is that there is a risk for the third party actor of losing the 
credibility and trust of the armed actor.  
Counter-intuitively, it is also possible that the fact that a third party actor 
has taken a risk in being in contact with a listed group might actually afford them 
increased credibility and trust with the group. Similarly, people who are close to 
the group and end up in jail because of these contacts might increase their 
credibility vis-à-vis the group and become useful intermediaries. Academics 
working on Northern Ireland have pointed out the important role played by 
prisoners as intermediaries between republican and loyalist armed groups.36  
In terms of third party actors working with governments, the material effects 
of proscription would not affect access to them, but might affect the trust needed 																																																								
36 Christopher Mitchell, Professor Emeritus at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George 
Mason University, Personal conversation, November 2014, London, U.K. 
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to work with them. Brian Currin, a South African lawyer and international third 
party actor, found it impossible to establish a minimal level of trust with Madrid 
after having engaged with the listed ETA. He said “to work with people 
associated with terrorists means that [he is] a friend of terrorists, therefore not to 
be trusted, and therefore promoting an evil cause” (quoted in Haspeslagh and 
Dudouet 2015). An experience he found in marked contrast to his work in South 
Africa where he started being involved in the peace process by being appointed by 
Mandela to head the prison Audit Committee but ended-up working with both 
parties in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Whitfield 2014). Similarly, by gaining too much trust with the LTTE the 
Norwegian mediators lost the trust of the Sri Lankan government (Whitfield 
2010). 
Having mapped out the possible effects of international proscription on the 
main actors under investigation, the chapter turns to exploring the effects on the 
three central processes at play during the pre-negotiation phases.  
 
II. How proscription affects pre-negotiation processes 
To understand how proscription affects pre-negotiation we need to explore the key 
ideas used to explain how, when and why parties get to the negotiation table and 
explore how proscription might affect these dynamics. The chapter does so by 
honing in on three central processes at play: namely the processes through which 
parties move from vilification to de-vilification, from asymmetry to perceiving 
symmetry, and from feeling a mutually hurting stalemate to envisaging a way out. 
Taking each process in turn and analysing them critically, this section assesses 
how they might be affected by international proscription. 
1. The impact of proscription on (de)vilification  
A central characteristic of protracted armed conflicts is that each side mobilises its 
supporters “behind mutually exclusive objectives and the demonization of the 
other side” (Guelke 2008: 69). De-legitimisation of the opponent is vital for both 
sides as it enables them to believe in the exclusivity of their claim (Guelke 2008: 
69). It also enables them to motivate their troops and get their constituencies to 
support long-term and sustained war efforts. Exploring why conflict resolution 
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fails, particularly in the Israel and Palestinian conflict, Ramsbotham described 
what he called ‘linguistic intractability’ and argued that “The war of words is just 
as virulent – and can be just as potent – as the war of weapons.” (Ramsbotham 
2016: 30).   
All protracted conflicts are marked by the demonization of opponents. 
Shifting this is not straightforward and takes time. Rothstein for example argued 
that: 
Changing the negative stereotypes of the other and ending the process 
of demonization and psychological distancing cannot be done quickly. 
These perceptions and attitudes have deep roots and may serve some 
useful purposes – as well as hostile ones – in strengthening group 
identity and maintaining group unity. (Rothstein 1999: 17).  
 
It is a long road to what Kelman goes on to describe as reconciliation. He argued 
that a shift in attitudes between groups “must be expressed in symbolic gestures 
and public statements that acknowledge the other’s suffering, victimization, and 
shared humanity and that convey commitment to the other’s security, well-being 
and human rights.” (Kelman 1999: 199). Somewhere along this path vilification 
has to turn to de-vilification. 
i. From vilification to de-vilification 
A central concept in the pre-negotiation phase of peace processes is the need to 
shift from vilification to de-vilification. The pre-negotiation phase involves 
changing the public image of the adversary (Zartman 2008:121). The concept of 
villainising non-state armed groups adapted by Spector (2003) from his work on 
villainising states (1998) is particularly relevant for this study.  Villainising, he 
explains, is the process of demonizing and dehumanizing the enemy. As noted 
above, these are “strong psychological motives that help countries clarify their 
purpose and demarcate their goodness from others’ badness” (Spector 1998: 47).  
It is also intended to influence domestic populations by seeking to “mobilize 
domestic perceptions against an outrageous enemy, to portray the other as not just 
an enemy but a rogue that must be undone. Socialization of the domestic 
population through the villainization process prepares them for any potential 
military action against the enemy.”(Spector 1998: 48).  
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Villains need to be “devillainized” for talking to begin (Spector 1998). For a 
government to be able to openly engage with a villainised group, they have to 
convince their constituency and public opinion that “they are no longer the devil, 
with whom one should not shake hands, or the enemy, against whom one wages a 
total confrontation” (Zartman & Faure 2011: 8). The risks are high, as they may 
appear hypocritical by turning the “demons of last week into legitimate and 
respectable partners of this week” (Spector 1998:49). In this case, actions are 
more compelling than words to create a public image that the villain has 
abandoned its villainous ways, allowing the government to negotiate without 
losing face. Spector (1998: 53) described this process as the model of “putting the 
decision in the villain’s hands” – i.e. the villain was forced to change its ways and 
tactics, “the villain needed to “devillainize” itself in a public and credible 
manner”. 
The side of the equation that has been much less explored in this literature is 
the (de)vilification of the government. Spector (1998) for example highlighted the 
changes made by the IRA in Northern Ireland ahead of negotiations to ‘de-vilify’ 
itself, but failed to explicitly consider changes made by the British government in 
terms of its own de-vilification process or how the armed group attempted to de-
vilify the government in its characterisations. During the pre-negotiation phase 
both parties have to start de-vilifying their opponents. This is the case with the 
government but also with the armed group. Here, the intra-party dynamics are 
key. Governments and armed groups have to be in a position to convince internal 
factions as well as their constituencies that the opponent is an entity that they can 
do business with, that they are rational enough, and that a negotiation can be 
started in good faith. 
Though the term vilification is well established in the conflict resolution 
literature, and there is broad consensus that vilification has to somehow turn to de-
vilification ahead of negotiations (Spector 1998, Spector 2003, Faure 2007, 
Zartman 2008, Zartman & Faure 2011), less has been written to explain how that 
happens, what its central components are. A useful starting point is to look at what 
constitutes vilification according to the literature. The opponent is cast as the 
enemy and is considered to be untrustworthy, illegitimate and not deserving of 
respect or the normal considerations of human behaviour (Spillmann & Spillmann 
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1991, Faure 2007). Furthermore, the villain is considered to act in a threatening or 
hostile fashion (Spector 2003) so is typecast as violent and its actions are 
condemned.  
These components of vilification - enemy, no respect, untrustworthy, 
illegitimate, violent and actions condemned – need to all somehow be reversed by 
both sides during the processes of de-vilification (see Table 1). De-vilification 
happens when both sides start recognising the existence of the conflict. The 
overarching conflict narrative shifts, both sides acknowledge the fact that there is 
in fact a conflict. They also start referring to their opponent. They start showing 
that they acknowledge the other’s existence. They also increasingly start showing 
respect for their opponent. This can be seen when the government uses the armed 
group’s name or the armed group acknowledges the opponent’s hierarchy by, for 
example, addressing a president as such. They start expressing the opinion that 
their opponent is rational and an entity that one can do business with. They 
acknowledge each other’s political agenda and recognise each other’s goals. They 
increasingly humanize their opponent and they create space for change to happen, 
for instance the armed group starts differentiating between the government and the 
state or the broader establishment (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Reciprocal vilification and de-vilification 
 
Vilification De-vilification 
 
Enemy Recognition of 
conflict/opponent 
No respect Show respect/recognition 
(organization/hierarchy) 
Untrustworthy Can do business negotiate 
with/ admit rationality 
Illegitimate Acknowledge political 
agenda/ recognize goals 
Violent Humanization 
Actions condemned Allow for change 
 
ii. Proscription and the ‘terrorist’ label as extreme vilification  
It is well established in the negotiation literature that vilification will lead the 
opponent to be cast as untrustworthy, illegitimate, and violent - the enemy who 
does not deserve our respect and whose actions should be condemned. 
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Proscription will lead to an extreme form of this process. It is a form of 
‘escalation of images’ (Zartman and Faure 2005). The previous discussion on the 
material and symbolic effects showed that proscription would affect the 
overarching conflict narrative. At the heart of what is understood as the conflict 
narrative are issues such as the root causes of the conflict and what keeps the 
conflict going.  The main components of this heightened vilification are drawn out 
its Table 3. 
First, the ‘terrorist’ label allows for a country’s problems to be framed in a 
way that does not acknowledge the existence of a conflict and it de-contextualises 
the ‘terrorist’ threat. Second, while vilification usually leads the opponents to treat 
each other with little respect, proscription leads to such extreme demonization that 
the armed group may even disappear all together from official discourse. Third, 
the opponent is framed not only as untrustworthy but also as irrational. This 
entails that the parties cannot trust each other as possible negotiation partners. 
Fourth, proscription also shifts the focus from a political conflict where the 
legitimacy of actors or their objectives are questioned to one where the opponent 
is perceived as not being political - it de-legitimises the cause being fought. 
Simplifying the conflict to a fight against illegal and criminal actors without a 
political agenda rendering eventual negotiations meaningless. Fifth, it casts the 
opponent not just as violent but as an actor that uses a type of violence, ‘terrorist 
violence’, that is unprincipled and immoral so the actor itself is considered 
barbarous, even inhumane. Finally, it rarefies the group into being only a 
‘terrorist’ group. It does not merely condemn terrorist acts placing them in a 
broader arsenal of possible warfare tools, but it turns the armed group itself into 
being just terrorists. The act and the actor become one and the same, which has a 
deep effect on the possibilities for conflict resolution because no change appears 
to be possible.37 
  
																																																								
37 In the context of Northern Ireland and South Africa, Kirkpatrick (2018a) comes to the conclusion that 
criminalisation has to shift away from actors onto acts for conflict resolution to take place. 
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Table 3. Proscription and extreme vilification 
 
Vilification Extreme vilification: the 
terrorist label 
Enemy No conflict/ no enemy/ de-
contextualises 
No respect Demonization/absence 
Untrustworthy Irrational 
Illegitimate De-politicises / criminal / no 
cause 
Violent Not human/ without 
principles/ barbarous 
Actions condemned Act and actor one and the 
same - no change possible 
 
iii. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’  
The material and symbolic interaction explored above showed that that listing is 
in effect productive. Particularly relevant to this study is the constructivist and 
labelling literature’s understanding that a name will place emphasis on certain 
characteristics while neglecting others and thus lead to a more limited set of 
responses. So, this heightened dehumanisation of the enemy justifies using 
methods of combat against them that are outside the laws of traditional warfare. 
But, more importantly for our argument, it also affects the possibility of engaging 
in a negotiation with armed groups labelled as ‘terrorists’. We saw previously that 
for the government, proscription can have the effect of creating a “policy 
straightjacket” (Hicks 1991:29). Similarly, Pettyjohn (2009:141) argued that 
having branded the group ‘terrorists’ in the eyes of national and international 
public opinion “a state is hard put to convince international and domestic 
audiences that the organization is now reformed and worthy of engagement”. 
Not only does the government in effect close down the possibility of being 
seen to negotiate with ‘terrorists’, but also, the labelled group itself can react to 
the label and might not be inclined to enter into a negotiation. Faure (2007: 7) 
captures this conundrum well when he says: 
Labelling the other party a “terrorist” will mean that the party 
designated as such is unlikely to be willing to negotiate. They may 
feel insulted and refuse to enter into relations with the opposing party. 
On the other hand, a state, for example, cannot formally negotiate with 
a terrorist counterpart. 
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The ‘terrorist’ label and the extreme vilification that goes with it lock the 
parties in a catch 22 situation. As Toros (2012:96) argued, the ‘terrorist’ needs to 
be unlabelled to start negotiating. But what has not been explored in this literature 
is how this ‘un-labelling’ takes place. This thesis offers the idea of the ‘linguistic 
ceasefire’ to enhance our understanding of the de-vilification process in the 
context of proscription.38  
The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ is defined as a process through which the 
government starts disarming and de-escalating the language used to describe its 
opponent in a public fashion. Though this particular step is intrinsically linked to 
the broader process of de-vilification, it is helpful to try and isolate it to 
understand its importance and main characteristics. It also tells us something 
useful about the order and the chronology in which things happen. For de-
vilification to happen the villain who has been proscribed first needs to be brought 
back into the realm of ‘normal’ politics so that further de-vilification can take 
place. Or, to put it in other terms, the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ becomes a necessary 
condition for further de-vilification. It is about removing the symbolic impact of 
proscription even if actual de-listing is not possible ahead of negotiations.  
The asymmetrical nature of proscription means that this process of un-
labelling is one-sided. It is important to consider the intrinsic difference here 
between the types of actors and how proscription might affect them, as we saw 
earlier. Non-state armed groups do not have the same audience costs as 
governments both vis-à-vis the general public or vis-à-vis international opinion. It 
is the government that needs to un-label the armed group before the two-sided 
normal de-vilification process can start.  
The shift in language is a conscious and deliberate attempt at sending 
signals. This signalling has multiple audiences and has as much to do with intra-
party as inter-party dynamics. For the government, the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ is an 
effort at shifting the image of the adversary held by the public both nationally and 
internationally. It is also about bringing their constituencies along in this 
transition. In some cases, the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ is incremental and allows 																																																								
38 This is a concept that has not been used before in academic work. Though the idea it encompasses has 
been expressed or described by practitioners and mediators in one form or the other. For example, in an 
entry in Jan Eliasson’s diary when he was mediating the Iran-Iraq negotiations in 1988, he referred to a 
“verbal cease-fire” (quoted in Svensson and Wallensteen 2010: 54). This was to be one of the guiding 
principles for the negotiation. The idea was that it would help build confidence between the parties. 
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certain branches of government to continue using the label to ensure that key 
internal constituencies like the military are brought on board over time. It is also a 
way of signalling their seriousness to their opponent.  
There are three main components to this process (see Table 4). First, the 
government recognises the existence of the conflict. The fight is no longer one of 
‘terrorists’ against a democracy but an armed conflict with two sides (or more). 
This helps re-contextualise the armed group and also makes the possibility of 
negotiating a peace agreement possible. Second, the government refrains from 
using the ‘terrorist’ label; the ‘terrorist’ tag is used less frequently until it is 
replaced by other epithets. Finally, by uncoupling the act of terrorism and the 
actor, the armed group is no longer just a terrorist group, it gains in complexity 
and change becomes a real possibility. 
 
Table 4. Extreme (de)vilification and the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ 
 
Vilification Extreme vilification: 
the terrorist label 
‘Linguistic 
ceasefire’ 
 
De-vilification 
 
Enemy No conflict/ no 
enemy/ de-
contextualises 
1. Recognise the 
conflict 
 
Recognition of 
opponent 
No respect Demonization/ 
absence 
2. Drop  
3. ‘terrorist’  
4. label 
 
Show 
respect/recognition 
(organization/ 
hierarchy) 
Untrustworthy Irrational Can do business 
negotiate with/admit 
rationality 
Illegitimate De-politicises / 
criminal / no cause 
Acknowledge  
political agenda/ 
recognize goals 
Violent Not human/ without 
principles/ barbarous 
Humanization 
Actions 
condemned 
Act and actor one  
and the same - no 
change possible 
5. Uncouple act 
and actor 
Allow for change 
 
2. The impact of proscription on (a)symmetry 
Asymmetry is generally understood as an imbalance in power. The idea being that 
states with unequal power resources confront each other. But, in the case of intra-
state conflicts, asymmetry takes on a different meaning and goes to the heart of 
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how power is understood and contested in violent protracted conflicts. Structural 
and long-lasting asymmetry, which develops over time in protracted conflicts, 
becomes one of the barriers to the inception of peace negotiations. According to 
negotiation literature, a more equal power balance favours negotiations (Albin 
1999; Zartman and Rubin 2004). Or to put it in different terms “symmetry is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for successful negotiations” (Pfetsch and 
Landau 2000: 40). It is based on a simple argument – “Equals make peace more 
readily and more easily than unequals” (Mitchell 1995: 36).  
Conflicts where the armed group is proscribed internationally are 
asymmetrical by definition. Yet, as Telledis (2015) points out, the opposite is true 
for conflict resolution frameworks, where symmetry is of essence. Diana Francis 
(2002) rightly contends that conflict transformation must have something radical 
to offer in conflicts where power asymmetry is not incidental but of essence. So, 
to understand how proscription and pre-negotiations can coexist and what the 
effect of one is on the other, there is a need to develop a more complex 
understanding of the sources of power and thus of asymmetry and symmetry. We 
also need to explore how symmetry is generally established and what the effects 
of proscription are both on asymmetry and on the ways it is usually reduced to 
encourage symmetry.  
i. Sources of power  
In today’s state-centred international system, “states often have the power to 
construct and structure notions of legitimacy and to enforce state legitimacy 
through dominant discourses and political and legal processes.” (McAuley, 
McGlynn and Tonge 2009: 90). But sources of power cannot be taken for granted 
in a conflict-context where legitimacy is deeply contested. Assymetry does not 
always lean towards the state. We have to dig a bit deeper in our understanding of 
the sources of power. More traditional accounts of power fail to understand 
resources and capacities in the broadest sense. Realists see power as force, neo-
realists approach power as resources. But, as Zartman (1997) pointed out, both fail 
to take on the use of less material resources such as will and skill. 
 A seminal article from the mid 1970s already highlighted the importance of 
political and more immaterial sources of power in the context of highly 
asymmetrical inter-state conflicts. Andrew Mack’s (1975) article in World 
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Politics, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars’, showed how militarily and 
technologically stronger countries lost wars to smaller/weaker states. In 
explaining why that was the case he highlighted the importance of political will. 
In the case of the smaller/weaker countries they leveled the asymmetry by 
perceiving the war as ‘total’ whereas external power saw it as  ‘limited’ as their 
opponent was not in a position to threaten their survival. As he incisively put it: 
“The constraints on mobilization are political, not material.” (Mack 1975: 179). 
Though this piece was written in relation to inter-state conflicts, the lessons are 
also relevant for intra-state conflicts where the sources of power that a 
government or a non-state armed group can command might be rather different 
(Ohlson 1998). 
So, an understanding of power focussed just on resources such as military or 
economic resources cannot account for these other forms of power. George 
Mitchell highlighted the need to differentiate types of “power as advantage” and 
how they are distributed amongst adversaries (Mitchell 2009: Notes 1). In doing 
so, he differentiated between different types of power: legal or status asymmetry, 
resources or capability asymmetry, behavioural asymmetries of tactics, moral 
asymmetry (i.e. right and wrong) and structural asymmetries (i.e. differences in 
the nature and conditions of conflict adversaries) (Mitchell 1991: 31; Mitchell 
1995). Similarly, Philipson (2005: 68) showed the diversity in sources of power in 
asymmetrical conflicts by highlighting “’soft’ and ‘hard’ political power; the 
commitment of constituencies, combatants and politicians; communication and 
bilateral relationships; and the political will to apply resources to war and peace”.  
All these different sources of power are important to develop an 
understanding of asymmetry and symmetry. To be able to evaluate both the 
material and symbolic dimensions of power in interaction, we fold these different 
sources of power under two main headings:  1) Status and 2) Resources (see Table 
5). So, status (a)symmetry would include the legal and status (a)symmetries 
mentioned by Mitchell (2009), but also the point made by Philipson (2005) on 
communication and bilateral/international relations. The resources (a)symmetry 
would include both material resources, such as military might and economic 
strength, but also the more abstract notions of capacity asymmetry and the will or 
skill flagged by Mack (1975) and Zartman (1997) as well as political and moral 
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asymmetry. Behavioural asymmetries of tactics would be folded in with military 
might. The commitment of constituencies, combatants and politicians would come 
under the heading of will and skills.39  
Table 5. Sources of power and (a)symmetry 
Sources of power (A)symmetry 
Status Legal 
Status 
International 
contacts/relations 
Resources  
 
Military might and tactics 
Will and skills 
Economic 
Political/moral 
 
ii. From asymmetry to perceiving symmetry 
Moving from a situation of power asymmetry to one of symmetry between 
conflict parties is a central feature of the pre-negotiation phase. “But in reality, it 
is not the fact of symmetry or asymmetry that can be related to behaviors but its 
perception, or power as perceived relation.” (Zartman 1997: 230 – emphasis 
added). A number of authors concur that perception by the conflict parties 
mediates objective reality and is central to understanding what constitutes 
asymmetry or symmetry (Mitchell 1995; Aggestam 2010; and Zartman and Rubin 
2000; Zartman 1997; Pfetsch and Labdau 2000; McAuley, McGlynn and Tonge 
2008). What is under investigation here is thus the asymmetry or symmetry in the 
perception of power not as an objective reality. Central to this is the need for the 
weaker party to develop a sense of increased power, so that both sides come to see 
their power as equal (Pruitt 2009).  
In exploring what he described as the “structuralist dilemma” Zartman 
(1997, 1999) explained how a party that is effectively weaker can negotiate with a 
party that is stronger and still get something.  Though this work has centred on 
inter-state negotiation processes the key findings can still be applied. Firstly, the 
weaker party gained sources of power by using the negotiation process and its 
evolution through equalizing actions rather than necessarily acquiring actual status 
equality (Zartman 1997). Secondly, the weaker parties tried to ‘borrow power’ 																																																								
39 The structural asymmetries mentioned by Mitchell (1991, 1995) are purposely left out because they 
cannot be easily shifted in terms of fostering perceived symmetry ahead of negotiations.  
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from various sources but particularly from third party actors. This conclusion 
chimes with Ohlson (1998) and Kriesberg (2009) who argued that though 
asymmetry in negotiations is complex and multi-faceted, third party facilitated 
dialogue have often succeeded in altering this asymmetry. So, third party actors 
are key in helping to build perceived symmetry. 
To understand how perceived symmetry is established in the pre-negotiation 
phase it is useful to explore for each source of power identified how they have 
been shifted during pre-negotiations drawing from the conflict and peace literature 
(See Table 6). 
Table 6. How perceived symmetry can be encouraged 
 
Sources of power (A)symmetry How perceived symmetry 
can be encouraged 
Status Legal Official/belligerent status  
Status Political recognition 
International 
contacts/relations 
International recognition 
Direct contact 3rd parties 
Resources  
 
Military might and tactics Ceasefire/demilitarized 
area/prisoner swap 
Will and skills Negotiation skills 
training/borrow from  
process 
Economic External support 
Political/moral Wide-ranging 
contacts/constituencies 
 
Status asymmetry can be reversed by giving the weaker party an official 
status, for example a belligerent status or by endowing it with some form of 
political recognition. A method that is commonly used to increase legal symmetry 
is to increase the legal status of the armed group (Mitchell 1995:31). Another way 
symmetry can be encouraged is through international recognition or support. This 
can be done by lobbying and contacts in other countries, armed group leaders 
setting off on world tours, setting-up quasi-embassies, or trying to get a form of 
affiliation in an international organization. Certain armed groups, for example, 
have been able to mount successful lobbying campaigns. The ANC’s fourth pillar 
of struggle was about isolating the apartheid forces in the international arena. 
Similarly in Aceh, GAM intensified its international advocacy efforts in 2002 and 
2003: “In its search for international legitimacy to balance its asymmetrical 
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position with Jakarta, the exiled leadership advanced its political cause by shifting 
from anti-capitalist and anti-Western discourses to appeals for human rights and 
democracy.” (Dudouet 2009:34).  
In terms of resources, generally the ways in which material resources such 
as military might and economic resources are equalized are more commonly 
addressed in the literature. Armed groups for example entertain cross-border 
relations with state-sponsors or other armed groups to get weapons, training 
grounds or safe havens. Governments that are feeling under military pressure buy 
weapons from abroad and sometimes get direct military hardware support or even 
sometimes direct intervention. These are ways of addressing the asymmetry that 
effectively escalate the confrontation. But, when it comes to de-escalation, a range 
of measures can be taken that are aimed at building confidence between the 
conflict parties and creating a sense of symmetry ahead of future peace 
negotiations. These confidence-building measures include ceasefires or the 
establishment of neutral zones or prisoner exchanges for example. 
The diversity in skill and understanding of the negotiation process is another 
area where much can be done to create perceived symmetry. States tend to be 
more familiar with diplomatic norms, understanding of negotiation processes and 
have pre-established political agendas. Armed groups have less of an 
understanding of the structure, pace and process of negotiations (Lustenberger 
2012). According to Dudouet and Planta (2012), armed groups can level the 
playing field by filling their knowledge gap about the technical asymmetries of 
the negotiation itself. Kriesberg (2009) argued that a mediator’s involvement 
tends to lend support to those that can articulate goals and methods more clearly. 
Philipson (2005:71) went a step further arguing that dealing with strong 
asymmetry often requires “the mediator to give unbalanced assistance directly or 
persuade other experts to work directly with the weaker party – government or 
non-government.” 
In terms of political and moral resources, armed groups often claim to 
represent a defined constituency and have a complex web of relationships. Public 
marches and demonstrations can strengthen the party that can mobilize large 
groups of people (Kriesberg 2009:8).  Armed groups can also build alliances. In 
Nepal, for example, the Maoists established a strategic alliance with the seven-
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party alliance in 2005, which is thought to have contributed to the success of the 
third round of peace negotiations (Dudouet 2009: 31). 
Having sketched out the key elements of (a)symmetry and the ways in 
which symmetry tends to be encouraged in a pre-negotiation phase, the chapter 
turns to assessing the effects of proscription on status and resources (a)symmetry.  
 
iii. Effect of proscription on (a)symmetry 
Proscription will influence both the nature of the asymmetry between the 
government and the armed group but also the way the perception of symmetry is 
generally encouraged.  
Status (a)symmetry 
Conflict parties spend much time either trying to reduce or maintain the “legal 
distance” between each other (Mitchell 1995:30). In this context, a central strategy 
of conflict parties is “to have one’s own version of favourable legal imbalance 
accepted in an international court” (Mitchell 1995:32). The international 
proscription of armed groups thus becomes a central ‘battleground’ in this 
process. Through international proscription, the state finds its legal status 
improved and the listed group finds its legal status much reduced. Moreover, the 
central symbolic effect of proscription is that it denies armed groups legitimacy 
and recognition (Bahtia 2008, Toros 2008, Höglund 2011, Franks 2012) as we 
saw earlier. But while it delegitimises armed group violence from the outset, it 
also bolsters the legitimacy of the state. This goes hand in hand with increased 
international contacts and support for the government which are severely reduced 
for the listed armed group because of the stigma attached to engaging with a listed 
entity but also through material provisions of travel bans and having to close 
offices or representations in foreign countries. 
So, in the case of the armed group or the ‘weaker party’ being proscribed we 
can expect the status asymmetry between the parties to be heightened, but how 
might it affect the ways perceived symmetry is generally encouraged ahead of 
negotiations. National or international de-listing can be a way of rebalancing the 
asymmetry by in effect annulling the effect of proscription both materially and 
symbolically. Zartman and Faure (2011:5) argue that the fact of engaging and 
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later negotiating with the group automatically “carry with them recognition of the 
terrorist organization (and, for the terrorists, the recognition of the state)”. But, 
because of the high political cost associated with this recognition in the context of 
proscription we might either see a refusal by the government to grant it or a more 
indirect or incremental process of recognition. Such as the government putting in 
place a ‘linguistic ceasefire’, which, as we saw earlier, would annul the symbolic 
impact of proscription, giving the armed group some form of subtle recognition.  
While generally the weaker party will “borrow” power from other actors, 
such as international contacts or third party actors, in the context of proscription 
the symbolic and material effects will lead these contacts to be reduced or secret. 
The armed groups might also try to tip the balance in their favour by receiving 
recognition and support from countries that choose to stay out of the proscription 
regime or circumvent it.  
Resources (a)symmetry 
Material forms of military support for the government, be it just advice, 
intelligence, military hardware or financial aid, will generally accompany 
international proscription. For the listed armed group, that will translate in 
heightened military pressure and, possibly, a shift in tactic or behaviour. Whereas 
instigating a bilateral ceasefire or prisoner swap might normally foster symmetry, 
proscription might make these strategies too costly politically for the government. 
We might however see efforts on the part of the listed group to pursue unilateral 
tactics such as one-sided ceasefires or hostage releases. 
Some of the material consequences of proscription on armed groups, such as 
asset freezes, will lead to practical ramifications in terms of an armed groups’ 
access to funds and fund-raising capacities. Meanwhile, the government will most 
likely be receiving increased financial support internationally. This will heighten 
the asymmetry. Listed entities may find a way around it by receiving support from 
actors that have opted out of the proscription regime to bolster themselves. 
Proscription will have an effect on the access to trainings and skills for the 
listed group. Certain provisions in proscription regimes, which criminalise contact 
with listed groups or actions that constitute support to the groups such as funding 
or travel, might affect the possibility of holding training workshops. As we saw 
above and in the practitioner work on the effect of proscription on third party 
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actors, proscription seems to have a “chilling effect” on third parties, leading them 
to avoid, or to question how far they can take interaction with listed groups 
(Dudouet 2011).  
While proscription will inevitably lead to a loss of moral legitimacy for the 
listed armed group, it can also stigmatize local communities where the group 
operates or support networks such as diaspora communities. Furthermore, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, the cause associated with the listed group itself might be deeply 
discredited. To redress the asymmetry, the listed group will be much more limited 
in its contacts and abilities to generate explicit political support such as marches 
or alliances ahead of negotiations both because of the material and symbolic 
effects of proscription.  
In the context of proscription, the listed armed group will be limited in its 
ability to ‘borrow’ power. Moreover the government will be less willing to 
establish (perceived) symmetry with the armed group. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ 
offers the government a way to give the group a sense of increased status without 
the high political costs associated with other forms of recognition. Moreover, a 
form of parity of esteem might be established through the pre-negotiation process 
itself. But the government will be unwilling to shift the resources asymmetry in 
favour of the listed group. The proscribed group might get around some of these 
difficulties through unilateral gestures and by receiving support from actors that 
have opted out of the proscription regime. 
3. The impact of proscription on ripeness 
Central to the understanding of pre-negotiation is the concept of ripeness. It is 
particularly well suited to answer questions around the timing of negotiation: Why 
did parties enter into negotiations? And particularly, why then? I. William 
Zartman (1989, 2000) argued that two conditions are necessary but not sufficient 
for a conflict to be ripe: the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out. Before 
assessing the effect of proscription on this classical conflict resolution idea, the 
chapter revisits theses concepts. 
i. Revisiting the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out 
There has been much scholarly discussion on this notion of ripeness. Some 
arguing that a ripe moment can only be identified post-facto so is weak in terms of 
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its predictive capacity (Lederach 2008). Others contend that instead of ripeness 
one should talk about willingness (Kleiboer 1994; Mitchell 1996) or readiness 
(Pruitt 2005; Schiff 2014) of conflict parties. But these concepts have become so 
embedded in explaining the timing of negotiations that even policy-makers and 
conflict parties themselves refer to them.  
Yet, much of the focus on ripeness has revolved around the concept of the 
mutually hurting stalemate rather than the way out, and particularly the hurting 
element of it in military terms especially when it comes to how it has been 
translated in conflict resolution circles.40 One recent example is a piece in the 
Atlantic by Jonathan Powell (2015), Tony Blair’s former negotiator during the 
Good Friday agreement, where he reflects on the need to negotiate with ISIS. 
Powell (2015) stated:  
Past experience tells us, however, that it would be sensible to open a 
secret channel now so we can communicate with ISIS and put 
ourselves in a position to negotiate once we have arrived at a 
“mutually hurting stalemate” in which both sides realize they cannot 
win militarily.  
 
This portrayal of ripeness shows the typical simplification of the concept to the 
mutually hurting stalemate element and its purely military nature. Much of the 
initial richness of ‘ripeness theory’ has been lost along the way. This framework 
hopes to salvage it.  
Parties perceive a stalemate when both sides think the costs of continuing 
the struggle exceed the benefits. There is an important psychological element to 
this process. It is not the stalemate itself that leads parties to the table but the 
perception of that stalemate. There is no such thing as an objective stalemate, as 
has often been mischaracterized. The parties’ perception of a stalemate is central 
to the concept of ripe moment (Zartman 1998; Zartman 2008). This is similar to 
Kleibor’s (1994) subjective dimension of willingness. Zartman (1998; 2015) has 
elaborated this point further in the context of the Middle East by highlighting the 
subjective nature of pain and the fact that parties often insulate themselves from 																																																								
40  See for example Ulracher (2013). Also, See Johnson & Jonsson (2013:74) for an illustration of how the 
mutually hurting stalemate analysis is applied in the case of Colombia: “The Colombian conflict may thus 
have reached a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, since FARC has been diminished and cannot realistically 
expect to return to its former size and military capability, while the Colombian government cannot expect 
to win the conflict through military means alone.”  
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feeling it. Moreover, the mutual element means that it has to be perceived and 
‘felt’ as a stalemate on both sides.  
But pain is not purely military and can be felt through all sorts of factors. As 
Zartman himself noted during a panel at an ISA Conference in 2014, the mutually 
hurting stalemate does not have to come in “body bags”. Moreover, though the 
deadlock has to be painful to both of them, it does not have to be for the same 
reasons or to the same degree (Zartman 2003). This thesis argues that the mutually 
hurting stalemate has both a military and a political component. Military costs are 
more obvious, things like the loss of territory, soldiers, the killing of leadership or 
desertions etc. Politically, some elements to look out for are things like changes in 
leadership (Zartman and de Soto 2010; Ulracher 2013), generational changes for 
the armed group or changes in allies (Zartman and de Soto 2010) or in public 
opinion or the mobilisation of citizens towards peace for example.  
The other part of the story is that alongside the pain of the stalemate, 
conflict parties also need to perceive a way out, meaning that both sides need to 
see a negotiated solution as possible. Otherwise “the push associated with the 
mutually hurting stalemate would leave the parties with nowhere to go” (Zartman 
2003). So party A convinces party B it is willing and able to negotiate: “Parties do 
not have to be able to identify a specific solution, but they must have the sense 
that a negotiated solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and 
the willingness to search for a solution” (Zartman and de Soto: 6). Third party 
actors can play important roles in helping the parties see a way out. 
Following the work done by scholars like Stedman (1991), Mitchell (2008) 
and Ulracher (2013), this thesis aims to reinstate the importance of the way out 
vis-à-vis the mutually hurting stalemate in understanding why parties come to the 
negotiation table. The concept of the way out is crucial because it is about parties 
being able to see another path to achieving their goals, a political path. Whereas 
the original formulation of the way out is focussed on inter-party changes (i.e. 
party A convinces party B), this framework adds an internal dimension to the way 
out. The party itself has to see that it has a way out. By looking at the intra-party 
dynamic it allows for an analysis of shifts within a party that lead them to 
consider exploring the decision to negotiate. So, both parties need to sense that 
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negotiation is an option and that the other side is willing to negotiate in good 
faith.  
This builds on the most useful additions to the ripeness concept, which have 
highlighted the lack of a political dimension in the original formulation. Authors 
such as Haas (1990), Stedman (1991), Mitchell (1996), Pruitt (2005) and Ulracher 
(2013) all conclude that there is a need to incorporate the analysis of internal 
political processes that influence decision-making for each party (Pruitt 2005). 
Indeed, Mitchell (1996:12) developed the idea of ‘internal ripeness’ and argued 
that “the willingness of leaders to contemplate a process of peaceful resolution is 
as likely to depend crucially on conditions being appropriate within both parties as 
well as between them”.  
While these authors had flagged the importance of looking at the internal 
dimension of ripeness, the application of this idea had been rather limited 
especially when it came to understanding the changes that lead armed groups to 
perceive ripeness. Even Ulracher (2013) who’s article is entitled ‘Negotiating with 
Insurgents: Changing Perceptions or Changing Politics?’ only focused on the 
governments’ perspectives because of what he described as empirical constraints. 
He argued there was less data available on the preferences of rebel leaders. This 
thesis aims to fill this gap because internal dynamics and debate are also central to 
the process of ripening for armed groups, even the most seemingly authoritarian 
ones. To allow us to do this it is helpful to complement concepts such as the 
mutually hurting stalemate and the way out with the recent literature on armed 
group focussed on intra-party change explored above. Ideas such as the 
‘composite actor approach’ (Pearlman 2010) and the ‘institutional equilibrium’ 
(McLauchlin and Pearlman 2011) will be helpful in understanding intra-party 
shifts when it comes to armed groups. 
Finally, a more central challenge to the concept of ripeness has been its 
simplification to the idea that if a conflict is not ripe then conflict resolution 
efforts should not be attempted, as they will fail. Zartman himself has clarified 
that unripeness should not constitute an excuse for third party inaction (Zartman 
2008): “The absence of ripeness is not a valid reason for inaction. Prospective 
mediators (and the parties themselves) can develop a policy of ripening” (Zartman 
and de Soto 2010:6). Here the role of other actors is key in terms of helping 
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parties perceive a mutually hurting stalemate and a way out. As we saw above, 
third parties can help belligerent groups ‘de-commit’ from the military 
confrontation and help shape a way out. Similarly, broader civil society can also 
help foster a way out by calling on the parties to enter into dialogue. 
Building on the same idea, and in the absence of a mutually hurting 
stalemate, Zartman (2005) also developed the idea of a ‘mutually enticing 
opportunity’. This can happen when the way out takes over from the mutually 
hurting stalemate. It is “the pull of an attractive outcome” (Zartman 2005: 1). The 
pull factor becomes the motor towards the negotiation instead of the push of the 
mutually hurting stalemate. Cases where this has happened and been successful 
are few and far between (Zartman 2005). 
Having revisited the key concepts of ripeness the chapter now turns to 
understanding the possible effects of proscription. 
ii. Effect of proscription on the mutually hurting stalemate and the 
way out 
Proscription as a type of sanction is intended to make the targeted armed group 
hurt. If our understanding of ripeness were focussed on the hurting element of 
ripeness in military terms the assumption would be that proscription would help 
ripen the conflict. But, as a more complete understanding of the mutually hurting 
stalemate and the way out made clear, the way proscription will play out is not 
that straight forward.  In fact, proscription may work against ripeness by 
postponing the mutually hurting stalemate and blocking the way out. 
Postponing the Stalemate 
International proscription may strengthen the government militarily and 
strategically, which could have an impact on the military component of the 
mutually hurting stalemate. As we saw earlier, the re-casting of armed groups as 
‘terrorists’ on the global arena translates into specific shifts both symbolically and 
materially. At a symbolic level, for the government, it gives increased legitimacy 
and support for its campaign against the group. Giving more support to the type of 
fight being led against the group focussed on increasing stability and security 
through police and military initiatives and not political engagement. At the same 
time, international proscription and having ones enemy subsumed in the ‘broader 
	 116	
war on terror’ can also lead to very direct material consequences such as extra 
resources, training, intelligence equipment and information that might affect the 
military equilibrium. 
The assumption would be that such a shift would push armed groups 
towards feeling a hurting stalemate, or the feeling that they will not win the war 
through the use of violence. But two factors need to be taken into consideration. 
First, it will depend on the armed group’s support structure and resources and  
whether or not these will be affected materially by international proscription. If 
they have a sponsor that is not aligned with the multilateral proscription regime 
they might be able to circumvent some of the ‘pain’. Second, we have now 
established that there is no such thing as an objective stalemate, the effect depends 
on the armed group’s world-view and how it perceives its own military strength 
and its relationship with its constituents. The party can somehow insulate itself 
from feeling this ‘pain’ (Zartman 2015). And, as Pearlman’s (2010) composite 
actor approach indicates, there might also be discrepancies within the group with 
some feeling the material and symbolic pain more than others.  
Moreover, politically, while the international proscription of an armed group 
as a terrorist organisation means the armed group might feel de-legitimized 
nationally and internationally, its effect will also depend substantially on the 
group’s own perception and what shapes its understanding of itself, going back to 
Adler-Nissen’s (2014) point on counter-stigmatisation. This raises important 
questions as to how the armed group itself or individuals within it might react to 
the label of internationally branded ‘terrorist’.  
Crucially, the government, emboldened by this external support, may feel 
that it can win the war militarily, thus moving them further away from perceiving 
a military stalemate. This chimes with what Grieg and Diehl (2012:109) argue 
when they say that the “unconstrained side” would continue fighting, leading to a 
one-sided stalemate. This could, in effect, postpone a mutually hurting stalemate 
from emerging. Moreover, by getting their outlook of their opponent symbolically 
validated on the world stage through international proscription, governments’ will 
feel politically validated and recognised in their endeavour to tackle the group. 
This might entail that the government would not feel pressured externally into 
feeling the political component of a mutually hurting stalemate either.  
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However, there might be particular political costs associated with the 
strategy pursued that, over time, could create resistance and pressure.  Human 
rights violations associated with the type of strategy pursued by the government in 
its fight against ‘terrorists’ can create a backlash nationally or internationally. If 
international proscription comes along with material support to the military, the 
governments in these countries may come under pressure from human rights 
groups and other advocacy networks to ensure that international standards are 
adhered to. If this is not the case, then the belligerent government might itself 
come under pressure to shift its behaviour, or at least feel some political pain 
inching it closer to perceiving a political stalemate.  
No Way Out 
Whether or not international proscription pushes the parties towards a stalemate, 
some kind of turning point in perception is needed to turn a stalemate into a search 
for alternatives (Zartman 1995). This is where the way out comes in. How would 
proscription affect the process through which parties can envisage a way out? We 
have already assessed how proscription might affect the roles played by third 
party actors, but how would it affect 1) inter-party relations; and 2) intra-party 
relations.  First, in terms of the inter-party relationship, the question is, does 
proscription impede one side signalling to the other that it is ready to negotiate? 
By getting their judgement of the armed group being a ‘terrorist’ validated on the 
world stage, the government in effect makes it near impossible to publically 
engage the proscribed group. As we saw above, international proscription appears 
to put the armed group beyond the pale of dialogue, or at least, it would raise the 
costs of engagement so much that any initial overtures would have to be indirect, 
led by third parties and deniable. So, governments would be unable to signal 
willingness to negotiate publically. Moreover, the armed group would be faced 
with the only option available if negotiations are off the table, to surrender and 
demobilise. 
Second, we saw above that intra-party dynamics are central to perceiving a 
way out. For the government, we established that a direct side effect of the 
vilification of their ‘terrorist’ opponent and the focus on a no-negotiation stance, 
builds-up resistance within the state and with its own constituents which limits the 
state’s freedom of action (Hicks 1991, Pecastaing 2011). International listings will 
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reinforce this trend and entrench an understanding of the armed group as un-
engageable. This will also affect the space for manoeuvre the government has at 
an international level putting the government in a difficult position if they want to 
reverse their policy. The other dimension to bear in mind is whether the armed 
group itself, having been proscribed, can envisage a way out? How would 
international proscription affect the ‘institutional equilibrium’ within the group? It 
might strengthen the hand of those advocating for the continuation of the armed 
struggle because of the absence of obvious political options or alternatives? The 
de-politicisation associated with proscription would lead its politics to be pushed 
further underground. Through the de-legitimisation of its cause internationally and 
through material impacts such as the closing of offices or travel bans, the group 
would see their political options as closed nationally and internationally. This 
could play a crucial role in them not perceiving a way out.   
It appears that proscription will distort the classic conflict resolution 
paradigm of the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out: the mutually hurting 
stalemate might be postponed and the way out might be blocked. So, how do we 
explain the conundrum that set us on the path for this research - that contrary to 
what we might expect, governments do end up negotiating with proscribed armed 
groups? What explains the manner in which the way out is encouraged in the 
context of proscription? For that we need to go back to the idea of the ‘linguistic 
ceasefire’ developed earlier, and add a new idea, the creation of a ‘political 
landing strip’. 
Creating a way out: the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the ‘political landing strip’ 
We argued above that the way out has two main components: the inter-party 
dynamic and the intra-party dimension. In terms of the inter-party element, we 
saw that the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ is a crucial first step in the process of public de-
vilification of the proscribed armed group. It sets the stage for further reciprocal 
de-vilification and opens the possibility of public pre-negotiations by annulling 
the symbolic effects of proscription. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ is a deliberate and 
conscious attempt to open-up political space and create possibility for dialogue. It 
has three components: (1) recognise the conflict; (2) drop the ‘terrorist’ label and 
(3) uncouple the actor from the acts. While this concept goes some way in 
explaining how the government can signal willingness to negotiate to the armed 
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group – thus the inter-party dimension of the way out - it is not enough to 
influence the intra-party dynamics or to show the armed group that a political path 
is possible.   
What is needed is a ‘political landing strip’ that allows the proscribed armed 
group itself to envision another path to achieving its goals. This needs to happen 
at three levels: 1) international level; 2) national level; 3) local level. 
Internationally the proscribed group needs to have countries or examples of armed 
groups that have made successful political transitions. These foreign actors can 
show the group that other paths are possible beyond the armed one. At a national 
level, what is crucial is that some political space is opened up which allows the 
group to perceive the possibility of a political future. Here, national civil society, 
political parties, academic, religious actors can play a role. Locally, in areas where 
the armed group operates, grassroots movements, insider mediators or local 
communities being politically active can show the group that a non-violent path is 
possible. 
The idea of a ‘political landing strip’ also helps us understand how a conflict 
can be ripened. Here the role of other actors is key in terms of helping parties 
perceive a way out. As we saw above, third parties can help belligerent groups 
‘de-commit’ from the military confrontation and shape a way out. But other actors 
as well, such as foreign governments, civil society, church leaders, actors close to 
armed groups, local communities can also play a fundamental role in shifting the 
perspectives of armed actors and showing them a political path. 
Before concluding, it is helpful to reflect back on the possible effects of 
proscription on the three central processes of pre-negotiation being analysed. It 
appears that international proscription will not only lead to extreme vilification, 
but it will also heighten the asymmetry between the government and the listed 
armed group. Moreover, the mutually hurting stalemate might well be postponed 
and the way out could be blocked. So how can we explain the conundrum that set 
us on the path for this thesis, that negotiations do still take place with proscribed 
groups? One central element that appears to explain how pre-negotiation happens 
in the context of proscription is the ‘linguistic ceasefire’. As we see in Diagram 2, 
it cuts across all the three processes and becomes a pre-condition not just for 
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further de-vilification but also for the establishment of a perception of symmetry 
and to create a way out of the military confrontation. 
 
Diagram 2. The effect of proscription on pre-negotiation processes 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
By drawing on the peace and conflict literature, this chapter built an analytical 
framework to study the effects of proscription on the inception of peace 
negotiations. While previous attempts at assessing the impact of proscription have 
been either ad hoc or narrowly focussed on third party actors, this framework 
offers a more nuanced and systematic way of assessing the possible effects of 
proscription. It is centred on understanding the material and symbolic effects of 
proscription on the main actors involved and the central processes through which 
these parties get to the negotiation table.  
By delving into three dynamics that lie at the heart of pre-negotiations, the 
move from vilification to de-vilification, the shift from asymmetry to perceiving 
symmetry and the mutually hurting stalemate to the way out, the chapter revisited 
central concepts and added to them. It drew out some of the key components of 
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these ideas to establish what the effects of proscription might be and also offered 
new ideas to understand pre-negotiations in the context of proscription such as the 
‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the ‘political landing strip’. 
Though this framework might need to be adjusted depending on the context 
explored, it should remain general and dynamic enough to fit the large class of 
cases this study is interested in. In order to explore its utility and the insights it 
can generate we now turn to its application in a concrete case:  the two instances 
of pre-negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC.  
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Chapter	Five	
(De)Vilification and the ‘Linguistic Ceasefire’ 
 
Introduction 
In July 1998, a month before being sworn in as President of Colombia, President 
elect Andres Pastrana made a perilous journey to Southern Colombia to meet with 
Manuel Marulanda then leader of the FARC. The video of the men exchanging 
warm handshakes and slaps on the back was broadcast at a press conference in 
Bogotá to announce the upcoming Caguán negotiations. This was the first meeting 
between a Colombian President and the leader of the FARC. It was also heavily 
publicised and took place even before the President was sworn in or before actual 
negotiations with the armed group were initiated.  
In stark contrast, in September 2012, as the news leaked that President Juan 
Manuel Santos was leading exploratory talks with the FARC, he was forced to 
make a public announcement. At a podium in the Casa de Nariño, flanked by his 
military high command, President Santos announced the signature of a framework 
agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. This framework 
agreement, signed between the Colombian government and the FARC on 26 
August 2012, which set the stage for the Havana negotiations, was the 
culmination of a two-year secret pre-negotiation process. It included six agenda 
points and set the ‘end of the conflict’ as the overarching objective of the 
negotiations. It would take another two years for a public handshake to take place 
between President Santos and Rodrigo Londoño, then leader of the FARC.  
These contrasting images illustrate the gulf between the two sets of pre-
negotiations, particularly in terms of de-vilification processes. Understanding 
these processes is the central concern of this chapter.  It examines how the 
international proscription of the FARC affected the processes of vilification and 
de-vilification between the Colombian government and the armed group. It does 
so by comparing these (de)vilification processes before and after the FARC was 
proscribed as a ‘terrorist’ organisation. 
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In Chapter 4 it was noted that  (de)vilification is a two-way process. This 
chapter explores that dynamic by mapping and analysing the representations each 
conflict party – the Colombian government and the FARC - made of the other. 
The chapter examines the language used, the associations made and how that has 
evolved at different moments and over time during the two pre-negotiation phases 
leading up to the Caguán and Havana negotiations. The chapter analyses twenty 
years of statements and communiqués by successive Colombian governments and 
the FARC and triangulates this with interview data.  
Pre-negotiation, as we saw in Chapter 4, requires changing the public image 
of the adversary. Both parties need to be de-vilainised in a public and credible 
way. The central components of this process identified in Chapter 4 include the 
recognition of the conflict and their opponent, showing a certain amount of 
respect and recognition for each other, acknowledging a level of rationality, 
recognizing each other’s political agenda, appreciating each other’s humanity and 
lastly conceding that the other can change.  
This chapter argues that before proscription each conflict party was able to 
react to opportunities fluidly and shift language – the key indicator of the degree 
of vilification - accordingly. Following proscription, de-vilification gets stickier 
as shifting the characterisations becomes harder and takes more time. This is 
especially true of the government, which, having vilified its opponent in an 
extreme way, cannot simply switch directly to de-vilification. First it has 
to normalise its vilification – a concept described in Chapter 4 as a ‘linguistic 
ceasefire’. This has three main components: 1) recognise the conflict; 2) drop the 
‘terrorist’ label and 3) uncouple the act and the actor. 
Looking first at the pre-negotiation processes that led to the Caguán 
negotiation (1999-2002) between the Colombian government and the FARC, in a 
pre-proscription era, allows us to analyse a ‘normal’ context and how both parties 
went about de-vilifying each other. Then the chapter analyses how proscription 
affected vilification on both sides, before looking at the lead-up to the Havana 
negotiation (2012-2016), which allows us to analyse a post-proscription context, 
and how this affected vilification and the de-vilification process as well as the 
onset of the negotiations. First, however, it is necessary to outline a brief 
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background to the dominant narratives produced by both sides before President 
Pastrana came to power. 
 
I. Background 
Picking-up the thread from the brief background on the Colombian conflict 
sketched out in Chapter 1, we see that the international understanding of the 
FARC has evolved over time and been deeply influenced by the US. There have 
been three, sometimes overlapping, international frameworks that have dominated 
the understanding of the Colombian conflict: 1) the Cold War, 2) the War on 
Drugs and 3) the War on Terror. But while the international portrayal of the 
FARC shifted, in Colombia it stayed broadly the same. Since emerging in the 
early 1960s and during the period leading-up to 9/11, the portrayal by the 
government of the FARC varied of course from government to government but it 
stayed broadly consistent.  
The FARC were portrayed as a classic enemy by the Colombian 
government: violent and illegitimate. Looking at the statements across the 
administrations of President César Gaviria (1990-1994) and President Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) for example, we can see the efforts at vilifying the group 
mainly focused on categorising its violence as illegitimate describing “violent 
acts”, “subversion” and “practices that are contrary to norms”41 such as the use of  
“mines”, “torture” and the recruitment of “minors”42 and at other times even as 
“terrorism”. 43  Successive Colombian Presidents explicitly condemned the 
FARC’s methods but refrained from vilifying the organisation itself as ‘narco-
terrorist’ or ‘terrorist’ focussing instead on vilifying the actions and the behaviour 
of the group.  
Similarly, the FARC vilified successive governments characterising them as 
“militaristic” and waging an “integral war” 44  or as “illegitimate”. 45  As the 
violence against them intensified, they increase their vilification too, using words 																																																								
41 Samper, E. 1994, ‘Mensaje del Presidente Ernesto Samper con occasion del día nacional de los 
derechos humanos’, 9 September. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de un proceso de paz: 
Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, Tomo IV: Bogotá, 
Colombia, p.103. 
42 Ibid, pp.108-109. 
43 Gaviria, C. 1991, ‘Se ha deterirado el diálogo’, 11 July. 
44 FARC-EP, 1992, ‘Comunicado CGSB’, 17 October; FARC-EP, 1992, ‘Nueva constituyente para salir 
del caos’, 9 November; FARC-EP, 1993, ‘Mensaje al parlamento Colombiano’, 1 February; FARC-EP, 
1993, ‘Circular interna FARC-EP’, 19 February. 
45 FARC-EP, 1996, ‘El mandato Samper-de la Calle es ilegítimo: el president debe renunciar’, February. 
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such as “terror”46 , “military terror” 47  or “fascist legislation”48 . The FARC, 
appeared to have used increasingly vilifying language the more they felt under 
military pressure, during the Gaviria administration, for example, and softened 
their discourse at times when negotiations appeared possible with Samper and 
then later with Pastrana. 
Similarly, when governments were paving the way for possible negotiations 
the tone would shift and the FARC would be portrayed as an actor that could be 
engaged with. These shifts were always fluid. President Samper for example 
recognised the “armed conflict”49 and talked of the need for “peace”, “dialogue”, 
“peace policy” and a “negotiated solution”.50 He also showed a certain level of 
recognition for the organization by using its acronym “FARC”. 51 Government 
documents also referred to the group by its full acronym of “FARC-EP”52 and 
acknowledged hierarchies within the group by mentioning for example “guerrilla 
leaders”53.  
Both parties vilified each other during periods of armed confrontation and 
then de-vilified one another as the possibility of negotiations drew nearer. This 
appears to confirm much of the literature on (de)vilification. Though it was only 
under President Pastrana that a full de-vilification of the FARC took place ahead 
of the Caguán negotiations.  
																																																								
46 FARC-EP, 1993, ‘Por la paz un nuevo gobierno de reconciliación’, 4 August. 
47 FARC-EP, 1996, ‘Pueblo Colombiano: A la carga!’, 7 October. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Samper, E., 1994, ‘Mensaje del Presidente Ernesto Samper con occasion del día nacional de los 
derechos humanos’. 
50 Samper, E., 1994, ‘Discurso de posesión’, 7 August. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de 
un proceso de paz: Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, 
Tomo IV: Bogotá, Colombia, pp.101-102. 
51 Samper, E., 1995, ‘’Presentación del Segundo informe sobre el estado del proceso de paz’, 18 May. In 
A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato 
Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, Tomo IV: Bogotá, Colombia, p.149. 
52 Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, 1996, ‘Estado del conflicto politico armado y su solución 
negociada, hacia un diálogo útil y durdadero, document de trabajo’, Melgar-Tolima, 26-28 November. In 
A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato 
Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, Tomo IV: Bogotá, Colombia, p.111; Holmes 
Trujillo, C, 1995, ‘Segundo informe del Alto Comisionado para la paz: estado del proceso de paz’, 18 
May. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato 
Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, Tomo IV: Bogotá, Colombia, p.143. 
53 Botero, F. and C. Holmes Trujillo, 1995, ‘Suspensión de recompensas por jefes guerrilleros’, 7 June. In 
A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) En ausencia de un proceso de paz: Acuerdos Parciales y Mandato 
Ciudadano por la Paz, Biblioteca de la Paz 1994-1998, Tomo IV: Bogotá, Colombia, p.150. 
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II. From ‘violent group’ to ‘insurgents’: the (de)vilification of the FARC in 
the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations 
During the presidential election campaign of 1998 the prospect of peace 
negotiations became a prominent issue. Candidate Andres Pastrana took note of 
the burgeoning peace movement in Colombia and made the search for a 
negotiated settlement a central platform of his 1998 presidential campaign 
(Arnson 2000). 54  In his inaugural speech he is very explicit about his 
government’s ambitions for peace.  He says he “wants peace” and will show an  
“unwavering leadership to build peace”. 55  There is no ambivalence in the 
government’s de-vilification of the armed group either. The shift is immediate. 
President Pastrana demonstrates a clear recognition of the conflict, characterising 
it as an “internal conflict”56 and an “armed conflict”57. Right from the start, 
Pastrana started de-vilifying the FARC through the language he used to qualify 
and describe them. He recognised the group as an opponent by calling the FARC 
an “insurgent force” 58 , the “insurgency” 59 , a “subversive group” 60 , the 
“guerrilla”61 or an “armed group”62. His choice of words tended to highlight the 
rebellious and political nature of the organization rather than their violent 
behaviour. Pastrana also showed a deep recognition of the FARC as an 
organisation and its leadership functions. He talked of the “guerrilla 
																																																								
54 Victor G Ricardo, Former High Commissioner for Peace, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
55 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘Una Colombia en Paz’, Discurso de Posesión del Presidente Andrés Pastrana 
Arango, 7 August. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y 
con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, Colombia, p.123. 
56 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘Diplomacia por la Paz’, Palabras del Presidente Andrés Pastrana, XII Cumbre de 
Jefes de Estados y gobierno, países no alienados, 2 September. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, 
negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, 
Colombia, p.127. 
57 Presidencia de la República, 1998, ‘Plan Colombia, document de la Presidenciade la República’, 
October. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el 
ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, Colombia, p.130. 
58 Pastrana, A. 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento 
(Ed.)  Diálogo, negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, 
Tomo V: Bogotá, Colombia, p.124. 
59 Ibid, p.124-125; 
60 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘El Plan Colombia: Alianza con el mundo contra el delito, por los derechos 
humanos, los derechos sociales y la ecología’, 22 October. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, 
negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, 
Colombia, p.129. 
61 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. 
62 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘Apoyo internacional para conseguir la paz, intervención del president Andrés 
Pastrana’, UN General Assembly, 23 September. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, negociación y 
rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, Colombia, 
p.128. 
62 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. 
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commanders” 63 , the “top leaders of the FARC –EP” 64 , the “heads of the 
guerrillas”65 or the “FARC Secretariat”66. He even expressed respect for the 
organization when he described them as the “oldest guerrilla group”67. 
In the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations, he spent some time in his 
speeches highlighting the FARC’s political agenda. He explicitly recognized the 
political nature of the organisation and its ideas by saying that the “guerrilla 
movement is a political reality”.68 He also argued that “It is time to take the 
agenda of the guerrilla seriously, as a condition to break the Gordian knot of lack 
of trust”.69From interviews it is clear that this is a point that was fundamentally 
important for the FARC.70 The FARC had wanted a formal status - a belligerent 
status - ahead of the Caguán negotiations.71 There were extensive discussions 
about it at the time (Villarraga Sarmiento 2009). Short of that, they expected 
“political recognition”.72 This de-vilification had both inter-party and intra-party 
objectives. By making this recognition so explicit in his discourse, President 
Pastrana was not only directly signalling his seriousness towards the FARC, he 
was also shifting the image of the FARC vis-à-vis public opinion and detractors in 
his own camp.  
Pastrana went to some length to convince the Colombian people and 
sceptics in his government that the FARC was a partner they could do business 
with. He said they had shown “seriousness and credibility”73 and that it was 
“possible to dialogue” with them.74 He went further by describing the FARC as a 
partner for change implying a certain degree of trust and humanization claiming 
																																																								
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘Espacio para la paz: he ordenado el despeje’, 14 October. In A. Villarraga 
Sarmiento (Ed.) Diálogo, negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 
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Parliament, Strasburg, 26 October. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.)  Diálogo, negociación y rupture con 
las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, Colombia, p.141. 
68 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Marcos Calarcá (Luis Alberto Albán Burbano), Member of the FARC negotiation team and 
International Secretariat, Personal interview, May 2015, Havana, Cuba; Carlos Lozano, Director of 
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71 Marcos Calarcá, Personal interview, May 2015, Havana, Cuba; Diego Martinez, Lawyer for the FARC 
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72 Carlos Lozano, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
73 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. 
74 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘El Plan Colombia: Alianza con el mundo contra el delito, por los derechos 
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	 128	
they were “co-protagonists in the national reconstruction”.75 Pastrana’s attempts at 
humanizing the FARC started even before he was sworn in as President when he 
met personally with their leader, Manuel Marulanda, and ensured that images of 
the two shaking hands were widely distributed, as we saw in the opening 
paragraph of this chapter. Victor G Ricardo, advisor to Pastrana during his 
election campaign and later High Commissioner for Peace, who instigated and 
was present at that meeting between the two leaders, confirmed that Pastrana and 
Marulanda agreed during this meeting to initiate the peace talks within 90 days of 
Pastrana taking office.76 
During the whole pre-negotiation phase President Pastrana focused intently 
on de-vilifying the FARC. All the six components of de-vilification were present - 
he showed respect and recognition towards the armed group, recognized the 
conflict, argued that they are trust-worthy, rational and human and that negotiating 
with them is possible. He acknowledged their nature as a political opponent, and 
very explicitly encouraged change by staking his political capital on initiating a 
peace negotiation with the FARC. He was able to make this shift immediately, 
directly and very explicitly.  
The FARC also went to some length to de-vilify the Pastrana government.  
In their communications, they address him in a formal and respectful way using 
phrases like “Mister President”77, “President of the Republic”78 or “President 
Pastrana”79. Once he was in office, they highlighted the pre-electoral encounters 
between Pastrana, his team and the FARC leadership and highlighted the 
President’s commitments vis-à-vis the FARC using words like “promise”80 and 
quoting sections of his pre-elections speeches in their own communications.81 
This showed willingness on the part of the FARC to portray Pastrana as an 
individual they could do business with.  
The FARC portrayed Pastrana as a man of his word who can be trusted. In a 
statement published by the international section of the FARC from Mexico, after 																																																								
75 Pastrana, A., 1998, ‘De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz’, 11 August. 
76 Victor G Ricardo, Former High Commissioner for Peace, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
77 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado’, Dialogue Commission of the FARC-EP, Raúl Reyes, Joaquín Gómez, 
Fabián Ramírez, Mountains of Colombia, 12 July. 
78 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado’, Raúl Reyes, Joaquín Gómez, Fabián Ramírez, Mountains of 
Colombia, 24 November. 
79 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado público’, International Commission of the FARC-EP, Mexico City, 31 
July. 
80 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado’, 12 July. 
81 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado’, 24 November. 
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the first encounter between president-elect Pastrana and the FARC leadership, 
they wanted to “highlight” the:  
Remarkable seriousness and political will of President Pastrana, by 
fulfilling the commitment he made to the Colombian people in the 
election campaign to personally meet with the leadership of the 
FARC-EP, in the search for peace.82  
 
In the same statement, the FARC also made inroads into attempts at de-
vilifying themselves by describing their “determined will for peace” and 
highlighting their political rather than violent characteristics.83 They described 
themselves as “armed political opposition to the governing system”. 84  This 
statement also implied their fight is not with this specific government but with the 
regime and in that context they continued to express strong criticism of the “State” 
and the “establishment”.85 This uncoupling of the particular government and the 
State, can be understood in the context of the FARC intra-party dynamics. It was a 
way for the leadership of the armed group to reassure their own group and 
constituency that change was possible with this particular government even if they 
remained critical of the broader establishment.  
The shift in discourse ahead of the Caguán negotiation between President 
Pastrana and the FARC was unimpeded by constraints and was both radical and 
reciprocal.  This confirms much of the literature on the importance of de-
vilification ahead of negotiations. Both sides succeeded in de-vilifying each other 
in their language and characterisation by showing recognition, respect, rationality 
and even trust, acknowledging each other’s political agenda, humanizing each 
other and creating the possibility for change to happen.  
 
III. Just ‘terrorists’: the extreme vilification of the FARC  
9/11 and the attack against the World Trade Centre happened at the tail end of the 
Caguán negotiations. Though the FARC had been listed as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organisation by the US since 1997, the developments following 9/11 gave this a 
whole new meaning which had deep symbolic and material consequences in 																																																								
82 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘Comunicado publico a extranjeros y colombianos’, Mexico City, International 
Commission of the FARC-EP, 12 July. In V. E. Gónzalez Mantilla, Discursos de la Guerra en Colombia 
1998-2005, Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, p.35-36. 
83 Ibid, p.35. 
84 Ibid, p.36. 
85 FARC-EP, 1998, ‘A la comunidad nacional e internacional’, International Commission of the FARC-
EP, Mexico City, December. 
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Colombia. In this chapter the focus will be on the symbolic effects as they are the 
most relevant when it comes to (de)vilification processes, though as we saw in 
Chapter 4 the symbolic and the material are deeply intertwined.  
After 9/11, symbolically, the Colombian conflict was subsumed in the 
broader War on Terror. The FARC were integrated in the group of ‘enemies’ 
against which the global war was being fought. As Secretary of State Colin 
Powell said in October 2001: 
There’s no difficulty in identifying [Bin Laden] as a terrorist, and 
getting everybody to rally against him. Now, there are other 
organizations that probably meet a similar standard. The FARC in 
Colombia comes to mind, the Real IRA comes to mind, all of which, 
both of which are on our terrorist list down at the State Department.86  
 
The impact of 9/11 on the assemblage of heterogeneous armed groups and 
thus the productive nature of proscription quickly becomes apparent.  The US 
administration no longer characterised the FARC as narco-guerrillas but starts 
linking them with other listed entities or the broader Islamic fundamentalist threat, 
eventually deploying the language of ‘narco-terrorists’. One Colombian civil 
society activist described how the narrative started shifting: “The fact that Bush in 
the US starts to merge a discourse of fundamentalism Islam to Colombia, imports 
a discourse that assimilates narco-guerrillas to Islamic fundamentalists. They try 
to show the links [of the FARC] with Palestinians, then with ETA.”87  
This post-9/11 re-framing in the US was also felt deeply in Colombia. As 
one analyst, who has followed the conflict for forty-five years, said to me “I have 
the impression that the 11th September had an impact. It marked a change, it 
linked what happens here [in Colombia] to what happens there [in the US].”88 But 
the Colombian government was not a passive recipient of this change, rather it 
was seen as an opportunity to convert the armed conflict into a war against 
terrorists.89 As Borda (2010: 135) argued, it was a strategy of internationalising 
																																																								
86 Wright, J., 2001, ‘Powell Sees ‘Gray Areas’ in Defining Terrorism’, Reuters, 25 October, Washington 
D.C. 
87 Rosa Emilia Salamanca, Executive Director of Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y 
Económica (CIASE) in Colombia, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
88 Fernán González, Coordinator of the Peacebuilding and Development Programme at CINEP/ Programa 
por la Paz, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
89 Ibid. 
	 131	
the conflict, which allowed the government to strengthen its military and political 
position vis-à- vis the armed groups.90  
In his first major allocution following 9/11 there was a radical change in 
President Pastrana’s tone as he referred to the FARC. He linked the FARC to the 
global scourge of terrorism “Colombia, which has been a victim like few 
countries of terrorist action is already part of the global fight against this 
scourge.”91 There was a clear and deliberate shift in strategy (Borda 2010). From 
then on his speeches contained regular mentions of the word “terrorist”, or 
“terrorism”. Previously, most of the focus is on describing the actions of the 
FARC as “terrorist” rather than the group itself.92  But in the speech he gave in 
February 2002 that put an end to the peace negotiation and the demobilized zone, 
Pastrana used the root “terror” seven times, under the forms of “terrorism”, 
“terrorist attack” and “international terrorists”.93 And it is President Pastrana who 
convinced the EU to include the FARC in its list of terrorist organisations (2014). 
Once the negotiations with the FARC were terminated in 2002, this trend 
continued unabated. One interviewee described the evolution:  
After the rupture of the talks, the use of the word ‘terrorist’ is 
generalised. Before the army did use it but not the members of 
government. Then, after Pastrana used it in his speech for the first time, 
Camilo Gomez and others started qualifying the guerrilla as terrorist 
and pushing for the US and then the EU to keep FARC included in 
lists.94  
 
The election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002 embedded this 
characterisation. President Uribe argued that there was no armed conflict in 
Colombia, just violence against a democracy, which should be considered 
terrorism. In his memoirs, he explained why he always refused to consider the 
FARC and other “illegal groups” as “insurgents” or “guerrillas” (Uribe 2012:58). 
He said: “What in Latin America suggested a virtuous struggle against a 
repressive military regime, did not apply to Colombia, where these groups were 																																																								
90 This is similar to what Álvaro Méndez (2012) argued in the case of Plan Colombia in his LSE PhD 
dissertation.  
91 Pastrana, A., 2002, ‘Alocución radiotelevisada del Presidente Andrés Pastrana: no cederemos en los 
controles, las FARC no quieren negociar’, Bogotá, 9 January. In A. Villarraga Sarmiento (Ed.) Diálogo, 
negociación y rupture con las FARC-EP y con el ELN, Biblioteca de la Paz 1998-2002, Tomo V: Bogotá, 
Colombia, p.265. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Pastrana, A., 2002, ‘Texto de la alocución del President Andrés Pastrana’, 20 February, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
94 Carlos Lozano, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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trying to destroy democracy.” (Uribe 2012:58). The political dimension of the 
conflict or any attempts to understand the history, social realities, root causes or 
grievances in the country were subsumed in the war on terror.95 President Uribe 
set out to change international and national perception of the conflict and security 
situation in Colombia.96 This became increasingly prominent from 2005 onwards. 
Uribe focused on convincing the media not to talk about an “armed conflict” and 
categorise the FARC as a simple delinquent and terrorist organisation (Pécaut 
2008).  
This idea that the FARC should be considered “terrorists” because they 
attack a “democracy” became the bedrock of his narrative.97 Uribe drew a parallel 
with European democracies under attack of terrorism post 9/11, and argued that, 
because the FARC are “terrorists”, other countries should not support the 
FARC.98 President Uribe set about reframing the understanding and perception of 
the Colombian conflict; there is no armed conflict. In a speech in 2005 to the 
diplomatic corps in Colombia he explained, there is “no conflict”, so there are “no 
combatants”, only “terrorists”.99  For example, in September 2006 during the UN 
General Assembly he said: 
For us, armed violence with fictitious political motives is terrorism 
and security is the path to peace. When there is a pluralist, vigorous 
democracy with guarantees, armed action against it is pure terrorism. 
Denying it would mean there is no difference between armed combat 
against dictatorships (…) and violent aggression suffered by our 
democracy, aggression that is terrorism. 
 
One high-ranking UN diplomat said the international community was under 
intense pressure to stop describing the situation in Colombia as an armed conflict: 
“We had to adapt in terms of language, we needed to do a certain amount of self-																																																								
95 Hector Fabio Henao, Director, Pastoral Social, Personal interview, January 2014, by phone; Virginia 
Bouvier, Director of the Colombia Program, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Personal interview, 
February 2014, Washington D.C.  
96 Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Senior Associate for Colombia, Washington Office on Latin America 
 (WOLA), Personal interview, April 2014, Washington D.C.  
97 Uribe, Á., 2002, ‘Retomemos el lazo unificador de la ley, la autoridad democrática, la libertad y la 
justicia social’, Bogotá, 7 August.  
98 Uribe, Á., 2003, ‘Declaración del Presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez tras atentado en el Nogal’, Bogotá, 8 
February; Uribe, Á., 2003, ‘Discurso ante la corte interamericana de derechos humanos, San José de Costa 
Rica, Costa Rica, 19 June; Uribe, Á., 2004, ‘Saludo al cuerpo diplomatico acreditado en Colombia, 
Bogotá, 22 January; Uribe, Á., 2004, ‘Intervención ante el pleno del parlamento europeo’, Strasburg, 
France, 10 February; Uribe, Á. ‘Palabras del President Uribe en la session inaugural de la 38 Asamblea 
General de la OEA, Medellín, Antioquia, 1 June; Uribe, Á., 2006, ‘Intervención del Presidente Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez: nuestro caso es una acción terrorista contra la democracia’, Cátedra Colombia y aniversario 
de la escuela superior de Guerra, Bogotá, 5 May. 
99 Uribe, Á., 2005, ‘Saludo al cuerpo diplomático acreditado en Colombia’, Bogotá, 31 January. 
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censorship, we found a consensus by using language that referred to the violence 
without talking of the armed conflict.”100 But this shift in discourse also had 
material consequences. Refugees and populations displaced by the armed conflict, 
for example, started being described as economic migrants (Idler and Paladini 
2015).  
What was also striking in President Uribe’s major speeches is that he did not 
even mention the FARC by name. In his inauguration speech, or later in 
allocutions he made to the Colombian Congress, he never used the acronym 
FARC nor did he use their full name.101 Their sheer absence from discourse 
rendered them politically insignificant. By erasing the FARC from official 
discourse and merging them into an amorphous “terrorism” threat he showed that 
he had no respect for them and that no one else should either because they are 
irrational, barbarous and not human. This extreme vilification was compounded 
by the sheer number of times Uribe choose to use the word with the root “terror” 
to describe them. Under the variants “terror”, “terrorism”, “terrorist”, “terrorists” 
and “antiterrorist” he uses the term 59 times in a speech in 2003.102 Though the 
use of the word was particularly frequent at the beginning of his first mandate, he 
continued to use it systematically throughout his two presidential terms. For 
example, in his Christmas message to the Colombian people103 in 2009 he used it 
five times and right at the end of his second mandate, during the installation of 
Congress104, he used it nineteen times.  
Intrinsic to this portrayal of the FARC is the de-politicisation of the armed 
group. Uribe painted them as a group that has no political arguments and is merely 
criminal. He said for example “These cynics of violent groups continue to ask for 
international audiences to speak like politicians when they are miserable 
terrorists”105. At the centre of this de-politicisation is the link between FARC and 
																																																								
100 Senior UN staff, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
101 See for example Uribe, Á., 2002, ‘Retomemos el lazo unificador de la ley, la autoridad democrática, la 
libertad y la justicia social’, Bogotá, 7 August; Uribe, Á., 2004, ‘Instalación de las sessiones ordinarias del 
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102 Uribe, Á., 2003, ‘Discurso del president Álvaro Uribe en la posesión del Nuevo comandante de la 
FAC’, 19 September. 
103 Uribe, Á., 2009, ‘Mensaje de Navidad del Presidente de la República, Álvaro Uribe Vélez’, Puerto 
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drugs.106 Drugs and terrorism become two sides of the same coin. He said “the 
only reason for terrorism is the drugs business”107, using the mirror image by 
saying that the “violence” in Colombia, which is funded by “drugs”, is 
“terrorism”.108 He called them a “terror and drugs cartel”.109 By 2009 Uribe made 
direct parallels between the FARC and “bandits” like Pablo Escobar.110 According 
to one civil society activist, the merging of the ‘narco’ and ‘terrorist’ labels is 
what did the most damage to the FARC’s political standing:  
For many people the term narco is stronger than being terrorist 
because narcotrafficking has caused so much pain in Colombia. You 
will find that for many people it means the same thing, narco and 
terrorist are equivalent.111  
 
Unlike previous presidents pre-9/11, who used the word terrorist to describe 
some actions committed by the FARC, Uribe used it to describe the FARC itself, 
as a “terrorist group”112 or “terrorist organization” 113. By doing so, he implied 
point blank that no change was possible because they are just terrorists. In his 
language he also drew parallels with Nazism. He put the FARC’s hostage taking 
in parallel with Nazi concentration camps.114 This amalgamation with a regime 
that committed the most heinous crimes against humanity served to portray the 
FARC as an organisation without principles. Furthermore, he stated that no 
																																																								106	This	idea	was	also	given	credence	with	the	popularity	of	the	‘greed	and	grievance’	literature	popular	at	that	time.	Economists	Paul	Collier	and	Anke	Hoeffler	(1998,	2004)	argued	that	insurgents	were	mainly	motivated	by	‘greed’,	i.e.	economic	profiteering,	rather	than	socio-political	grievances.	This	academic	debate	got	much	policy	attention	and	was	used	by	leaders	in	their	attempts	to	depoliticise	political	violence.	
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“appeasement”115 was possible with the FARC and says that Colombia had 
suffered a “dictatorship of terrorism”.116 When the FARC started unilaterally 
releasing hostages in 2008 he refused to acknowledge them or their gesture and 
said “terrorists cannot be thanked”117, implying that the group was completely 
irrational and could not be trusted. 
President Uribe took the vilification of the FARC to a whole new level, over 
his two terms in office (see Table 7). By denying the existence of the armed 
conflict and labelling the FARC terrorists nationally and internationally, he 
succeeded in portraying them as de-politicised, irrational, without principles, a 
bunch of criminals for whom change is not possible. This made the idea of 
political negotiations with the group unfathomable in the eyes of the public. 
 
Table 7. Proscription and extreme vilification in Colombia 
 
Vilification Extreme vilification:  
the terrorist label 
Modalities of practice  
in Colombia 
Enemy No conflict/ no enemy/ 
criminal/ de-contextualises 
“no conflict”, “no 
combatants”  
“terrorists” 
No respect Demonization/absence Absence/no mention  
by name 
 
Untrustworthy Irrational “terrorists cannot be 
thanked” 
Illegitimate De-politicises / criminal / 
no cause 
“terror and drug cartel”, 
“narco-terrorists”  
Violent Not human/ without 
principles / barbarous 
“Nazi concentration  
camps” 
Actions  
condemned 
Act and actor one and  
the same - no change 
possible 
“No appeasement  
possible” 
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The FARC responded to President Uribe’s discourse with matching 
vilification. They never used the title of “President” when mentioning or 
addressing him, they merely say “Uribe” or “Álvaro Uribe”.118 This was a 
significant departure to the way the group had addressed President Pastrana and 
illustrated that they had very little respect or recognition for Uribe.  Over the two 
terms of his presidency the language used to describe both President Uribe and his 
government was consistently negative and vilifying. They describe him as a 
“paramilitary”119, a “fascist”120. The words “fascist”121, “terror”122 or “military 
terror”123 were used regularly to typify government policy illustrating a form of 
reciprocal extreme vilification. The FARC demonized the Uribe administration 
implying it was without principles and irrational. The FARC also made regular 
references to the US’s role in Colombia, calling it “neo-colonial” 124 , “US 
imperialism” 125 , and “US intervention”, implying a country that was 
“occupied” 126  and in a subservient relationship towards the US, effectively 
implying it was illegitimate.  
The reaction of the FARC against being labelled as ‘terrorists’ was very 
strong in the early years of the Uribe administration, fitting neatly in the category 
of stigma ‘rejection’ in Adler-Nissen’s (2014) typology. The FARC demanded 
that the State and the government “exclude from the language of officials epithets 
of ‘terrorists and narco-terrorists’ to refer to our organisation of political-military 																																																								
118 FARC-EP, 2004, ‘Comunicado’, Secretariado del Estado Mayor Central, FARC-EP, Montañas de 
Colombia, 24 February; FARC-EP, 2009, ‘Comunicado’, Compañia Alfredo Gonzalez FARC-EP, no 
date; FARC-EP, 2010, ‘Comunicado’, Pablo Catatumbo, Jefe del Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva 
Colombia, 29 April. 
119 FARC-EP, 2004, ‘Comunicado’, 24 February; FARC-EP, 2005, ‘Comunicado’, Secretariado del 
Estado Mayor Central, FARC-EP, Montañas de Colombia, 25 February. 
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opposition against the State”. 127  In April 2003, they decried the usage of 
“pugnacious language” and “improper epithets” to describe them.128 They resisted 
and rejected the label and offered a counter narrative, describing their struggle as 
the “universal legitimate use of the right to revolt”.129 
According to James Lemoyne, the second UNSG Special Envoy to 
Colombia (2002-2005), the FARC took the labelling as a ‘terrorist’ organization 
by the international community seriously. It was not so much the material aspect 
they were bothered with but it was the symbolic elements, particularly the loss of 
legitimacy - they did not want to be listed (cited in Powell 2014). Following the 
inclusion of the FARC in the EU terrorist list, the FARC’s first reaction was to 
refuse to meet with any EU member states in protest at the new EU strictures 
against the FARC (International Crisis Group 2002). 
This is corroborated in my interviews with the FARC. When asked how 
they reacted to being listed as ‘terrorists’, Marcos Calarcá, a member of the FARC 
negotiating team, responded:  
First of all, what is terrorism? It is a reflection of this unipolar world 
in which the United States decided. There is not a definition of what is 
terrorism. We have been in the US list since September 1997, but 
nothing happened. We asked them to take us off the list. It is after 
9/11 that it became relevant. Then the EU put us on the list under US 
pressure. (…) But what does it mean? (…) Our origin is legitimate – it 
is the right to rebellion. We are a consequence of our aggression. An 
aggression that was similar to what the war on terror is today.130 
 
Similarly, Alexandra Nariño, a member of the FARC negotiating team in 
Havana, said “Before we were narcotraffickers, then after the attacks on the twin 
towers they associated us with Al Qaeda. It is totally opposite to what we are, we 
are a political struggle”.131 
However much the FARC resisted the label, it stuck. In short, the 
vilification became so extreme that President Uribe succeeded in excluding the 
FARC from the political landscape and de-legitimizing them. This is echoed in 																																																								
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the account of a high-level UN staff member working in Colombia during this 
period: 
Before they [the FARC] could be seen as legitimate actors. Then the 
bombardment of language and propaganda changed the imaginary, 
identifying them as bandits, terrorists. Uribe succeeded in changing 
the minds of the middle classes. He won the cultural war. This was 
also helped on the part of the FARC by their increased involvement in 
drug trafficking and actions against populations, which gave the 
government very good arguments to diffuse this image.132 
 
The characterising of the FARC as terrorists both nationally and 
internationally also had concrete material consequences. Not only did it justify 
long-term and sustained war efforts, but it also de-legitimised the idea of dialogue 
politically. By using the same language they used internationally President Uribe 
made clear they were terrorists with whom the government would not negotiate.133 
First, if there is no conflict, just a fight against terrorists, then what would there be 
to negotiate? Second, if the FARC are nothing but ‘terrorists’ then how could they 
ever change? This shows how assigning one particular label can automatically 
exclude any other understanding of the armed group. The only options remaining 
were to win the war militarily, for the FARC to give themselves-up, or to subject 
them to justice through a demobilization process.134 Political negotiations with the 
FARC remained outside of the options considered. Even if President Uribe 
wanted to initiate dialogue 135  he had created such a tight fitting policy 
straightjacket that it cut off any possibility of negotiating a peace agreement with 
the FARC. 
IV. The path to Havana: the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the FARC 
When President Juan Manuel Santos took office in August 2010 he was already 
considering the possibility of initiating peace negotiations with the FARC. But, 
according to his brother, Enrique Santos, who was closely involved in discussions 
during these initial stages, Santos was very aware that public opinion in Colombia 																																																								
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would be completely against it after eight years of extreme vilification during the 
Uribe government.  As his brother noted, the question was “How does this 
government start talking with ‘narco-terrorists’”?136  
1. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ 
President Santos was very aware that he could not suddenly embark in a 
negotiation with the armed group. This challenge was also picked-up by people 
following closely the dynamic at the time who commented that shifting 
perceptions when the armed group had actively been portrayed as ‘terrorists’ for 
years would be challenging.  As the late Virginia (Ginny) Bouvier, head of the 
Colombia programme at the USIP, asked: “how to convince the public that the 
armed group can be negotiated with and can respond to rational thought?”137   
President Santos could not switch directly to de-vilifying the FARC. A step 
was needed in between. He was self-consciously aware that he first needed to shift 
back the description of the FARC to one of ‘normal’ vilification. Several of my 
interviewees, among which Ginny Bouvier, Carlos Velandia and Mauricio García-
Durán, noted that from early 2011 President Santos had toned down the rhetoric 
towards the FARC considerably, mentioning the idea of a “ceasefire”138 or a 
“disarming of words”.139 
This can be seen as an instance of a ‘linguistic ceasefire’.  As set out in 
Chapter 4, there are three main components to the linguistic ceasefire: 1) 
recognition of the conflict; 2) dropping the terrorist label; and 3) uncoupling the 
act and the actor.  Each of these will be explored in turn.  
i. Recognition of the conflict 
The bedrock of this shift was President Santos’ recognition of the armed conflict. 
Indeed, a major change in his discourse compared to President Uribe’s was that he 
explicitly recognized the existence of the armed conflict in Colombia. He talked 
about “conflict”140, the “victims of the conflict”141 or “recognising the conflict”142. 
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He explicitly changed the language he used, stating for example in the press in 
May 2011 that “It has been a while that there is an armed conflict in this 
country”143. He went even further than pure rhetoric by enshrining this description 
in law through the Law on Victims and Land Restitution (Law 1448, 2011), which 
defined victims as:  
Those individuals who individually or collectively have suffered 
damage for events that occurred on or after 1 January 1985 as a result 
of violations of international humanitarian law or serious violations of 
international human rights standards that occurred during the internal 
armed conflict.144 [emphasis added] 
 
By recognising the existence of the conflict he effectively re-contextualised 
the FARC within Colombia’s modern history. This set the stage to normalise and 
re-politicise them. And by acknowledging the conflict he also made the case that 
it should be resolved. He argued that the “best way to end this conflict”145 was 
through dialogue. By shifting his description of the violence as an armed conflict 
instead of a ‘war against terrorists’ he was shifting the image of the FARC 
publicly - nationally and internationally - and creating the conditions for a 
negotiation. 
He was also sending direct signals to the FARC that he recognized them 
politically as a party to the armed conflict. According to a member of the FARC, 
the armed group was very conscious of this shift: “I know that at one moment 
they started recognising this as a conflict. Under Uribe it was terrorists, which was 
absurd. Afterwards, with Santos they started talking about an armed conflict”.146 
People who have had close contact with the armed group or followed their 
evolution carefully confirm that the recognition of the armed conflict was central 
to the FARC’s decision to engage in the negotiations with President Santos.147 
This chimes with what President Santos’ brother, Enrique Santos, who led the 
exploratory talks with the FARC said: “Santos started talking about the conflict, 
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for Uribe this was impossible as it implied there were political reasons to the 
conflict, the FARC is very sensitive to the use of language.”148 
Though the FARC statements remained critical of Santos they referred 
multiple times to his own expressions and statements such as using the sentence 
“President for Peace”149, or the fact that he claimed to be considered a “traitor to 
his social class”150 by stating his openness to dialogue. By using Santos’ own 
words, even if it was done sometimes in a mocking or critical fashion, it showed 
that the FARC were paying close notice to what he was saying, they were taking 
on board the shifts in his tone and discourse, thereby acknowledging his efforts at 
de-vilifying them. In an interview given to a Spanish newspaper Alfonso Cano, 
who had become the FARC commander following the death of its founder Manuel 
Marulanda, showed that he was taking on board the fact that Santos had 
acknowledged the existence of the armed conflict in the Victim’s law by saying: 
“The inane uribista insistence in signalling the FARC as a terrorist, does not 
overshadow the blunt truth about the existence of armed conflict in Colombia 
contained in the draft of the so-called Victims’ law.”151  This shows that Cano was 
acknowledging Santos’ efforts at recognising the armed conflict in contrast to 
Uribe’s terrorist framing.  
ii. Dropping the terrorist label 
Santos quickly set the tone for a shift in discourse in his 2010 inaugural speech.152 
He referred to the FARC, as well as other groups that invoke “political reasons”, 
as “illegal armed groups” or “illegal groups”.153 In the same speech, he talked 
about the “violent ones” and the “guerrilla”. 154  Though he still mentioned 
“terrorist leaders” once in his inauguration speech155, it is apparent that by using 
multiple epithets and labels to describe the FARC he was trying to break the 
image of the group seen merely as terrorists. The FARC gained in complexity. 
This trend continued in subsequent allocutions where he used words such as 																																																								
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“guerrilla”156, “guerrillas”, “the violent ones”157, “violent groups”158, “illegal 
armed groups”159, “organization”160, “subversive”161 or “insurgent groups”162 to 
describe the FARC. In a speech in July 2011 he referred to the FARC as “groups 
outside the law” and the “guerrilla”.163 Later, in November 2011 he described 
them as “subversive groups”.164 This was a long way from the sole ‘terrorist’ label 
affixed by President Uribe.  
In President Santos’ speeches there was still the odd mention amongst 
other descriptors of “terrorists”165 or “terrorist group”166, but by 2011 the main 
epithet used by President Santos to describe the FARC became “guerrilla”167. But 
dropping the ‘terrorist’ label was not that easy because of intra-party dynamics. 
There were some differences within the government. While President Santos was 
conscious of needing to signal a shift in his own discourse he allowed other 
branches of government to continue using the ‘terrorist’ label. This was mainly 
linked to internal constraints on Santos. He needed to be able to bring along the 
army as an important constituency. According to Colombian military 
representatives at the Havana negotiations, it was a major challenge for the 
government to shift the discourse while at the same time making sure its soldiers 
kept on fighting. 168  Ministers of Defence continued calling the FARC a 
“narcoterrorist organisation”, “terrorists” or referring to “terrorism” more 
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broadly.169 This chimes with what analysts said in interviews about the time 
period. According to Mauricio Garcia:  
The current Colombian government [Santos administration] has had a 
pragmatic relationship with the use of the terrorist label. (…) Certain 
sectors of government like the Ministry of Defence use the term more 
frequently but there is a sense that the word [terrorist] has been used 
less and less.170 
 
Santos also had to shift the perception of the FARC internationally. Santos 
headed off on a tour of Latin American countries soon after his inauguration to do 
just that.  But the key country to convince was the United States. One could argue 
that Obama being in the White House instead of George W. Bush would have 
given Santos more leeway. But the FARC was listed as a terrorist organization in 
the US and the US government had spent millions of dollars on helping the 
Colombian government win its counter-terrorist war. Enrique Santos recalled that 
President Santos and his team were wondering what to do in relation to the US 
where the FARC was listed as ‘terrorists’.  As Enrique Santos noted: “It was 
important to convince the US and the international community of the need to 
dialogue.”171 
iii. Uncouple the act and the actor 
President Santos continued to use the word ‘terrorist’ but mainly to describe the 
actions of the group, using expressions such as “terrorist act”172, “terrorism”173, 
“terrorist actions”174, “terrorist attacks”175 or “terrorist drift”176. This uncoupling 
of the act and the actor implied that change was possible. By not rarefying the 
FARC as terrorists but focussing on terrorist acts he implied that the FARC could 
choose another path. 																																																								
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Having uncoupled the ‘terrorist’ act from the actor, Santos had laid the 
foundation for dialogue. This other path was made explicit in President Santos’ 
speeches. Already during his inauguration he stated that the “door of dialogue is 
not closed with a key” and he frequently used the words “dialogue”, 
“reconciliation”, “negotiations”, “conversation” and “peace”.177 Later on, just 
after the death of Alfonso Cano, he explicitly said the FARC had a choice 
between “two paths”, between “reason and force”. 178  By shifting the label 
assigned to the FARC, going back to describing their actions as terrorist and not 
the actor itself, it opened-up the possibility for dialogue. This shows how the un-
labelling through the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ had concrete material effects. 
2. Further de-vilification of the FARC 
Having brought the description of the armed group and the conflict back to a pre-
9/11, pre-proscription vocabulary, Santos could move towards further de-
vilification. He started using the armed group’s acronym “FARC” to address and 
describe them in a clear sign of recognition.179 He also started showing a form of 
respect for the group by acknowledging the structures of the organisation using 
vocabulary such as “ringleaders”180, “maximum leader”181, “number one”182 or 
“Secretariat”183.  
Looking at the words Santos used to describe the FARC chronologically we 
see that he shifted first to a ‘normal’ vilification level by using words such as 
“violent”. He then switched to a de-vilifying level later on by implying the group 
had a political agenda with words such as “subversive”, “guerrilla” or “insurgent”. 
This was a deliberate attempt to re-politicise the FARC. Frank Pearl, one of the 
government negotiators during the pre-negotiation phase, corroborated this view. 
He said the FARC asked “not to be called terrorists or bandits, [for us] to 
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recognise their political nature”. 184  The FARC tell the same story. Marcos 
Calarcá, a member of the FARC’s negotiating team, said that what was important 
was that by sitting down to negotiate with them the government was in effect 
giving them political recognition.185  
Another key element was to portray the FARC as a partner that the 
government could do business with. In February 2011, Santos said he “value[d] 
positively”186 the freeing of five hostages by the FARC, a stark contrast to Uribe’s 
refusal to even acknowledge previous releases. In April 2011, when the FARC 
released 10 military and police officers and committed to no longer take hostages, 
Santos warmly welcomed this shift by stating that it was “a gesture that we value 
and appreciate in all its dimension”187. When Santos broke the news to the nation 
that authorities had been conducting exploratory talks with the FARC on 27 
August 2012, he acknowledged that the FARC had “worked seriously”.188 Later, 
Humberto de la Calle, the government’s chief negotiator, said the FARC had 
“fulfilled” the government’s requirements.189 He was building an image of an 
opponent that was rational and should be trusted to start an official negotiation. 
President Santos put in place a ‘linguistic ceasefire’ that was able to de-
escalate the vilification of the FARC to a level of normalised vilification the main 
components of which were to stop describing and labelling the FARC as 
“terrorists”, to re-contextualise them by recognising the existence of the armed 
conflict and to uncouple the act of ‘terrorism’ and the actor. This succeeded in 
dealing with the more symbolic effect of proscription by shifting the language 
away from the ‘terrorist’ label. Following the linguistic ceasefire, Santos was able 
to further de-vilify the FARC by showing recognition, respect, rationality, and 
expressing the possibility of change ahead of the Havana negotiations. Though 
enough was done to allow the negotiations to begin, very little was said in the pre-
negotiation phase to humanize the FARC. Unlike in the pre-proscription period, 
the process of de-vilification has had to continue well into the negotiation phase 																																																								
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and even in the post agreement phase, both of which are beyond the scope of this 
study.  
3. The FARC’s self de-vilification 
When President Santos was elected, the FARC were deeply sceptical and 
expected him to follow the course set by President Uribe. Santos had been Uribe’s 
Minister of Defence and one of the leading figures in the government’s military 
strategy. Initially, the FARC showed very little respect in the way they addressed 
him. The first mention does not even refer to him by name but as the “Minister of 
Defence of Uribe”190. In a video from Alfonso Cano addressing the President 
directly he refers to him as “Doctor Juan Manuel Santos”191. By 2011, FARC 
communiqués call him “Mister Juan Manuel Santos”192, “Mister President”193 and 
“President Santos”194. This evolves to “President of the Republic”195 when the 
negotiations with the government are announced in 2012. This evolution in 
characterisation shows a clear effort at recognising and respecting their opponent 
as well as a progression in how they perceived President Santos and his 
willingness to engage. 
Instead of focussing on criticising the government, the bulk of the FARC 
statements in the period leading up to the Havana negotiations, shifted to 
criticising the role of business and the oligarchy. It showed an effort on the part of 
the FARC to uncouple the Santos administration from the broader Colombian 
establishment. This is similar to what happened in the lead-up to the Caguán 
negotiations and showed an effort on the part of the FARC to reassure parts of the 
group that were sceptical of the possibilities of negotiating. Another development 
in FARC statements was the increase in language reflecting openness towards 
negotiations. They used language such as “finding the political solution to the 
conflict” 196 , “open paths to coexistence” 197 , “initiate dialogue” 198 , and 																																																								
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“conversations”.199 In Alfonso Cano’s video addressed to Santos in July 2010 he 
said to him, “Then man we must speak”200. The tone and content of this sentence 
is informal with an undertone of jest which implied a certain level of 
humanization of Santos, or at least an invitation to deal with each other as humans 
rather than bitter opponents. It showed the FARC leadership making a deliberate 
and self-conscious effort to de-vilify their opponent but also themselves. As 
Enrique Santos said in our interview: “Cano had been sending public messages, 
he had been creating an environment”.201  
By distancing themselves from certain practices deemed inhumane, the 
FARC started taking steps towards ‘devillainizing’ itself. This is particularly 
apparent in their public correspondence with Colombianos and Colombianas por 
la paz (Colombian@s) on the subject of hostage taking. Through an exchange of 
public letters the FARC committed itself to end what they described as “economic 
retentions”. 202  Colombian@s succeeded in engaging the FARC in a public 
dialogue over a period of two years, which culminated in getting forty hostages 
freed unilaterally. The FARC y described these releases as a way of creating an 
atmosphere conducive to talks: “The releases of prisoners of war by the FARC, 
are unilateral gestures to create an enabling environment to trigger the swap 
agreement for prisoners and clear the road for a political settlement to the 
conflict.”203From the perspective of the government, this decision was seen as 
fundamental to show that the villain was willing to abandon its villainous ways. 
The fact that the FARC published a statement to end economic retention was seen 
as “very important to establish the process [i.e. the negotiation]”.204  
Another step in the FARC’s own de-vilification process was their effort at 
reframing their fight. In their statements from 2010 onwards they start regularly 
describing their struggle as part of a broader movement of the masses. In a 
statement addressed “To the Colombian people”, they refer to the strikes led by 
the indigenous, agrarian organizations, peasant farmers against fumigation, and 
truck drivers, in the summer of 2011, implying that they are part of the same 
																																																								
199 Cano, A., 2011, ‘Entrevista concedida’, 20 June. 
200 Cano, A. 2010, ‘Conversemos’, Al Jazeera, 30 July. 
201 Enrique Santos, Personal interview, Bogotá, Colombia, June 2015. 
202 Jímenez, T., 2012, ‘Comunicado: Carta a la Señora Marleyna Orjuela, ASFAMIPAZ, Bogotá’, 
Commandante del EMC, Montañas de Colombia, 3 March. 
203 FARC-EP, 2011, ‘Desde la trinchera’, Jorge Briceño Suárez, 7 March. 
204 Enrique Santos, Personal interview, Bogotá, Colombia, June 2015. 
	 148	
struggle.205 The FARC’s narrative started going beyond their classic historical 
account of class struggle and oppression. They tried to renew their ideology 
through social forums and mentioned issues as wide ranging as the minimum 
salary, LGBT rights, gender equality, the right to abortion, the protection of the 
environment or unemployment.206 They were also trying to create an explicit link 
with the struggles of the poor and disenfranchised of Colombia, particularly the 
peasants, indigenous and afro-Colombian movements.207  
By the time the FARC and the Santos administration met in Havana in 
September 2012, both sides had succeeded in de-vilifying their opponent to a 
sufficient degree to start negotiating. But the path was tortuous and jagged. 
Because of proscription, the government had to consciously and deliberately shift 
its discourse through a ‘linguistic ceasefire’ before being able to further de-vilify 
the FARC. The FARC’s shift was more fluid but just as deliberate and their 
efforts at de-vilifying themselves, though still far from what might be needed, set 
the path for the armed group’s transition. 
 
Conclusion 
The intense de-vilification process that took place in the lead-up to both the 
Caguán and Havana negotiations confirm the importance of de-vilification in 
getting the negotiations started, corroborating much of the literature on the 
subject. Through a close analysis of the changing language used by the 
Colombian government and the FARC over time, this chapter offered a better 
understanding of the main components and modalities of practice in the processes 
of vilification and de-vilification processes in the context of proscription.  
In the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations the de-vilification process 
between the protagonists was immediate, direct and very public. On the contrary, 
in the lead-up to Havana, the de-vilification was indirect and protracted. The 
proscription of the FARC in the post 9/11 environment led to a form of extreme 
vilification that made starting negotiations with the group nearly impossible. 																																																								
205 FARC-EP, 2011, ‘Al pueblo Colombiano’, Secretariado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC-EP, 
Montañas de Colombia, 27 December. See also Hernández Delgado (2012). 
206 FARC-EP, 2011, ‘47 Anos de batallas por la paz de Colombia desde la Resistencia armada’, Estado 
Mayor Central, 26 May ; FARC-EP, 2011, ‘Al pueblo Colombiano’, Secretariado del Estado Mayor 
Central de las FARC-EP, Montañas de Colombia, 29 December. 
207 FARC-EP, 2012, ‘Declaracion Publica’, Secretariado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC-EP, 
Montañas de Colombia, 22 July. 
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Proscription added a step to the de-vilification process. The government had to 
retreat from extreme vilification to vilification without the terrorist label before 
moving towards further de-vilification. I described this shift in discourse as a 
‘linguistic ceasefire’. The effect of this is threefold: in recognising the existence of 
the conflict it re-contextualised the armed group in the conflict, and helped 
normalise and re-politicise them, to a degree; it brought about a removal of the 
terrorist label; and it uncoupled the act and the actor, creating the possibility for 
change to happen.  
While President Santos was able to de-vilify the group enough to initiate the 
formal negotiation process, the ‘terrorist’ label has meant that the de-vilification 
process is still on-going in Colombia and a large sector of public opinion is yet to 
be convinced either by the armed group’s efforts at de-vilifying themselves or by 
the government’s efforts at de-vilifying the FARC. This was very apparent in the 
rejection of the peace agreement in the referendum that took place in October 
2016. The impact proscription has on de-vilification in the longer term will have 
important implications for post-agreement peacebuilding and the possibility for 
the FARC to transition into becoming an unarmed actor in Colombian politics.  
The literature on negotiations acknowledges that secret talks can often allow 
the government to start exploring a vilified group’s ‘seriousness’ without losing 
face vis-à-vis public opinion. And indeed that is what President Santos did. But, at 
the same time, he strategically and deliberately attempted to change the image of 
his opponent - shifting the rhetoric to prepare the public and his own government 
for the possibility of negotiations. What is also apparent in the analysis is the 
interplay between the inter-party and intra-party dynamics and the importance 
each side gave to bringing along their different factions as well as signalling to the 
other party. This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6 which focuses on the 
symbolic and material effects of proscription to assess how proscription affected 
the perception of asymmetry and symmetry between the Colombian government 
and the FARC. 
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Chapter	Six	
Asymmetry and Symmetry 
 
 
Introduction 
On 7 January 1999, in the sweltering heat of San Vincente del Caguán in Southern 
Colombia, President Andres Pastrana sat next to an empty chair. He was waiting 
for Manuel Marulanda, the leader of the FARC to join him at the opening 
ceremony of the Caguán negotiations.  Sweating and visibly crestfallen he sat 
while several hundred members of the FARC pointed guns in his direction. 
Finally he stood up and made his speech. This iconic image of the empty chair, 
like a bride left at the altar on her wedding day, came to symbolise the stillbirth of 
the Caguán negotiations. It also serves to illustrate the complexities of power 
relationships between governments and armed groups. Asymmetry in protracted 
armed conflicts does not necessarily lean towards the State.  
In October 2012, in a much cooler setting in Hurdal, 60km north of Oslo, 
the Colombian government and the FARC announced they would be meeting in 
Havana to start peace negotiations. Both sides were represented not by their 
leaders but by their chief negotiators, Humberto de la Calle for the Colombian 
government and Iván Márquez, for the FARC. During a carefully stage-managed 
event both negotiators entered the room at the same time and sat with 
representatives of Cuba and Norway between them. They neither talked nor shook 
hands with each other. The contrast with the image of the empty chair was not 
incidental but deliberate. Everything was done to avoid the comparison. The mood 
in Hurdal, indirect, carefully crafted, deliberate and controlled was illustrative of 
the way the Colombian government altered the power relations in the lead-up to 
the Havana negotiations in the context of proscription. 
The analytical framework set out in Chapter 4 explored a wide 
understanding of power. Building on the work of Mack (1975) and Zartman 
(1997), Philipson (2005) and Mitchell (2009), we saw that the asymmetry 
between a government and armed group can be based on a range of different 
sources of power. To be able to assess the material and symbolic dimensions of 
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power in interaction, these different sources of power were folded under two main 
headings. First, power based on status differentials, which include legal standing, 
status and international contacts and relations. Second, power based on resource 
differentials, which include military might and tactics, differentiated will and 
skills, economics, political and moral resources. Only by assessing all these 
different components for both parties can we have a clear picture of the power 
relationship. But Chapter 4 also clarified that power is a “perceived relation” 
(Zartman 1997). So, in the pre-negotiation phase, the weaker party needs to 
develop perceived symmetry by ‘borrowing’ power from different sources 
(Zartman 1997). Third parties can play important roles in this regard (Zartman, 
Ohlson 1998, Kriesberg 2009). Parties can establish a form of parity of esteem 
through the pre-negotiation process itself.  
The question this chapter sets out to answer is how proscription affected the 
nature of the asymmetry and how this asymmetry was adjusted during the two 
pre-negotiation processes between the Colombian government and the FARC. It 
seems rather obvious that international proscription of the armed group will 
broadly heighten the power of the government. The government, having won a 
central battle in the process of having its legal status confirmed by the 
international community, will be bolstered. But it is less clear how the material 
and symbolic effects of proscription will affect all these multiple sources of 
power. Moreover, there is little understanding of the particular effects of 
proscription on the ways the perception of symmetry is established during the pre-
negotiation phase.  
By first exploring the complex power relations between the FARC and the 
Colombian government that led to the Caguán negotiations the chapter will add 
nuance to our understanding of power symmetry and asymmetry between 
governments and armed groups and the different sources of power at their 
disposal. It will also make apparent the ways in which perceived symmetry was 
encouraged between parties ahead of negotiations in a pre-proscription period. 
The second part of the chapter will look at how proscription affected the balance 
between the Colombian government and the FARC and the different sources of 
power at their disposal post 9/11. It will then explain how it affected the 
establishment of perceived symmetry in the lead-up to the Havana negotiations.  
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I. The path to the Caguán 
As the opening paragraph made apparent, the power relationship between the 
Colombian government and the FARC was complex and multifaceted in the lead-
up to the Caguán negotiations. The perceived symmetry established between the 
conflict protagonists ahead of the negotiations was as much about the Colombian 
government tapping into different sources of power as it was about the FARC 
vying for increased political clout. In a pre-proscription context, both parties were 
able to ‘borrow’ power from national and international sources easily and fluidly. 
1. Asymmetry 
The way power is understood and contested lies at the heart of violent protracted 
intra-state conflicts. The Colombian conflict with the FARC is no exception. The 
nature of the armed confrontation between the Colombian government and the 
FARC has been about power. As Saramiento and Sanchez noted: “the seizing of 
power and the defence of power has been the main object of the armed 
confrontation” (Saramiento and Sanchez 2011: 33). In fact, looking closely at the 
FARC it becomes apparent that everything that they are and everything that they 
do is a function of trying to seize power (de Francisco 2011: 76). 
i. Status differentials 
From a legal status point of view, this is a classic case of a highly asymmetric 
conflict between a state, recognised by the international society, battling an illegal 
and thus illegitimate non-state armed group. The FARC was made illegal since its 
formal creation in 1964. But a closer look at the period leading-up to the Caguán 
negotiations shows a more nuanced picture of the asymmetry between FARC and 
the Colombian government particularly when it came to status differentials.  
During the 1990s, the FARC exhibited elements of legitimacy both 
nationally and internationally. During what French historian and sociologist 
Daniel Pécaut described as the FARC’s “apogée”, they received strong support 
from certain sectors of population, as they implicitly and explicitly formulated the 
demands and gave form to their feelings of injustice (Pécaut 2008: 69). The armed 
group felt it represented a constituency of sorts. At that time, the FARC were 
present in half of Colombia’s municipalities where about 70 per cent of the 
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population lived.208 De Francisco (2011) made the interesting point that the 
FARC, beyond considering itself a party to the armed conflict, seemed to actually 
consider itself as a type of de facto state and had developed a “parallelism” with 
state institutions in the language used to describe their actions.209  They do not 
‘extort’ people but ‘cover a tax’ (cobrar impuestos), they do not take people 
‘hostage’ but ‘retain’ people (de Francisco 2011: 78).  
The FARC had established a certain level of status nationally that put it in 
direct competition with the State. It portrayed itself as the equivalent of Robin 
Hood for the oppressed in Colombia. This was also apparent at the international 
level. The FARC opened offices and representations internationally. They had an 
office in Mexico City and a network of contacts across Europe and Latin America. 
Its perception was that it felt supported internationally (Gómez Alzate 2010: 47). 
According to Marcos Calarcá, head of the FARC’s international section, the 
FARC “travelled around the world, met with governments”.210 
In stark contrast, the status and legitimacy of the government led by 
President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was in crisis. His government was widely 
perceived as lacking legitimacy at both the national and international level as his 
presidential campaign had been funded by the Cali drug cartels. This crisis 
became known as the ‘8.000 process’. The US State Department even revoked 
President Samper’s visa based on these suspicions in August 1996, denying him 
permission to visit the U.S. This was unprecedented for a Colombian President. 
President Samper had been keen to get a negotiation process with the FARC 
off the ground and the FARC had initially welcomed the possibility of talks. But 
this crisis of national and international legitimacy linked to the 8.000 process drug 
scandal meant he was unable to follow through. The crisis made his Presidency 
precarious and meant he did not have the space for this type of political 
manoeuvre. President Samper’s strategy had been based on looking for direct 
contact with the guerrilla (Noé Muñoz 2008). President Samper had asked Carlos 
Lozano and Alvaro Leyva to explore the FARC’s willingness to engage in a peace 
																																																								
208 Advisor 1, Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Office, Personal interview, Bogotá, Colombia, 
June 2015. 
209 See Arjona (2018) for details on the FARC’s local governance in Colombia’s civil war.  
210 Marcos Calarcá (Luis Alberto Albán Burbano), Member of the FARC negotiation team and 
International Secretariat, Personal interview, May 2015, Havana, Cuba. 
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negotiation through initial contacts.211  Carlos Lozano explained that the talks did 
not happen “not because he [Samper] did not want to, but because he did not have 
the space because of this crisis”.212 The FARC issued a statement on 11 February 
1996 in which they called on the government to step down claiming it was 
“illegitimate” because of the drug scandal.213 So, in terms of status differentials 
and international contacts, the balance actually tipped in favour of the FARC who 
felt powerful. Similarly, when it came to resources asymmetries, it is not a clear-
cut picture of a dominant government versus a weak armed group.  
ii. Resources differentials 
The Colombian army was in a poor state and was not adequately equipped to fight 
the FARC. In fact, “The situation appeared so grim [for the Colombian 
government] that the [US] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) predicted in 
November 1997 that the guerrillas could defeat the Colombian government in five 
years unless the armed forces were restructured.” (Arnson 2000: 13). The army 
was equipped and trained for classic warfare: “The military was trained for the 
war that did not exist, not for the one they were actually fighting, the guerrilla 
war”.214 According to the International Crisis Group (2002:8), in 1998, the army 
had 133,000 soldiers, of whom only approximately 40,000 were actual combat 
troops. Most of these were conscripts. So there were not enough soldiers, they 
were not adequately trained and they did not have the right equipment. General 
Colon recalled that there was not much support for the military at the time, their 
equipment was not at all adequate for asymmetrical warfare, what they needed at 
the time were special forces and helicopters.215  
In contrast, the period under Ernesto Samper is known as the period of the 
FARC’s “splendour”, they “had strength, were victorious and had capacity”.216 
The FARC having switched to an all-out war strategy in the 1990s and had greatly 
increased their numbers. The FARC had been preparing since 1996 through a new 																																																								
211 Carlos Lozano recalled being asked by President Samper in 1994 to establish direct contacts with the 
FARC, “we started working towards the possibility of a dialogue”, Carlos Lozano, Director of Semanario 
Voz and Member of the Communist Party, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia.  
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military strategy dubbed the ‘New Way of Operating’ (Nueva Forma de Operar) 
to move from guerrilla warfare to a war of positions with an increase in the 
number of fronts, soldiers and weapons (Granada & Sánchez Meertens 2009). 
Whereas they were only an estimated 3,600 FARC combatants in 1986 by 1996 
there were an estimated 17,000 fighters and 10,000 militiamen (International 
Crisis Group 2002). They were organised in 70 fronts across the country and 
structured like an army (Valencia 2006) distributed in seven regional blocs.217 
In terms of the military resources, the FARC felt like they had the upper 
hand. This military strength translated into battlefield gains. Until the mid-1990s 
the FARC mainly conducted hit and run guerrilla-type attacks.  But between 1996 
and 1998 the FARC started conducting large-scale attacks on important military 
battalions which led them to take military bases, destroy elite Colombian military 
units and to permanently occupy 202 municipalities in eastern and southern 
Colombia (Rangel 2000; International Crisis Group 2002; Pécaut 2008; Leech 
2011). Moreover, the guerrilla held 500 soldiers. There was a general feeling that 
the Colombian armed forces were incapable of winning the war militarily. The 
FARC on the other hand had the military initiative and thought they could win – 
in other words they thought the “revolution was close” (Gómez Alzate 2011:47). 
According to Teófilo Vasquez, a Colombian conflict analyst present during the 
Caguán negotiations, at the time, “there was a clear perception, imagined or real, 
of the FARC’s dominance”.218 
Economically as well, the Colombian government was in dire straits.  
Between 1994 and 1998 unemployment doubled from 7 per cent to 16 per cent, 
the financial sector was in crisis and, for the first time in more than sixty years, 
forecasters were expecting no growth of the GDP (Gómez Alzate 2011: 46). The 
FARC on the other hand had been steadily increasing its income by becoming 
more involved in the drug trade in the 1990s. The FARC was thought to be 
earning $900 million annually in the late 1990s (Hylton 2006 cited in Leech 
2011:67). And, unlike other armed insurgencies in Latin America and elsewhere, 
the FARC were not dependent on funding from foreign governments or a 
diaspora.   As Jan Egeland, the UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) Special Envoy to 																																																								
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Colombia between 1999 and 2001, noted, the “FARC never depended on anyone 
else outside, they are a very domestic group”.219 So, unlike many other armed 
groups who suffered financially from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, the FARC did not.  
So, instead of a more customary and clear-cut situation in which the 
government was seen as the powerful party and the armed group as the weak 
party, things were inverted in Colombia during the 1990s. Though the government 
had legal superiority, the FARC had national and international status parity and 
showed they were a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield.  
2. Perceiving symmetry  
In the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations both parties tried to bolster their 
positions. It was not just about strengthening the armed group’s position, the 
government also attempted to strengthen its own weak position ahead of the 
negotiations. Both parties borrowed power, to use Zartman’s terms (1997), from 
different sources both nationally and internationally. 
i. Status symmetry 
When it came to legal status, the asymmetry in favour of the government 
remained. The FARC was not given any particular legal standing ahead of the 
Caguán negotiations. They had actively pushed to have an official belligerency 
status. This is a status that can be given either by the government or another state. 
The requirements for which include things like control of territory, troops, or 
respect for international humanitarian law. This was a very active debate in 
Colombia at the time and it was something the group wanted, according to the 
FARC themselves220, and a Cuban diplomat posted in Colombia at the time.221 
People close to the armed group argued that “There was a moment when the 
feeling was that the FARC fulfilled these criteria”222. 
Though the FARC was never granted official belligerent status, they did 
receive explicit political recognition ahead of the negotiations, which established a 																																																								
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form of perceived status parity at the national level. The government passed 
Resolution 84 of October 1998 which in effect recognised the FARC as a political 
organisation ahead of the Caguán negotiations. This resolution built on Law 418 
of December 1997223, which had been explicitly passed under the Samper 
administration to allow any government to initiate exploratory talks with the 
insurgents. This law made it a requirement that before negotiating with an illegal 
armed actor, the government should recognise that organisation politically. The 
aim of Law 418 was to make a clear difference “between political dialogue with 
the insurgency and the demobilisation and bringing to justice of the self-defence 
forces” (García-Peña 2008: 28). 
Moreover, President Pastrana immediately set out to have direct and public 
contacts with the FARC as we saw in the Chapter 5. Even between the first and 
second rounds of the election, candidate Pastrana sent Victor G Ricardo, advisor 
to Pastrana during his election campaign and later High Commissioner for Peace, 
to meet Manuel Marulanda the leader of the FARC. Pastrana then published 
photos of the meeting and issued a statement that he would seek direct talks with 
the FARC if elected (Egeland 2008). When Pastrana was elected President a 
number of analysts at the time attributed his victory to this meeting. Pastrana then 
made a point of meeting the FARC directly ahead of his inauguration, meeting in 
early July 1998 with the FARC leader Manuel Marulanda and Mono Jojoy the 
FARC’s military chief at an undisclosed location. These direct contacts gave the 
FARC a form of recognition that bolstered the FARC’s perceived status 
nationally.  
The Pastrana government strengthened its own national status by taking on 
the mantel of the ‘Citizen’s Mandate for Peace Life and Freedom’, known as the 
‘Mandate for Peace’. This ‘Mandate for Peace’ was the culmination of a series of 
public marches that led to a vote on 26 October 1997 in parallel to the local 
elections. 10 million votes were cast in favour of a ‘Mandate for Peace’. The 
genesis behind the vote will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7 as it played 
an important role in ripening the situation ahead of the Caguán, but should be 
mentioned here because it gave President Pastrana a very clear mandate and thus 																																																								
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legitimacy to start a negotiation with the FARC. This shifted the balance 
considerably compared to Samper’s illegitimate position marred by the Cali drug 
cartel financing scandal. The government found its national status greatly 
bolstered.  
All these gestures levelled the imbalance between the government and the 
armed group in terms of their perceived status differentials at the national level. 
On the one hand, President Pastrana was in a more favourable position compared 
to President Samper as he had a clear mandate to initiate negotiations with the 
FARC; on the other, the FARC received clear political recognition putting them 
on the par with the government. The other space where both parties borrowed 
power was the international arena.  
Both parties bolstered their positions through international contacts and 
third party interventions. This was a big shift from previous strategies both for the 
government and for the FARC. Historically, international actors had played a 
rather marginal role in previous peace efforts (Nasi 2009). Peace processes in the 
1980s under the Belisario Betancour (1982-1986) and the Virgilio Barco (1986-
1990) administrations were done behind “closed doors” with an absence of 
international participation or accompaniment. During Cesar Gaviria’s (1990-
1994) negotiation with the CGSB there was some involvement of Venezuela and 
Mexico where the talks took place but it was rather limited. The Colombian 
government had a long-standing aversion to international third party intervention 
(Civico 2011: 259). And, as a closed and local armed group, the FARC had 
always shown little confidence in international actors (Pécaut 2008).  As the 
UNSG Special Envoy for Colombia, Jan Egeland (2000: 83), said in his 
memoires:  
Colombians in general have been more sceptical than many others of 
having international involvement. (…) The government and the 
guerrillas have at some times actually agreed only on one thing, and 
that is not to bring in international mediation.  
 
President Pastrana took a different route and developed an approach dubbed 
‘Peace Diplomacy’ (Diplomacia para la Paz) aimed at getting a maximum of 
international allies for his efforts at negotiating with the FARC (Barreto Henrique 
2014). Pastrana thought international involvement would guarantee more support 
and credibility for his initiative. It is also clear that it was a way of bolstering his 
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status vis-à-vis the FARC. Even weakened, the government still had the attributes 
of power and influence internationally as a State  (Bejarano 1999b). Luckily for 
Pastrana, the international community responded with enthusiasm. The United 
Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed a representative as a Special 
Envoy to Colombia in 1999. The first one to be appointed was Jan Egeland who 
had already been actively advising Pastrana in his capacity with the Norwegian 
ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egeland 2008). His role was not supposed to be one 
of mediation but rather of facilitation or intermediation (Hernández Delgado 
2012).224 The appointment of such a high-level UN figure would later become 
impossible in the context of proscription post-9/11. 
So, the participation of the international community in peace negotiations 
effectively only started in the 1990s. The FARC also quickly realised that 
international participation would be an opportunity to gain legitimacy in front of 
the world and the recognition of its political status (Borda 2012 cited in Barreto 
Henrique 2014). The FARC already had offices and contacts internationally but 
also came to see the Caguán negotiation and the involvement of internationals as a 
way to strengthen itself politically.225 According to Carlos Lozano “A lot of 
countries wanted to speak to the FARC, and they did, some in Colombia, some 
outside the country. (… ) At the time, the FARC had offices in Europe, in 
Switzerland, they moved with more ease, they had more acceptation.”226  
Even the United States had direct contact with the FARC during this period. 
The US had explicitly wanted to open a direct channel of communication with the 
FARC despite the fact that the group had been designated as a terrorist 
organisation by the State Department since 1997 (Arnson 2000:8).  The State 
Department’s Director of Andean Affairs, Phil Chicola, held a secret meeting with 
Raul Reyes in December 1998 in Costa Rica (Jones 2009).227 According to 
Chicola himself, he “had some significant discussions about the FARC’s 
objectives.” (Philip Chicola, office of Andean Affairs, U.S. Department of State: 
35). But when the FARC were accused of murdering three American indigenous 
rights activists in March 1999 this political space was curtailed. The US House 																																																								
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International Relations Chairman, Benjamin Gilman, accused the administration 
of “blurring the longstanding U.S policy of not dealing with terrorists” (cited in 
Arnson 2000: 9). 
The establishment of perceived status symmetry ahead of the Caguán 
between the government and the FARC was fluid and relatively effortless. 
Contacts with the FARC were direct, public and done at the highest level of 
government. Both parties also had easy access to international actors and the 
political climate in Colombia was particularly conducive to initiating negotiations.  
ii. Resources symmetry 
The main confidence building measure, presented as a step towards negotiations 
by the Pastrana government, was the demilitarized zone. Indeed, soon after he 
took office, in August 1998, President Pastrana announced his decision to create a 
demilitarized zone (despeje) in five municipalities in the region of Caquetá: La 
Uribe, San Vicente del Caguán, Vistahermosa, Meseta, and La Macarena.  
Effectively demilitarizing a territory of 42,000 km2 (approximately the size of 
Switzerland) and withdrawing 2,000 soldiers. What was particularly surprising 
about this gesture was that, according to people who had been discussing pre-
conditions with the FARC in the years leading-up to the Caguán, the FARC had 
not even considered asking for an area that was so large.228  
The FARC did not directly reciprocate, but they had, in the year’s leading-
up to the peace negotiation, made a number of unilateral gestures when it came to 
releasing hostages. The most notable of which was the unilateral release in June 
1997 of 70 Colombian soldiers by the FARC in Remolinos del Caguán. This 
initiative had been led by the then Bishop of San Vincente del Caguán, Monseñor 
Luis Augusto Castro, following six months of dialogue with the FARC.229  
These confidence-building measures played a role when it came to shifting 
the perception of resources asymmetry.  In agreeing to a demilitarized zone, 
which was unmonitored and ended-up being used as a training and recuperation 
area for the FARC, the Colombian government in effect acknowledged the armed 
group’s control over that part of the territory and the group’s overall military 																																																								
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strength, thereby acknowledging symmetry of sorts with the armed group both in 
terms of status and resources. 
One area where the FARC had less know-how and experience than the 
government was in terms of skills - both in the elaboration of their political 
agenda and their negotiation skills. UNSG Special Envoy Egeland said on a 
number of occasions how he was “struck by how vague the FARC demands for 
Colombia’s future were.” (Egeland 2008: 53).230 But because of the FARC’s 
network of contacts across Europe and the fact that they had direct access to 
European and UN diplomats they could request direct support during the pre-
negotiations phase. These mainly fell under the category of building the armed 
group’s capacity in terms of negotiation. The Norwegian government, through the 
Norwegian Churches and the Lutheran World Federation, funded a constitutional 
lawyer, for example, that was trusted by the FARC so they could be prepared for 
the negotiation and “give them the expertise so they are on par with the 
government”.231 This allowed the FARC to start building a sense of capacity 
symmetry.  Others also sought to affect the group’s strategic calculations. 
According to Ramirez Ocampo (2004: 75), the International community in 
Caguán area “attempted to influence the armed actors, informing them that their 
war tactics and financing by drugs, extortion and kidnapping defied agreed 
multilateral principles”. 
But the most sticking example of direct international capacity building to 
the FARC was the ‘FARC eurotour’. It was also an attempt at trying to influence 
how the group saw itself and how others saw it, which reinforced the FARC’s 
status as a legitimate political actor. The joint delegation that travelled to Europe 
was composed of Colombian government and FARC negotiators to find “points of 
reference and possible alternatives that could then be discussed in the context of 
negotiations” (Confidential interview 2007 cited in Barreto Henrique 2014). The 
FARC were exposed to the workings of Northern European social democracies 
and were encouraged to establish contacts with a range of governments and 
international organisations.232 Asked about the eurotour, Marcos Calarcá, who 																																																								
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participated in the tour as part of the FARC’s International Secretariat, said the 
FARC already had many of these contacts before “more than the government 
did”.233 This shows the ease and extent to which the FARC had been able to 
establish international contacts and tap into these to bolster their perceived status 
but also their knowledge in a pre-proscription era. 
Similarly to international actors, Colombian civil society actors had 
relatively easy access to the FARC ahead of and during the Caguán negotiations. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the years leading up to the peace negotiations were marked 
by extensive mobilization for peace. The Colombian Jesuit research centre CINEP 
even developed a specific dataset called Datapaz which was an inventory of 
‘collective actions for peace’ since 1978.  According to the dataset, there had been 
little civil society peace activism until the early to mid-1990s. A whole range of 
non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations and networks 
were set-up in the 1990s. These “civic peace initiatives” played a range of ‘roles’ 
from defence and resistance to violence, to peace education and peace and 
development work all the way to direct engagement in dialogue and negotiations 
with the armed actors (Fernandez, García-Dúran and Sarmiento 2004: 28). When 
it came to those actors engaging the FARC directly their roles fell under the 
categories of understanding the armed group and trying to influence the group’s 
strategic calculations. A notable example is the National Conciliation Commission 
(CNN) set-up by the Episcopal Peace Commission in 1995. The Bishops who 
were part of the CNN had an explicit mandate and were authorized by the 
government to dialogue with armed groups.234 They helped bring the parties 
together by providing ‘good offices’ (Fernandez, García-Durán and Sarmiento 
2004).  
The Colombian government and the FARC established a clear sense of 
symmetry ahead of the Caguán negotiations, which confirms much of the 
negotiation literature on the need for symmetry. While the government and the 
FARC already had status and resources parity by the 1990s, the period leading-up 
to the Caguán greatly reinforced this trend. The FARC were granted explicit and 
direct political status and recognition, they also had easy access to civil society 
and international actors. Moreover, by establishing a de-militarized zone, the 																																																								
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government in effect acknowledged a form of parity with the armed group. But 
the government was also able to strengthen its own position by tapping into the 
national clamour for peace and borrowing power internationally through its peace 
diplomacy strategy. This perceived balance was about to shift radically.  
 
II. Proscription and the path to the Havana negotiation  
After 9/11 and the attack against the World Trade Centre, suddenly the world 
remembered that the FARC had been on the U.S. State Department’s list of 
terrorist organisations since 1997 (International Crisis Group 2002). According to 
Colombia analysts, 9/11 exposed the peace negotiations to much closer 
international scrutiny. Virginia Bouvier, for example, argued that it was one of the 
factors that “torpedoed” the talks as suddenly the “political space to engage with 
groups that were listed as terrorists by the US completely shut down” and it “gave 
clout to those who thought the negotiated solution was not the way to go”.235 
Whereas in the lead-up to the Caguán the listing had been downplayed and US 
representatives had even met directly with the FARC, post-9/11 being on the US 
list took on new importance: “rhetoric emanating from both Washington and 
Bogotá shifted to emphasizing the US State Department’s listing of the FARC as 
an international terrorist organization” (Leech 2011:86). 
1. Asymmetry 
The effects of international proscription on the shift in rhetoric and the particular 
symbolic effects were explored in depth in the previous chapter. It is just worth 
restating that it led the Colombian conflict to be understood and subsumed in the 
broader war on terror. It also had very direct material implications. The interaction 
between the symbolic and material effects of proscription completely shifted the 
power relationship between the Colombian government and the FARC both in 
terms of status and resources differentials. 
i. Status differentials 
While during the 1990s the FARC had a form of perceived parity with the 
Colombian government because it was seen as representing a constituency, this 
shifted considerably after the Caguán. The political and moral standing of the 																																																								
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FARC was deeply affected by the failure of the Caguán negotiation and by 
international proscription. The FARC lost a huge amount of credibility nationally 
during this period. Colombian citizens were greatly disillusioned by the armed 
group and felt betrayed by the lack of seriousness they had shown during the 
negotiations. It was also shocked by the way in which the group was able to take 
advantage of the demilitarized zone to kidnap people and control drug production. 
The general feeling was that the FARC had used the negotiations to strengthen 
itself both politically and militarily and had not shown a real ‘will for peace’ 
(voluntad de paz). Civil society actors who had played key roles in the ‘Mandate 
for Peace’ and the peace marches in the lead-up to the Caguán felt betrayed.  
There was huge popular frustration with the armed group.236  
This loss of political and moral credibility was compounded by international 
proscription and the way in which President Uribe took advantage of the post-9/11 
environment and the international listings to frame the conflict as a fight against 
terrorists through extreme vilification. Symbolically the language of terrorism 
deeply de-legitimised the FARC as we saw in detail in the discussion of 
(de)vilification in Chapter 5. As one civil society actor put it, the “use of the word 
terrorism and terrorist has simplified the situation as a fight against criminals”.237 
It reinforced the idea that the armed group was not interested in politics or 
negotiations but only had criminal interests. Materially, it also made the 
construction of their political relations much more complicated. It increased their 
isolation as it became legally and practically very difficult to meet the group. Civil 
society interactions with the armed group that had been relatively fluid in the lead-
up and especially during the Caguán suddenly stopped. As one member of the 
FARC acknowledged, before contact was possible, meetings took place, “but after 
that, for about eight years, there was some isolation, not total but some”.238  
The listing of the FARC as a terrorist organisation and the particular 
meaning this took on post 9/11 allowed President Uribe to build a narrative of the 
internal conflict as a fight against terrorists. It deeply heightened the status 																																																								
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asymmetry between the Colombian government and the FARC from the point of 
view of the international community. After intense lobbying in 2002, the 
Colombian government succeeded in getting the FARC and the ELN also 
included in the European Union’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. “This was 
a diplomatic success for the Colombian government as it deligitimized both 
groups on the political level” (Kurtenbach 2009:393). The fact that the FARC was 
now on the US and the EU list of terrorist organisations confirmed the armed 
group’s illegality on the world stage. It deeply affected the way they were 
perceived internationally, which the Colombian government saw as a great 
victory. As Camilo Gómez Alzate (2009: 35), Former High Commissioner for 
Peace said: 
The guerrilla have been unmasked in front of the world with their 
terrorist attitude, who no longer see them as mythical like the “Robin 
Hood” of the oppressed in Colombia (…) Luckily, this vision changed 
and the whole world catalogued them like terrorists.  
 
Similarly, at the UN level, Colombia denied the existence of the internal 
armed conflict and the government generated a wide range of documents and 
statistics that gave the impression that Colombia was in a post-conflict phase. The 
majority of the international community started buying into the idea that the 
FARC was a terrorist phenomenon. In effect it stopped the international 
community thinking that the conflict is a problem between two equal, or at least 
similar parties (de Francisco 2011: 74).  
The EU list in particular also had clear material consequences for the status 
of the armed group. It put an end to the FARC’s network of support in Europe. In 
concrete terms it meant the FARC were made illegal in Europe, could not travel 
there, have offices there or hold public meetings inside the EU nor could they 
qualify for political asylum. This had a deep influence on their international 
status. Marcos Calarcá who represented the FARC in Mexico at the time said they 
had to shut the Mexican office in April 2002 but that in Europe “it was worse” as 
they had people in Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, who all had to leave after EU 
proscription.239 Their contacts with internationals were deeply affected: 
In the Caguán, the FARC had extensive relations with many countries, 
even with the Queen of Jordan.  There were many meetings with 
internationals. After the listing, these relations ended. They abandoned 																																																								
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diplomatic relations with the FARC. Once they put us in the list they 
did not want to have contact with us.240  
 
International proscription also de-legitimised the idea of dialogue itself and 
the possibility for international third party involvement. President Uribe “re-
nationalised” any contacts with the non-state armed actors and relegated 
international actors to an even more irrelevant role (Barreto Henrique 2014). 
President Uribe saw international facilitation as only acceptable if it was seen to 
support his policy, was politically controllable and without an independent voice 
(Barreto Henrique 2014). Based on the premise that you do not negotiate with 
terrorists, the government thought that if it were seen to accept international third 
parties playing a role that this would “detract from its position that the FARC is a 
terrorist phenomenon” (de Francisco 2011: 74).  
So, while proscription deeply de-legitimised the FARC at a national and 
international level, it also bolstered the status legitimacy of the Colombian state. 
The situation in Colombia was no longer perceived as one between two conflict 
parties but as a fight between a legitimate government against a group of 
terrorists. 
ii. Resources differentials 
During the Caguán, the armed conflict actually got worse while the peace 
negotiations were taking place (Egeland 2008). As the FARC continued its slow 
numerical growth, the paramilitary groups achieved supremacy in important 
agricultural and strategic corridors for drugs and arms trafficking. Moreover, the 
government security forces were able to modernize their equipment with new 
technology through the support of Plan Colombia with the United States 
(Gonzales Posso 2004). The military balance between the government and the 
FARC had already started shifting in favour of the government during the Caguán 
negotiations, but the material implications of 9/11 deeply reinforced this trend. 
The incorporation of the FARC in the broader ‘war on terror’ led to very 
concrete material implications in terms of the military balance between the 
Colombian government and the FARC. In August 2002 the US Congress allowed 
“lethal assistance” provided to Colombia, which had previously been restricted to 
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counter-narcotics, to be used in counter-terrorism operations (Tate 2004: 73; 
Fajardo 2003: 32). This is a very clear example of the symbolic and material 
effects of proscription reinforcing each other. Because the conflict was labelled in 
a particular way, it allowed the Colombian government to use resources from its 
fight against drugs for its war against the FARC. It also led to an additional 
US$35 million for the Colombian military and police. The aim was to target “the 
unified ‘cross-cutting’ threat posed by groups that use narcotics trafficking to fund 
their terrorist and other activities that threaten the national security of Colombia” 
(quoted in International Crisis Group 2002: 14).  
President Uribe’s two terms in office, between 2002 and 2010, reinforced 
this trend. It is during this period that “the country experienced a more radical 
relation between war and politics” (Saramiento and Sanchez 2011: 33). The Plan 
Colombia, was followed by the Plan Patriota and Seguridad Democratica 
policies. The Colombian government invested heavily in modernizing its armed 
forces. Military spending between 2001 and 2007 according to the Court of 
Auditors grew to 4.7 per cent of GNP compared to an average of 1.6 per cent in 
the rest of Latin America (cited in International Crisis Group 2002). By 2010, and 
the end of the Uribe administration, the “correlation of forces had shifted 
favourably” for the government.241  
The terrorism framing delegitimised armed group violence but it also had 
the effect of bolstering the government’s strategy: “the impact of the listing was 
more connected to legitimising the Uribe government”.242  Similarly, the FARC’s 
own assessment was that international proscription facilitated Uribe’s bellicose 
strategy: “Then it was the start of Plan Patriota and the military onslaught. Having 
us on the list worked well, they needed to justify it”.243 It also strengthened the 
Colombian military not just in material terms but also symbolically. They felt 
supported and valued. One military personnel explained, “These attacks [9/11] 
changed my life because those that were working [against the FARC] received 
total support and clarity on identifying and clarifying the target. It was positive for 
us in our fight against them.”244  																																																								
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So, proscription not only strengthened the government and the army 
symbolically, it also made violent counter-terrorism strategies by the state appear 
appropriate and legitimate with clear material consequences. The army itself 
acknowledged that this characterisation helped their fight:  
The FARC and the ELN are included in the lists and considered 
terrorists at the global level, this gives us a judicial support and a 
justification to attack the FARC not like a revolutionary group or a 
political group but like a terrorist group.245  
 
President Uribe’s government succeeded in altering the military balance and 
pushing the FARC out of urban centres. General Colón recalled: “Uribe hit the 
FARC hard in its centre: its structure, militias, lines of communication. The 
FARC moved to the periphery, away from the urban centres and main transport 
connections.”246  By the end of 2010 the FARC only retained a significant 
presence in three regions: the south-east (Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá and 
Putumayo), the south-central highlands (Huila and southern Tolima), and the 
south-west (Nariño, Valle de Cauca and southern Chocó) (Leech 2011:139). The 
government also succeeded in killing members of the FARC’s top leadership, 
which was something completely new. Though Manuel Marulanda, the FARC’s 
founder and leader, died of natural causes in March 2008, key members of the 
FARC Secretariat Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios were killed by the army in 2008 as 
well as Mono JoJoy and Alfonso Cano in 2011. These assassinations were greatly 
helped by US intelligence and military support through the re-focussing of Plan 
Colombia from a fight against narcotics to a fight against terrorists. 
It terms of military resources we already saw how the US listing in 
particular bolstered funds for the Colombian army. What is less clear is how the 
financial material implications of proscription such as asset freeze affected the 
FARC. It is obviously difficult to have a clear picture of the impact on FARC’s 
finances. While there are no published figures, the asset freeze appeared to have 
been of limited consequence for the armed group because of its other sources of 
funding and the fact that it was not dependent on diaspora support or international 
banking transaction. Even though certain military personnel argued that it had an 
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impact because “it stopped Europeans giving them money”247, this would have 
been very marginal compared to the FARC’s broader budget. The Norwegian 
team, who probably have a good sense of the FARC’s finances as they funded the 
armed group’s participation during the Havana negotiations, claim that 
proscription had little financial impact especially if compared to other armed 
groups: “International proscription has not had a material effect on their funding 
because the group has other sources – unlike the LTTE that depended on diaspora 
money.”248 
By the end of President Uribe’s two terms in office, the perception of 
asymmetry between the Colombian government and the FARC was acute. The 
situation had switched completely when compared to the 1990s period. This time 
the government was definitely seen as the most powerful actor and the FARC was 
deeply weakened. International proscription and the framing of the FARC as 
terrorists radically shifted the legal and status relations between the Colombian 
government and the FARC. The armed group was broken politically by the 
listings while the government was strengthened. It put an end to the FARC’s 
international contacts and relations while bolstering the government’s. It also 
deeply eroded the armed group’s political and moral standing in Colombia. This 
trend was even more apparent in terms of resources asymmetry. Though 
proscription did not appear to have had a big impact on the group’s finances, it 
deeply shifted the military and political and moral balance in favour of the 
government. It produced a shift from a situation in the late 1990s where the FARC 
was actually thought of being on the brink of power practically, to one where the 
armed group was seen as beaten militarily. Proscription symbolically and 
materially bolstered the Colombian military and legitimised a shift towards 
increasingly violent counter-terrorism strategies, which had deep repercussions on 
the FARC.   
2. Perceiving symmetry  
Under President Uribe, and following the collapse of the Caguán negotiations, the 
option to have a political negotiation with the FARC shuts down. The Uribe 
government made it perfectly clear they would not negotiate with ‘terrorists’. 
Similarly, the FARC argued that “dialogue with the current government [Uribe 																																																								
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administration] is impossible as long as the government persists in its media 
strategy of characterizing the insurgency as narco-terrorist, and as long as it 
continues to criminalize popular protest” (Echeverri 2006:19). The only issue that 
remained on the agenda during the Uribe period was the possibility of a 
humanitarian negotiation, swapping hostages for prisoners, which became known 
as the possibility of a ‘humanitarian accord’ (acuerdo humanitario)(Correa 
Robledo 2006, Chernick 2009). In August 2002 President Uribe asked UN 
Secretary General Kofi Anan for his good offices to establish a humanitarian 
accord with the FARC. President Uribe authorized the UNSG special adviser 
James Lemoyne to make contact with the FARC. But by April 2005 the UNSG 
withdrew Lemoyne acting on a request by President Uribe himself.  According to 
Jones (2009), James Lemoyne had deeply offended Uribe by saying the FARC 
had a political programme. This was to be the end of high-level UN representation 
in the Colombian conflict. Uribe was not going to take the risk of having the 
FARC ‘borrow’ power from an international third party.  
It is only with the arrival of President Santos that we start seeing attempts at 
redressing the asymmetry between the Colombian government and the FARC. 
President Santos actually surprised everyone when he stated in his inaugural 
speech on the 7 August 2010 that the “door was open for peace”.249 As Uribe’s 
defence minister and a senior figure in pursuing his ‘Democratic Security Policy’, 
this is not what Colombians nor the FARC had expected of Santos. But, though he 
clearly expressed his readiness to enter into dialogue, he also said he would only 
move forward if the guerrilla laid down their arms and stopped kidnapping, 
intimidation, extortion and drug dealing.250 It is clear from the outset that though 
President Santos was exploring a negotiation with the listed armed group he did 
not want to weaken his own government’s position or strengthen the FARC’s 
unnecessarily. This became rapidly apparent both in the way the status and 
resources differentials between the government and the FARC were adjusted in 
the lead-up to the Havana negotiations. 
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i. Status symmetry 
Unlike the period leading-up to the Caguán negotiations when the FARC were 
granted explicit political recognition, the lead-up to Havana was marked by much 
more indirect and nuanced attempts at creating perceived symmetry. The FARC 
were not granted a change in legal status nor were they de-listed by any 
government or international organisation, which would have greatly bolstered 
their status. As we saw in Chapter 5, proscription created a political straightjacket 
for Santos as it greatly increased the entry cost for negotiations. Granting the 
FARC obvious and explicit status and recognition ahead of negotiations was not 
an option.  
The FARC did not receive a political status ahead of Havana. The Santos 
administration benefitted from the fact that the Public Order Law 418 of 1997, 
which had been used by President Pastrana to grant the FARC political status 
ahead of the Caguán negotiations, had been amended under President Uribe in 
2002. When Uribe was setting the stage for his negotiations with paramilitary 
groups, this law was renewed through the passing of Law 782 (2002) but a key 
clause was changed - the clause by which the government needed to recognise an 
organisation politically before negotiating with them. Instead, Uribe pushed for 
this sentence to be taken out of the law meaning that a government no longer 
needed to recognise a group politically to be able to negotiate with them.  
According to a government official, this change in the law also facilitated the 
initial exploratory contacts with the FARC in the context of proscription because 
they were able to do so without having to grant the group an official political 
status. 251 
 Though the FARC were not granted any change of status ahead of Havana, 
the ‘linguistic ceasefire’, which was explored in detail in the Chapter 5, reduced 
the symbolic effect of proscription. It allowed President Santos to slowly adjust 
the FARC’s public status but also give the FARC a sense of parity. The fact that 
Santos recognised the existence of the armed conflict, stopped using the terrorist 
label to describe the FARC and acknowledged the fact that the armed group could 
change, the three key components of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’, all contributed to 
creating a sense of parity of esteem between the parties. This was a crucial pre-																																																								
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condition for the group and one of the ways in which they felt their status 
bolstered ahead of Havana. Frank Pearl who was involved in the exploratory talks 
said “They [FARC] asked not to be called terrorists or bandits, to recognise their 
political nature”. In the absence of an official political status it was also the fact of 
the government engaging with them that gave them ‘automatic recognition’ 
(Zartman and Faure 2011). As one analyst said about the Havana negotiations, 
they were “clearly not treating them as ‘terrorists’ as they are negotiating on 
content such as political participation and land redistribution” central issues of the 
FARC’s agenda.252 The act of pre-negotiation itself helped level the playing field. 
President Santos did not want to give the FARC a platform for an extended 
public negotiation, the potential political costs of which would be too high in the 
context of proscription. Unlike when candidate Pastrana was meeting with the 
FARC in broad daylight even before being sworn in, Santos made sure to keep the 
pre-negotiation process completely secret and indirect. All the initial contacts with 
the FARC were done in secret not through himself or government officials but 
through a Valle de Cauca businessman called Henry Acosta who had long-
established links with Pablo Catatumbo, a key member of the FARC’s Central 
Command. Henry Acosta would carry messages across between President Santos 
and the FARC leadership.253 It is only once President Santos had established 
through this indirect exchange that there was real willingness and capacity on the 
part of the FARC that he designated two representatives to have direct talks with 
two FARC leaders. One was Frank Pearl, who had been High Commissioner for 
Peace under the Uribe administration and the other was his own brother, Enrique 
Santos. Enrique Santos explained the content of these meetings: “We were 
discussing: what, where, how, when after ten years of absolute war.”254 
The role of Enrique Santos as the President’s brother was important 
symbolically to establish a form of subtle parity of esteem between the 
government and the armed group. Many of my interviewees highlighted the 
essential and central role he played.255 As Frank Pearl said “He was the clearest 																																																								
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and most direct message” of the government’s commitment.256 It gave much 
confidence to the FARC257 and gave them a sense of significance. Even Enrique 
Santos himself acknowledged the importance of his own role “it was a mark of 
confidence, his own brother, this was a clear signal”.258 It was an effective side-
stepping strategy since the government could not give explicit status to the group 
it gave them a channel with the highest status it could bar the President himself.259  
Another notable difference with the Caguán in terms of fostering symmetry 
ahead of negotiations was the absence of high-level international actors during the 
Havana pre-negotiation phase. In the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations there was 
a UNSG Special Envoy to Colombia. As Barreto Henriques (2014) noted, the 
absence of a highly relevant international actor like United Nations is unusual. 
This was linked to President Uribe’s strategy over eight years in office to 
systematically minimize the political aspect of the conflict by blocking any 
attempts for Colombia to be seen as having an armed conflict. As one US-based 
Colombia analyst recalls, “Colombia had no real visibility at the political level at 
the UN”.260 In the context where a group is branded as a terrorist organisation by 
the US, having a UNSG Special Envoy “would be impossible”.261 As a UN 
representative confirmed, “It became almost taboo to have someone at the level of 
Jan Egeland or James Lemoyne since Caguán”.262 It is only later, well into the 
negotiation process itself, that the UN was finally invited to nominate a 
representative. But Jean Arnault was only nominated as ‘Delegate of the 
Secretary-General to the Sub-Commission on End of Conflict Issues within the 
Colombian Peace Process’. As the convoluted title shows, his status was very 
much reduced compared to previous UN representatives. He was only upgraded to 
‘Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia’ in 
March 2016 after the signature of the final agreement. 
The FARC was thus not able to ‘borrow’ much power from internationals 
because of their absence in the pre-negotiation phase. Interestingly the only 																																																								
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262 Senior UN staff, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
	 174	
countries that came to play a role during that period had all opted out of the 
worldwide proscription regimes. The only ‘Western’ country that was able to play 
a significant role in the pre-negotiation and negotiation phase was Norway, who, 
in 2006 explicitly distanced itself from the EU terrorist listing. The two other 
countries were Venezuela and Cuba who were not aligned with the US or 
European proscription regimes. A number of third party actors closely involved in 
the Havana negotiations noted that both countries, Venezuela and Cuba, played an 
important role in bringing the FARC around and have been closely involved in the 
pre-negotiation and negotiation in Havana.263 This will be explored in more detail 
in the Chapter 7, but what is relevant here is that the FARC tried to ‘borrow 
power’ from these countries in the lead-up to Havana albeit not very successfully. 
For example, in 2008 President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela called for recognition 
of the FARC “as a legitimate insurgent force” (Romero 2008) and to be removed 
from the different terrorist listings. His plea remained unheeded.  
The way in which perceived status symmetry was established ahead of the 
Caguán was indirect and subtle. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’, the important symbolic 
role played by Enrique Santos the President’s brother, and the fact of pre-
negotiation itself became important factors in creating a certain sense of parity of 
esteem. However, the government kept its legal dominance and made sure to 
minimise the FARC’s ability to ‘borrow’ power from national or international 
third parties. 
ii. Resources symmetry 
Militarily the Colombian government had the “upper hand” ahead of Havana, 
which was not the case during the previous negotiations.264 The government 
choose to keep this dominance by not putting in place a bilateral ceasefire. The 
government choose to “escalate the war while talking peace” (Bouvier 2014). 
Similarly, no demilitarized zone was granted to the FARC this time around. The 
decision not to have a bilateral ceasefire or a demilitarized zone was partly to do 
with the government having learned its lessons from the Caguán process. Both the 																																																								
263 Jonathan Powell, Former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and Advisor to Colombian government, Personal 
interview, October 2014, London, U.K.; Norwegian diplomats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Personal 
interview, February 2015, Oslo, Norway. President Hugo Chavez also called on the FARC to end its 
armed struggle stating that “At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of 
place” (Romero 2008). 
264 Virginia Bouvier, Director of the Colombia Program, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 
Personal interview, February 2014, Washington D.C. 
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despeje and the ceasefire had given the FARC ample opportunity to strengthen 
itself. It also had a lot to do with how such concessions would be seen by the 
Colombian public and by the military in a context of proscription. The Colombian 
government wanted to keep its military advantage in the context of the 
negotiations. According to Frank Pearl, not having a bilateral ceasefire gave them 
a lot of power:  
One of the key lessons of the Caguán was to keep the military 
pressure. I remember a time when Mauricio Jaramillo came to a 
meeting shaking for having almost been killed in an attack. This gave 
us a lot of power in the negotiation. It is crude as I am talking about 
human lives but it is true. Without the daily armed confrontation, 
organisations like the FARC and the ELN become anesthetized, the 
processes become longer, the political commitment lowers.265 
 
It is only once the official negotiations were on going, and the government 
considered that sufficient progress was being made, that the government agreed to 
‘de-escalate’ the military pressure on the FARC. Moreover, it is only at the end of 
the negotiations, when the final agreement was reached and signed that a true 
bilateral ceasefire was put in place. 
Unlike in the lead-up to the Caguán, it is the FARC that made the most 
gestures in terms of confidence building measures, mainly through their unilateral 
ceasefires and by releasing hostages unilaterally. They enforced a number of 
unilateral ceasefires, the first of which was instituted on 19 November 2012. As 
the FARC stipulated on their website, the first unilateral ceasefire was aimed at 
“strengthening the climate of understanding necessary for the parties to start 
dialogue and to achieve the purpose all Colombians ask for” (FARC 2012). Their 
statement showed an acknowledgement that a ceasefire on their part was a 
necessary first step towards creating the right conditions for negotiations. 
Similarly, between 2008 and 2012 the FARC released 40 hostages 
unilaterally facilitated through letter exchanges with Colombianos and 
Colombianas por la Paz. We saw in the Chapter 5 that these unilateral releases of 
hostages by the FARC were a way for the armed group to de-vilify themselves 
vis-à-vis the Colombian public. But they were also a clear confidence building 
measure vis-à-vis the Colombian government who had set the release of hostages 
as a pre-condition as well as an attempt to ‘borrow’ power from national and 																																																								
265 Frank Pearl, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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international actors involved. As Frank Pearl reflected back on the releases he said 
the government was worried that “The FARC were trying to get legitimacy from 
the liberations and Piedad Cordoba and Chavez were getting a lot of credibility for 
it.”266  
There was a certain amount of worry within the government and the army 
that the FARC would have more experience negotiating because they had more 
scope to build on lessons from previous peace negotiations. As an army officer 
said “We don’t have the years and years of experience in negotiations as do the 
ELN or FARC. Will we be taken advantage of at the table by all sides?” (quoted 
in Schimer 2009: 406).  The government made a deliberate and conscious effort to 
plug this capacity gap and bolster their understanding of negotiations. It was easy 
for them to get that sort of international and specialised support during the pre-
negotiation phase. This time around the Colombian government made a big effort 
to learn the lessons from previous attempts at negotiating with the FARC and in 
getting support from international peace and conflict resolution specialists.267  
According to a high-level official working in the High Commissioner for Peace’s 
office, they started collecting documents of past processes in 2010 with the aim of 
learning lessons from previous processes: “it took two years of maturation 
working on this, the focus was how to start a process with the biggest armed 
group which is the FARC”.268  
The FARC on the other hand did not have easy access to negotiation 
training or support. A ‘euro tour’ like the one organised in the setting-up of the 
Caguán negotiations was impossible in the context of international proscription. 
So, while some in the leadership of the group, such as Andres Paris and Carlos 
Antonio Lozada, had experience from previous negotiations with the government, 
other members of the FARC’s negotiating team received little training.269 A 
member of the FARC negotiating team, asked if she had received any training in 
the pre-negotiation phase, said: “No, nothing. I was told: in fifteen days you are 
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going to Havana”. 270  But even discreet support by both international and 
Colombian third parties became much more challenging in the context of 
proscription. Symbolically, the political space for third party engagement with the 
listed group shrunk considerably. The idea of dialogue was deeply de-legitimised. 
Father Francisco de Roux, the Jesuit provincial and someone who has been deeply 
involved in dialogue processes with armed groups in Colombia, said that the 
framing of the armed conflict as a war against ‘terrorists’ “had a big impact of de-
legitimising us, those who are doing the work of conversation”.271 He added 
“They [the government] say – you are talking to our perverse enemies. They do 
not offer anything except destruction. You give them legitimacy by talking to 
them”.272  
Materially as well, the access to the group was also deeply affected. There 
have been a number of cases of people, both internationals and Colombians, 
criminalised for their contacts with the FARC. One illustrative case is that of the 
Swiss government emissary, Jean-Pierre Gontard. He had been explicitly asked by 
the Colombian government to open a dialogue channel to the FARC in the process 
of negotiating the humanitarian exchange under the Uribe administration. 
Although Uribe played up to the international community’s expectations that he 
should appear to agree to a humanitarian exchange, his lack of will became 
apparent.  A number of people involved in these efforts have pointed out that 
though he publically appeared to support these efforts, privately he sabotaged 
them (Jones 2009; Cordoba quoted Hernández Delgado 2012).273 Jean-Pierre 
Gontard, was the victim of a smear campaign in the Colombian press and judicial 
charges were pressed against him for his contacts with the FARC.274 A number of 
other intermediaries both international and Colombian (the Colombians Piedad 
Cordoba, Alvaro Leyva, and the American Jim Jones) were also charged for 
contacts with the FARC.  
This criminalisation also created a climate of self-censorship and fear 
amongst potential third party actors. Norwegian diplomats admitted that though 
they had “always had contact with the FARC, but for a number of years [during 																																																								
270 Alexandra Nariño, Personal interview, May 2016, Havana, Cuba. 
271 Padre Francisco de Roux, Jesuit Provincial, Personal interview, January 2014, Washington D.C. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Carlos Lozano, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia; Rémy Friedmann, Swiss diplomat, 
Personal interview, January 2014, by phone. 
274 Rémy Friedmann, Personal interview, January 2014, by phone. 
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the Uribe administration], it became more difficult to have direct contact so [we] 
interacted through people close to the group”. 275  Similarly, members of 
Colombian civil society said that direct access to the FARC became impossible; 
instead it was mediated through certain key people that had been closer to them, 
people who knew them from the Caguán and Casa Verde.276 One of the innovative 
strategies, which helped to side step the effects of proscription to a certain degree 
at a very local level was the use of ‘pastoral dialogues’ (dialogos pastorales) with 
armed actors.277 They happened at a local level led by priests and local bishops 
and were an essential way of keeping some communication channels open and 
were very useful to negotiate hostage releases or respect for civilians. The 
Colombian government had attempted to control and limit these ‘pastoral 
dialogues’, but had to accept them to a large degree (Henao 2009). Though they 
were not mentioned in law they had become more of a custom – the supposition 
being that these dialogues are for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Church 
leaders used this ‘cover’ strategically to accompany community leaders in 
conversations with armed groups – “then he or she is legitimated”.278  
In terms of political and moral resources, parties can bolster their perceived 
position through mobilising large groups or building alliances. In the context of 
proscription, the government was the party able to mobilise the biggest numbers. 
Unlike the marches for peace in the lead-up to the Caguán, the biggest marches in 
the lead-up to Havana were the marches against the FARC. In February 2008 for 
instance thousands of Colombian marched under the banners “No More FARC” in 
Colombian cities and abroad.  
What is clear is that Uribe has beaten the FARC politically. Since the 
end of the Caguán the movement has been towards discrediting them 
completely. Before the Caguán people were broadly favourable 
toward talks with them. This has been a political victory; public 
opinion is completely against the FARC. The marches in 2006 and 
2008 for peace were mainly against the FARC (and against hostage 
taking). The polarization in the country has become more extreme.279 																																																								
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Proscription greatly influenced the perception of symmetry ahead of the 
Havana negotiations. While a certain level of status symmetry was put in place 
through the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and an indirect and subtle parity of esteem, the 
imbalance in resources in favour of the government remained. The lack of a 
bilateral ceasefire, access to trainings, and more broadly the narrowing of the 
space for civil society and international actors to engage directly with the listed 
armed group, all contributed to keeping the asymmetry in terms of resources 
differentials. It was only once the formal negotiations were well under way that 
the Colombian government agreed to de-escalate the military confrontation and 
allowed the FARC to re-balance the capacity asymmetry by having contacts with 
internationals in Havana.280 
Conclusion 
The status asymmetry between the Colombian government and the FARC was 
considerably widened post 9/11. Whilst in the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations 
the two parties were not that far apart in terms of perceived status differentials, 
both seen as representing legitimate constituencies, with international recognition 
and contacts, following the collapse of the negotiations and the international 
proscription of the FARC as a terrorist organisation, this balance completely 
shifted. The conflict was reframed as a war against terrorists who did not 
represent legitimate grievances; the FARC had to shut down their offices abroad. 
Even the idea of dialogue with the armed group was de-legitimised and all 
contacts with the FARC were ‘renationalised’ and criminalised. The conflict 
stopped being seen as one between two parties if not equal at least similar. 
The shift in terms of resources asymmetry was in a way even more radical, 
moving from a situation where the FARC felt it had the upper hand militarily, 
when people even talked about the possibility of them ‘taking power’, to one 
where the FARC was in retreat, and deeply shaken by the loss of key leadership 
figures. The post 9/11 changes, which allowed for lethal assistance from the US to 
be used in the Colombian government’s fight against the proscribed FARC, 
played a significant role in this reversal. This important material effect of 
proscription might be less pronounced in a context that is further removed from 																																																								
280 The contact with Colombians remained criminalized unless someone received a special permission 
from the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. 
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the US’ strategic interests, but the effect of legitimising the type of war being 
fought against the listed armed group would remain. 
A similar pattern can be seen when it came to the way the asymmetry 
between the parties was re-balanced in the pre-negotiation phase. In the lead-up to 
the Caguán, the status differentials were adjusted through very public and direct 
contacts between the highest levels of government and the FARC leadership. This 
was coupled with explicit political recognition of the armed group ahead of the 
negotiations, and an environment that encouraged contact with international actors 
including the US and national actors.  This picture stood in sharp contrast to the 
way the perception of status symmetry was established in the lead-up to the 
Havana negotiations. There were no direct meeting between the Colombian 
President and the FARC leadership, as all the initial exploratory phase was kept 
secret and conducted through intermediaries. There was no involvement of high-
profile third party actors such as the UN, nor was there an explicit change of 
status of the FARC or a recognition of the group’s political nature. Instead, we 
saw low-key and indirect acknowledgment of a status being established through 
the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and a form of perceived parity of esteem established 
through the act of pre-negotiation itself. 
Moreover, while ahead of the Caguán the Colombian government granted 
the FARC a demilitarized area the size of Switzerland thereby acknowledging the 
group’s territorial presence, it is the FARC that acknowledged the government’s 
dominance on the battlefield in the lead-up to Havana by establishing a number of 
unilateral ceasefires. Similarly, the fluidity and ease of contact, which led to direct 
capacity building for the FARC by internationals and Colombians in the late 
1990s, was soon replaced by the criminalisation of direct contact and an increase 
in the FARC’s isolation in the context of proscription.  
This discussion on the perception of these different sources of power 
reinforces the analysis of how proscription affected ripeness.  It also impacts on 
perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate and the envisaging of a way out, 
which is what the next chapter turns to. 
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Chapter	Seven	
Ripeness: the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out 
 
Introduction 
In October 1999, as the negotiations in the Caguán were about to start, more than 
eight million Colombians took to the streets calling for peace. This was the 
culmination of months of pro-peace marches across the country and increasing 
peace activism in Colombia since the mid-1990s. Waving banners bearing the 
slogan “No Mas” (“No More”), people were calling on the Colombian 
government and the FARC to end thirty-five years of war. What was striking 
about these marches, in a highly divided society, is that they brought together 
people from a range of backgrounds. This confluence of different sectors of 
society brought together business people, grassroots activists, and women’s 
organisations. In the capital Bogotá alone two million people marched.  
In February 2008, again millions of Colombians took to the streets only this 
time the slogan was “No Mas FARC” (“No More FARC”). Chanting: “No more 
kidnapping, No more lies, No more killing, No more FARC,” people marched 
down the streets of Bogotá and all major Colombian cities. This time, the marches 
were one-sided, supporting the Uribe government and against the FARC. A 
counter-march was organised a month later on the 6th of March, with a much 
smaller turnout, aimed at highlighting the plight of victims of state crimes and 
paramilitary violence. In this intensely polarised context, nobody was talking 
about peace. 
These two opposing images illustrate the complete reversal in how the 
Colombian public perceived the conflict before and after 9/11 in the context of 
international proscription. In the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations, Colombians 
were marching jointly against the war and demanding that all armed actors should 
stop the bloodshed and negotiate a peace agreement. In contrast, well into 
President Uribe’s second term, the marches of 2008 showed a deeply polarised 
society, the large majority of which did not see an armed conflict in Colombia but 
a fight against a group of ‘terrorists’ who were attacking society. But in 2008, 
	 182	
even though it looked like the FARC had ‘lost’ the war and the majority of public 
opinion was against them, the situation was not yet ‘ripe’ for resolution.  
Ripeness is the keystone of the conflict resolution literature to 
understanding and explaining why parties initiate peace negotiations. As Chapter 
4 described, the two central ideas of ripeness are the mutually hurting stalemate 
and the way out. Parties are in a deadlock that is painful for both of them (the 
mutually hurting stalemate), so they seek an alternative (way out). Central to these 
processes is the issue of perception. Indeed, there is no such thing as an objective 
mutually hurting stalemate or way out, it all depends on how the conflict parties 
perceive the situation, their assessment of the pain they experience or the 
opportunities they see. The pain felt by the parties is not necessarily felt to the 
same degree or for the same reasons and it can have both a military and a political 
component. 
Chapter 4 also argued that the way out is as, if not more, important than the 
stalemate in explaining the timing of peace negotiations. Sometimes the way out 
even takes over from the mutually hurting stalemate to lead parties towards a 
mutually enticing opportunity – when both sides can see the benefits of 
negotiating. Furthermore, the point was made that the way out is as much about 
intra-party as inter-party dynamics. Both parties have to be able and willing to 
negotiate so the party itself has to see a way out. In the case of the armed group, 
the shift in the ‘institutional equilibrium’ of the group is key in understanding how 
the situation becomes ripe.  
The aim of this chapter is to assess how proscription affected these central 
dynamics of ripeness. There is a prevalent understanding that the Colombian 
government and the FARC got to the negotiation table in Havana because the 
FARC were cornered and weakened so much they did not have another option; 
they were militarily forced to the negotiation table.281  Proscription, the logic 
would go, played a key part in this by weakening the armed group. However, a 
closer look at these dynamics through the lens of ripeness shows a different 																																																								
281 See for example The Economist (2016): “Under Álvaro Uribe, who followed Mr Pastrana as president, 
the paramilitaries demobilised and the FARC guerrillas were battered so hard that they agreed, in 2012, to 
start peace talks with the government of Juan Manuel Santos, Mr Uribe’s successor (and his former 
defence minister).”  For a more scholarly iteration of such an argument see D. Davies, D. Kilcullen, G 
Mills and D. Spencer (2015) A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence. The edited book’s 
inside jacket notes: “In 1999, FARC and ELN rebels were literally at the gates of Bogota, and Colombia 
was a country synonymous with the antics of Pablo Escobar, known primarily for rapacious corruption, 
weak government, drug smuggling and criminality. Fifteen years later the guerrillas, seriously weakened, 
have been persuaded to attend peace talks in Havana”. 
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picture. While proscription undeniably weakened the FARC, it also worked 
against the mutually hurting stalemate by bolstering the government to such an 
extent that it clouded its perception of a stalemate. Moreover, proscription also 
worked against ripeness by blocking the way out. The chapter goes on to explore 
how these challenges were overcome. Two ideas help us explain the fact that the 
parties got to the Havana negotiations, the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the ‘political 
landing strip’.  
The chapter first turns to how the mutually hurting stalemate and the way 
out developed over time in the period leading-up to the Caguán negotiation in the 
1990s before the FARC were proscribed as a ‘terrorist’ organisation. This helps 
the analysis add nuance to the concepts and our understanding of the 1990s pre-
negotiation process, which then serves as a useful comparison to explore the post 
11 September 2001 environment. The chapter then turns to analysing how 
proscription affected the Colombian government and the FARC’s perception of 
the mutually hurting stalemate and way out. 
 
I. The path to the Caguán 
As the opening paragraph shows, the 1990s were marked by very intense peace 
activism, which turned the prospect for peace into a prominent issue during the 
1998 Presidential elections. While President Samper had been willing but unable 
to initiate a negotiation with the FARC, President Pastrana was elected based on 
the premise that he would deliver a negotiation with the FARC. The FARC also 
realised they needed to convert their military successes into political recognition. 
There was no mutually hurting stalemate in the lead-up to the Caguán negotiation 
but as we will see in this section, there was a political stalemate and a way out that 
led to a mutually enticing opportunity. Civil society played a key role in marching 
the government and the FARC to the Caguán negotiations table.  
1. No way out 
When President Ernesto Samper took office in 1994 he made his intention to 
engage directly with the FARC clear. He announced that the search for “integral 
peace and useful dialogue” (Samper 1994) would be a central plank of his 
mandate. He took a number of concrete steps in that direction such as recognising 
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the political nature of guerrilla organisations and the armed conflict282 (Samper 
1994; García-Peña 2008), and he created the office of the High Commissioner for 
Peace (Ramírez Ocampo 2008).  
However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the ‘8000 process’, the scandal that 
emerged a year into President Samper’s term that showed his campaign had been 
funded by drug trafficking money, rapidly thwarted his plans. This institutional 
crisis deeply de-legitimised President Samper and left him with little room for 
manoeuvre to initiate peace negotiations.283 Augusto Ramírez Ocampo (2008) 
looking back at that period argued that if it had not been for the ‘8000 process’, 
dialogue would have moved forward considerably. The FARC, who had initially 
expressed willingness to enter into exploratory dialogue with Samper’s 
government284, rapidly claimed the government was illegitimate and called for 
President Samper to step down.285 The ‘8000 process’ made it impossible for the 
government to initiate peace conversations with the FARC and as a result the 
FARC ended-up having no partner to do business with. As a consequence, there 
was no inter-party way out. 
The scandal was not the only thing standing in the way of initiating peace 
negotiations.  The Samper government itself could not see a way out because of 
contradictory intra-government dynamics.  President Samper had an incredibly 
tense relationship with the Colombian armed forces. Key factions within the 
Colombian military were not in favour of initiating peace negotiations with the 
FARC. They even publically undermined the President. At the time, President 
Samper had agreed with the FARC to demilitarize the region of La Uribe to allow 
for a first direct encounter with the armed group. General Bedoya publically 
questioned President Samper’s approach. Following General Bedoya’s public 
attack, President Samper reneged on this initial agreement, La Uribe was not 
demilitarized and the first direct meeting did not take place. Carlos Holmes 
Trujillo, who had been nominated by President Samper as the first High 
Commissioner for Peace, resigned in protest at the President’s volte-face 																																																								
282 By establishing Law 418, Ley de Orden Publico 418 from 1994 that came into effect in 1997. 
283 Carlos Lozano, Director of Semanario Voz and Member of the Communist Party, Personal interview, 
May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. Same point made by Alvaro Leyva, Conservative politician and long-time 
FARC intermediary, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
284 FARC-EP, 1994, ‘La guerra total de Gaviria, un gran fracaso’, Secretariado Nacional, Montañas de 
Colombia, July; FARC Secretariat. 1994. ‘Carta Abierta Del Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP Al 
Presidente Ernesto Samper: Dialogar hasta conseguir un tratado de paz’, 19 August. 
285 FARC-EP, 1996, ‘El Mandato Samper-De la Calle es ilegitimo’, 11 February. 
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(Villarraga Saramiento 2008). The intra-party dynamics on the government side 
were so tense that they did not allow the government itself to envisage a way out.  
The way out was blocked because of contradictory intra-party dynamics 
within the government and the fact that the government was unable to offer an 
inter-party way out to the FARC because of it’s legitimacy crisis. Moreover, there 
was no mutually hurting stalemate between the parties. 
2. No military stalemate but a mutually enticing opportunity 
As noted in Chapter 6, the 1990s were the years of the FARC’s military 
dominance, during which they shifted from guerrilla warfare to a war of 
movements and succeeded in incurring a number of strategic blows against the 
Colombian armed forces. The perception of the FARC was that there was still the 
likelihood of further military successes on the battlefield. Gónzalez Posso (2009) 
recalled speaking with Marcos Calarcá, the FARC’s representative in Mexico, 
towards the end of 1997.  Calarcá said “it is a matter of time but we are in the 
final stretch towards power” (quoted in Gónzalez Posso 2009: 57). The quote 
illustrates that the FARC did not feel in a deadlock and still thought they could 
escalate the confrontation. The situation was not painful for them.  
The armed confrontation was more painful for the government who at that 
stage felt weak and ill equipped as we saw in chapter 6.  But the two parties were 
not in a deadlock; the military pain was not felt on both sides. There was no 
military stalemate between the Colombian government and the FARC in the 
period leading-up to the Caguán. The ones that were feeling the pain of the war 
most intensely were the civilians. The high humanitarian costs of the conflict were 
becoming unbearable for large sectors of the Colombian population. This spurred 
civil society actors to take the lead in pushing for a negotiated solution to the 
armed conflict. So, while the political establishment was unable to move forward 
to explore negotiations with the FARC during the Samper Presidency, as we saw 
earlier, because of the lack of inter-party and intra-party way out, a large 
movement for peace emerged. This ‘Mandate for Peace’, mentioned in Chapter 6, 
played an important role in ripening the situation ahead of the Caguán and 
creating a mutually enticing opportunity for the armed actors. 
On 26 October 1997, in parallel to the local elections in Colombia, 10 
million votes were cast in favour of a ‘Mandate for Peace’. This vote was the 
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culmination of months (and years) of peace activism, including a series of public 
“No More” marches as we saw in the opening paragraph to this chapter. 
According to Teresa Bernal (2008), the founder of REDEPAZ, the national 
network of citizen’s initiatives for peace and against war, founded in 1993, the 
new Colombian constitution of 1991 greatly encouraged civic initiatives. The new 
Constitution included article 22, which gave Colombian citizens the ‘right to 
peace’. 
The period was marked by a burgeoning of civic initiatives aimed at getting 
the conflict parties to the table. The mid-1990s in Colombia saw the emergence of 
social and urban movements ‘for peace’, ‘against war’, ‘against violence’, ‘against 
kidnapping’. A plethora of networks and initiatives were created such as 
REDEPAZ, women’s organisation networks, business groups, non-governmental 
organisations were all working on a range of issues all related to stopping the 
violence. What was unusual in the Colombian context was the breadth of these 
initiatives, which included a wide spectrum of society, including powerful elites 
and business leaders. 286  As Camilo Gonzalez Posso noted,  “You saw a 
confluence of many parts of society focussed on ending war and pushing for 
negotiations.”287 
The Colombian Catholic Church also played a key role during this period. 
When the Church witnessed the government backtracking vis-à-vis the FARC 
under the Samper administration, it decided not to give up on the idea of a 
negotiated solution and created the Comisión de Conciliación Nacional (CCN) in 
1995. As Padre Echeverri, a member of the CCN recalled, “The Church did not 
resign itself vis-à-vis the FARC”.  He said that at the time they thought “we 
cannot just leave it to the military option that only leads to pacification not to 
peace” so their  “decision was to create the CCN.”288 The CCN was mandated and 
authorised by the government to have direct communication channels with the 
FARC.  
It is during this period, principally through the leadership of Monseñor Luis 
Augusto Castro, then Bishop of San Vincente del Caguán, that the CCN got the 																																																								
286 On 18 June 1997 the representatives of the country’s principal economic groups (Santo Domingo, Luis 
Carlos Saramiento, Carlos Ardila Lulle) asked President Samper to initiate a peace process (Villarraga 
Saramiento 2009). 
287 Camilo González Posso, Former President of the Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz 
(INDEPAZ), Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
288 Padre Dario Echeverri, National Secretary of the Comisión de Conciliación Nacional, October 2015, 
Bogotá, Colombia. 
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FARC to release 60 soldiers and 10 infantry members which ended-up becoming 
an important confidence building measure explored in Chapter 6. Asked how he 
explained this success, Padre Echeverri said, “The Church presence is in areas 
where the guerrilla is strongest. This allowed us to access the armed actors and 
their social bases. We find bridges with their social base and we start building 
trust with them.”289 Beyond their humanitarian role, the CCN was also mandated 
by the government to dialogue with the FARC in Costa Rica to explore conditions 
for future peace negotiations.290  
The multiple peace movements, the role of the Church, the marches and the 
‘Mandate for Peace’, had an obvious impact on the government. Initiating a peace 
negotiation became a political imperative. The overwhelming mobilisation by 
civil society in effect created a political stalemate. The perception of the 
government was that they were weak and failing.  As a member of the Colombian 
military notes, “We felt weak at the time. The decision to start negotiations was a 
political decision.(…) The political will obeys the will of the people.” 291 
Similarly, a number of civil society actors interviewed said that it was undeniable 
that they had a deep impact, “It is civil society that asked for peace and had an 
impact on the government”.292 As Jesús Antonio Bejarano (1999: 202), former 
peace councillor under presidents Barco and Gaviria, wrote a few months before 
being assassinated in 1999:  
We cannot speak of a military stalemate in Colombia. But I would 
argue that the intensity of the conflict and its effects on the entire 
civilian population are reaching the point that would oblige elite 
sectors of society to make concessions. 
 
As we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, President Pastrana won the Presidential race 
by strategically shifting his campaign towards the search for peace between the 
two rounds of the election. His triumph was to get his representative, Victor G 
																																																								
289 Padre Darío Echeverri, Head of Pastoral Social and Secretary of the Comisión de Conciliación 
Nacional, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
290 FARC Secretariat. 1996. ‘Comunicado: reunion en Costa Rica entre las FARC, La Comisión de 
Conciliación Nacional y un representante del Gobierno Costarricense’, 24 and 25 June. 
291 Coronel Carlos Arturo Velásquez, Member of the strategic command on transition, Personal interview, 
October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
292 Rosa Emilia Salamanca, Executive Director of Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y 
Económica (CIASE) in Colombia, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. Similar point 
made by Mauricio García-Durán, Former Executive Director of the Centro de Investigación y Educación 
Popular (CINEP), Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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Ricardo, to meet directly with the leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda.293 The 
photo of Marulanda wearing President Pastrana’s campaign watch quickly did the 
rounds, making Pastrana the undeniable ‘peace candidate’ which helped clinch the 
election in his favour.294 This change in leadership was key in setting the stage for 
the Caguán negotiations. For the government, the peace negotiations became a 
political necessity.295 Victor G Ricardo (2009:33) later reflected that the “one who 
needed oxygen was the State not the guerrilla”.  
The FARC on the other hand initially underestimated and misread the 
‘Mandate for Peace’ and, at the time, had called for its boycott (González Posso 
2009). They accused the ‘Mandate for Peace’ of being “linked to the 
government’s political and economic interests” (Villarraga Saramiento 2009: 89). 
But, a few months later the FARC did show some acknowledgment of the 
‘Mandate for Peace’. Alfonso Cano, then member of the FARC’s Secretariat had a 
radio-telephone call with the civil society spokespersons of the ‘Mandate for 
Peace’ alongside Francisco Galán of the ELN in February 1998. A couple of years 
earlier, the FARC had also explicitly thanked the CCN for their work in “bringing 
the parties in conflict closer together to achieve national reconciliation” and 
expressed their openness for dialogue in a joint communiqué (FARC, CCN & 
Costa Rica 1996). This shows that at a minimum, the FARC were aware of the 
clamour for peace emerging from civil society though they would not have felt 
electorally bound by it, unlike the government. 
Though it was for different reasons than the government, the FARC’s 
incentive to initiate peace negotiations was also strongly political. They realised 
that wining military battles was not enough, they needed to gain political 
legitimacy and networks that they could not get out of war. As one interviewee 
put it: “Before the Caguán the FARC were winning the war but thought they 
should convert the military success in political capital. The FARC realised they 
were not being applauded for winning battles.” 296  For the FARC, peace 
																																																								
293 Victor G Ricardo, Former High Commissioner for Peace, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
294 Ibid; Carlos Lozano, Director of Semanario Voz and Member of the Communist Party, Personal 
interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia; Camilo González Posso, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
295 Point echoed by Teófilo Vasquez, Researcher, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Personal 
interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia.  
296 Carlos Velandia, Former commander of the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN) and appointed 
‘Peace Manager’ by the Santos administration, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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negotiations were about getting political recognition.297 The prospect of public 
peace negotiations were appealing to the armed group because they saw it as an 
opportunity to re-engage politically, re-establish networks and make the most of 
the public nature of the dialogue.  
There were however divergent views within the FARC on the timing of the 
negotiation. While some members of the central command were convinced by the 
importance of negotiating for political reasons at this stage, others thought it was 
distracting them from wining the war militarily. Victor G. Ricardo recalled a 
conversation he had with Alfonso Cano who apparently said to him, “I have never 
been friendly with the idea of sitting at the table and I do not know what you told 
them but we had to put a number of our plans that would have brought us closer to 
power in the freezer.”298 Victor G Ricardo said the conversation surprised him 
because he had not realised there were differences in opinion within the FARC 
until that time. Even though there were divergent views within the FARC, the 
‘institutional equilibrium’ had shifted in favour of negotiations on the basis that 
they was an opportunity “not to end the war but to reconnect with Colombian 
society, to strengthen itself politically”.299 
There was thus no mutually hurting stalemate between the Colombian 
government and the FARC in the lead-up to the Caguán negotiations. They each 
had reached political stalemates of sorts, each for different reasons: 
Both sides considered that it was the opportune moment for 
negotiations. Pastrana based on the weakness of the State; and the 
FARC guerrilla convinced they were at the ‘end of the end’ and that 
all the advantages were in their favour.300  
 
In a pre-proscription context however, civil society had the ability and 
political space to establish direct contact with all conflict parties to call for a 
negotiated solution. Civil society actors were able to put pressure by increasing 
the political costs for the armed actors. Citizens helped foster a way out for the 
parties by putting peace negotiations squarely on the political agenda. This is a 																																																								
297 One of the FARC’s main objectives with peace dialogues (1999-2002), and concretely through the 
despeje of 5 municipalities, was to advance in their recognition of belligerent status according to Ferro 
Medina and Uribe Ramón (2002). The despeje gave a formal character to their territorial control. 
Moreover, the FARC took a number of other steps to get their belligerent status recognised, such as 
wearing uniforms and visible weapons and developping relations with different governments in Latin 
America and Europe (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón 2002). 
298 Victor G Ricardo, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
299 Teófilo Vasquez, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia.  
300 Lozano (2008: 52) 
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case of a mutually enticing opportunity. Based on political necessity, the way out 
became the motor towards negotiations. The space and possible role played by 
civil society actors would shift completely post 9/11 in the context of international 
proscription. 
 
II. Proscription and the road to the Havana negotiation  
The 11 September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers, and the onslaught of the war 
on terror which happened at the tale-end of the Caguán negotiations, gave a whole 
new meaning to the FARC being listed as a terrorist organisation internationally. 
Chapters 5 and 6 already noted many of the material and symbolic consequences 
of this for the FARC and the government. This section assesses how these effects 
influenced ripeness for both actors. It also tries to understand how, in a context 
where proscription led to the mutually hurting stalemate being postponed and the 
way out blocked, the Colombian government did eventually end up negotiating 
with the proscribed FARC. The ideas of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the ‘political 
landing strip’ are brought to the fore to understand how these challenges were 
overcome. 
1. The effect of proscription on the military stalemate 
While most analysts highlight how the FARC were battered and bruised to the 
negotiation table, little attention has been paid to what this entailed for the 
government. If the FARC were deeply affected by the military onslaught buoyed 
by proscription, it also bolstered the government symbolically and materially, 
which had the effect of postponing the mutually hurting stalemate in military 
terms. 
i. Postponing the pain for the government 
One direct material consequence, as we saw in Chapter 6, particularly of the US 
proscription regime, was the shift in 2002 of the US financed Plan Colombia 
resources from a war against drugs to a war against ‘terrorists’ focussed on the 
FARC. This shift dramatically increased the armed forces’ budget, equipment and 
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intelligence.301 Following this modernization, the army was able to retake control 
of the territory and hit the FARC deeply on a number of fronts.302 
By taking on the global mantle of the fight against terrorism in Colombia, 
President Uribe was able to gain international and national recognition and 
legitimacy for his fight against the FARC. Coupled with the re-focussing of Plan 
Colombia on a fight against terrorists and the huge investment and modernisation 
of the army, this had the effect of strengthening the Colombian government vis-à-
vis the FARC. This interaction of the symbolic and material effects of 
proscription also had the effect of skewing perceptions303 as it helped convince the 
government, and large sectors of the Colombian population, that the war could be 
and should be won and ended militarily.  
I think the main impact of the war on terror has been Uribe’s 
Democratic Security Policy. It is the natural expression of this 
phenomenon. It has had a big impact on the collective imaginary, it 
changed the culture mentally.304 
 
As late as July 2010 President Uribe was still claiming that the "final victory 
is not far off" (cited in El Tiempo 2010). He upheld this belief right until the end 
of his Presidency. The “unconstrained side” (Grieg and Diehl 2012), in this case 
the Colombian government, felt supported nationally and internationally by 
proscription and this had the effect of postponing the government’s perception of 
a military stalemate.  
It is only between 2008-2010 that the military component of the stalemate 
starts being felt within certain circles of the government. Significantly, the 
neuralgic centre of this shift happened in the military and the ministry of Defence, 
when President Juan-Manuel Santos was still President Uribe’s Minister of 
Defence (between 2006 and 2009). The Colombian army itself started becoming 
aware of its limits. There was a growing realisation that both the topography of 
Colombia and the nature and modus operandi of the FARC as an armed 
organization made the likelihood of a ‘military victory’ elusive. The head of the 
armed forces, General Alejandro Navas, said that a military victory against the 																																																								
301 The number of professional soldiers increased from 20,000 to 78,000 between 1998 and 2007 and the 
armed forces acquired 27 new helicopters according to the Colombian Ministry of Defense (2007). 
302 Between 2002 and 2006, according to the Colombian Ministry of Defense (2007), the number of 
homicides reduced by 40%, the number of hostage taking for ransom by 83%, and the number of ‘terrorist 
attacks’ by 61%.  
303 Over 80% of the (polled) Colombian population considered the guerrilla to be mere “delinquents” 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2012: 23).  
304 Senior UN staff, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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FARC was not possible because of its “group” leadership system (un sistema de 
mando colegiado) through the Secretariat. Every time a leader is killed he is 
replaced by another: “Here fell Mono Jojoy, died Manuel Marulanda Velez, were 
killed Raul Reyes and Alfonso Cano, one and the other, and nothing happens 
because the command is collegiate” (quoted in El Nuevo Siglo 2012). General 
Colón echoed a similar sentiment: “Even though you are able to kill leaders and 
you move forward, there are still rising from the land and they will never end.”305 
A certain conviction starts to emerge within the military and the Ministry of 
Defence that the war would not be won militarily.  This got them to start thinking 
of different strategies and options. As one member of the armed forces put it: 
We knew the solution would be political, not always, but we have 
done a strategic revision of our operations. In 2002, at the end of the 
Caguán we were close to 26,000 guerrillas. We managed a significant 
decrease under Uribe but realized the levels started plateauing. This 
made us conclude that we will not get them militarily. I remember an 
article called ‘How Terrorist Groups End’306, we identified certain 
behaviours of the FARC linked to this and thought we need to look at 
other options.307  
 
According to his brother, Enrique Santos, Juan-Manuel Santos “had the 
perception that the FARC was affected militarily but was still there, he realized 
that a military victory was not possible, Colombia is not Sri Lanka.”308 He later 
took this perception along with him as he started his Presidency in 2010. As 
Francisco de Roux said, “Having been minister of defence [Santos] realized that 
even though you can put the FARC against the wall, weaken them, but you cannot 
overcome them because of Colombia’s complex circumstances.”309 Leadership 
change was an important element in the government’s shift in perception of the 
military component of the stalemate. The new leader, in this case President 
Santos, was someone who had shifted his perception from the inside as Minister 
of Defence and carried this change into his presidency. 
																																																								
305 General Rafael Colón, Director, Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, Presidencia de la 
República, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
306 He is referring to a study by RAND (Jones and Libicki 2008) which shows that military force has 
rarely been the primary reason for ‘terrorist’ groups to end their activities. They concluded that in 43% of 
the cases it was because they joined the political process. 
307 Capitán de Fragata Omar Cortés, Member of the government negotiation team, sub-commission on the 
end of the conflict, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia.  
308 Enrique Santos, President Santos’ brother and government negotiator, Personal interview, June 2015, 
Bogotá, Colombia. Similar point made by Padre Francisco de Roux, Jesuit Provincial, Personal interview, 
June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia.  
309 Padre Francisco de Roux, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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ii. FARC and the impact of the government’s military onslaught 
The FARC was deeply affected by the military reversal during the two Uribe 
administrations. Proscription played a central part in this.  The Colombian 
military, thanks in large part to the material support received by the US, 
developed sophisticated techniques to identify the location of the FARC’s top 
leadership and attack them. International proscription also made strategies such as 
targeted killings and rewards appear legitimate in the context of combating 
terrorism as we saw in Chapter 6. In 2008 a series of attacks against ‘high value 
targets’, led to the killing of key leadership figures such as Raul Reyes and Iván 
Ríos. These assassinations of important commanders had a “very hard effect” on 
the FARC.310 Moreover, high rewards were given for internal treason. These 
rewards led to a number of internal betrayals that had a deep impact on the 
FARC.311 The most famous case was that of FARC Secretariat member, Ivan 
Ríos, who was killed by his bodyguard in March 2008 who then cut off his hand 
as proof to claim the reward. 
Between 2002 and 2010 the FARC lost five out of its seven Secretariat 
members. Though the FARC had a group leadership style, with a system to 
automatically replace fallen commanders, the sheer volume of deaths had an 
important impact at the leadership level of the armed group. But beyond that as 
well, the mid-ranking commanders and the rank and file of the armed group were 
also deeply affected by the military onslaught.  
According to the Group for Humanitarian Attention of Demobilized People 
(Grupo de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado - GAHD), 15,500 FARC 
members defected between 2002-2010 (quoted in Jonsson 2014). According to 
Michael Jonsson (2014: 243), this very large number of defections from the 
FARC can be explained by the group’s “war-time experiences”. These 
experiences were a crucial motivational factor for leaving the guerrilla: 
Summarizing sentiments expressed repeatedly during interviews, it 
seems that combatants were willing to face severe risks and hardships 
for extended period of times, but not certain death without any 
prospect of exiting the group or winning the conflict. (Jonsson 
2014:252) 
 
																																																								
310 Padre Francisco de Roux, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
311 Ibid. 
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As the Colombian military had been able to increase the frequency and 
precision of its bombardments on FARC camps thanks to increased material and 
intelligence support, certain death became a reality for the FARC mid-ranking 
commanders and rank and file members. A number of interviewees confided that 
the increasing precision of the bombardments was affecting the FARC’s moral.312  
The FARC come to see that a military victory is no longer within their 
reach. They no longer had the capacity to expand, “the guerrilla realizes it is much 
more weakened militarily.”313 As Carlos Velandia, a former member of the ELN 
said, “The tendency is clear, the blow is real and the impact is real. They [FARC] 
are conscious of their precarious situation.”314 Velandia adds that unlike the ELN, 
which is an armed group that is more societal in nature, the FARC’s main strength 
was military so they felt the pressure more strongly.315 The year 2008, which was 
also marked by the (natural) death of Manuel Marulanda, the founder and leader 
of the FARC, became a ‘turning point’ (Gross Stein 1989) for the FARC. Most 
interviewees concur in saying that at this stage, in 2008, the FARC start 
perceiving that they cannot be defeated nor can they win.316 
The FARC is hit badly. They start losing the capacity to operate like 
an army. Afterwards there is the death of important commanders. The 
support of the US allows the Colombian military to develop 
sophisticated techniques to identify the location of the leadership to 
bomb them. The effect on the guerrilla is very hard. There is a high 
number of individual demobilization, young men leaving the guerrilla. 
Another development, which was also very hard for the FARC, was 
the internal betrayal to give-in commanders.317 
 
It is the perception by the FARC that things had changed militarily that is 
important. Even though the Uribe administration had been saying for years that 
the FARC had been cornered and defeated, it is only from 2008 onwards that the 
FARC itself show signs of recognizing and acting on it. Similarly, it is only 
between 2008- 2010 that sectors within the government start perceiving that a 																																																								
312 General Rafael Colón, Director, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. Point also made by 
Alvaro Leyva who has deep knowledge of the FARC, Alvaro Leyva, Personal interview, Bogotá, 
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military victory against the FARC will remain elusive. Proscription played a role 
both in getting the FARC to feel that they could no longer win the war and feel 
the military component of the stalemate but it also played a role in clouding the 
government’s perception of the military component of the stalemate.  
2. The effect of proscription on the political stalemate 
As we saw in Chapter 6, international proscription gave support to the 
government in its fight against terrorists. The military felt buttressed to attack the 
FARC not as insurgents or guerrillas, but as ‘terrorists’. But this shift had human 
rights repercussions, which led certain elements of the government to feel political 
and economic pain.  
i. Feeling the pain of human rights for the government 
International proscription led to symbolic and material support for a shift in the 
type of war being fought. The government and the army felt supported in using 
increasingly pugnacious counter-terrorism methods. One analyst recalled: 
The characterising of these people as terrorists by the US and the EU 
is the basis on which Uribe establishes his whole strategy with a huge 
media component. This characterisation allowed things that would 
have never been allowed in another context: EJEs [Extra-Judicial 
Executions], torture etc. The idea is that you, the citizen, will accept it 
because it will save you.318  
 
In this context, President Uribe focussed his strategy on attacking the 
internal enemy, which steered the government to increasingly employ a number of 
dubious strategies. According to civil society representatives, President Uribe 
used the issue of terrorism to justify putting the war above the law and the 
Constitution. Some highlight the deep impact it had on Colombia’s social fabric. 
Referring to the case mentioned above of Ivan Rios’ hand being cut off for a 
reward, one civil society activist said: 
It did not just polarise us, it fractured us. Things like being encouraged 
to denounce your neighbours. Or certain symbolic acts that were very 
intense, like giving money in exchange for the arm of a guerillero. 
This sort of thing had never happened. A society that starts learning 
that if I denounce somebody I will be given money is changed 
deeply.319  
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conversation, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
319 Rosa Emilia Salamanca, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
	 196	
Once these strategies were in place for a while the political costs associated 
with them become increasingly apparent.  It is during President Uribe’s second 
term that a number of scandals erupted which shed light on some of the political, 
particularly human rights, costs associated with these strategies. The extra-judicial 
executions, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) scandal, and 
parapolitics scandals in particular made the Colombian government lose a lot of 
national and international credibility.  
Human rights group inside and outside Colombia had been raising the alarm 
bells for some time on extra-judicial executions conducted by the Colombian 
military but it is only in 2007, the year they increased exponentially320, that the 
issue started receiving attention from the Colombian government. Extra-judicial 
executions were being performed by Colombian soldiers, killing non-combatants, 
dressing them-up as members of the FARC or the ELN and claiming that they had 
been killed in combat. Though the Colombian military maintained that these 
extra-judicial executions were not part of the military doctrine and were a case of 
particular individuals that strayed from the “values of the military”321, these extra-
judicial executions need to be understood in a context of an incentive structure 
within the Colombian military aimed at increasing the ‘results’ of the war which 
linked the numbers killed to the pay and holiday received by soldiers 
(ABColombia 2009).322  
By 2008, a number of actions had been taken by President Uribe following 
mounting international and national pressure, including the dismissal of 27 high-
ranking military personnel including three army generals and a change in the 
incentive structure for pay and holidays. The weekly political magazine Revista 
Cambio reflected on the surprising nature of these dismissals, especially at a time 
of military success.  It concluded that for President Uribe  
The perception that the armed forces could eliminate civilians could 
erase what had been achieved through the long chain of military 
victories (…) From a political point of view the good image of the 
Democratic Security strategy (…) is a capital that cannot be risked. 
The motivation [also] has to do with the increasing preoccupation 																																																								
320 Between January 2007 and June 2008, 535 cases of extra-judicial executions were recorded compared 
with 1,122 in the five-year period 2002-2007 (Coordinacion Colombia Europa Estados Unidos 2008). 
321 General Rafael Colón, Director, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia; Capitán de Fragata 
Omar Cortés, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
322 This information on extra-judicial executions should be understood in the context of a general increase 
in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations on the part of state actors since 2001. According to 
CINEP, IHL violations by security forces increased steadily from about 100 violations a year in 2001 to 
about 500 in 2007 (CINEP 2008). 
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about this situation of the international community. (Revista Cambio 
cited in Villarraga Saramiento 2013). 
 
During the same period, the Colombian intelligence agency, the DAS, also 
came under close scrutiny. It appeared that not only was it illegally intercepting 
the communications of journalists, members of NGOs, political leaders and 
anybody considered as “opposed to the government” and with potential links to 
‘terrorists’, but the governmental agency was also threatening them (Semana 
2009). The increase in international humanitarian law and human rights violations 
by the armed forces and the security agency need to be understood and put in the 
context of the links between the Colombian army, political class and paramilitary 
forces which had grown exponentially in the 1990s. The parapolitica or 
paramilitary-politics scandal came to the fore between 2008 and 2009 thanks to 
the work done by investigative journalists, academics and victims groups. They 
highlighted the deep nexus between Colombia’s political class, particularly 
President Uribe’s party, and the paramilitary groups. By July 2012, 45 
congressmen and seven governors had been convicted for ties with paramilitaries 
(Alsema 2012).  
The extra-judicial executions, DAS and parapolitics scandals made the 
Colombian government lose a lot of national and international credibility.323  As 
noted above, by the end of Uribe’s mandate there was a growing awareness 
amongst certain government sectors, that the military offensive had not been 
sufficient and was reaching its limits. Key sectors in the military and the ministry 
of Defence also became aware of the human rights costs associated with the 
strategies pursued. As one retired Cornel reflected: “We won the armed war (…) 
We won that little war but war is not just military.  What is missing is the 
unarmed component. The unarmed war is in the population. So what? We will 
finish off the population, the villages? No.”324  
It is thanks to the emergence of strong human rights advocacy groups and 
social movements (indigenous, victims and women’s movements) that these 
issues got on the national and international agenda. These movements “played a 																																																								
323 “The State was clearly battling its own legitimacy problems on all fronts such as extra-judicial 
executions, parapolitica. I think what they recognized is that they did not need more in terms of military 
pressure but needed to switch the type of negotiation offered.” Senior Analyst, International organisation, 
Personal interview, 29 May 2015 Bogotá, Colombia.  
324 Coronel Carlos Arturo Velásquez, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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key role by concluding publically that there is no difference between the armed 
actors”.325 The population they represented bore the brunt of the violence by all 
armed actors – the paramilitaries, the army and the guerrillas. Unlike in the lead-
up to the Caguán negotiation, when civil society groups were mobilising and 
calling for peace and had direct access to all armed actors, these groups mobilised 
around the issue of human rights and were not able to explicitly access the FARC. 
These are also the same groups that bore the brunt of stigmatization as ‘terrorist-
sympathisers’ by the Uribe administration for questioning the military strategy 
and refusing to fall into the ‘you are either with us or against us’ dichotomy that 
had become prevalent. This has to be understood in a context where the labelling 
of individuals as “guerrilla collaborators” or “terrorist sympathisers” was used as 
a justification by paramilitary groups for targeting and assassinating civilians 
(Rojas 2005: 229).  
While President Uribe did not appear to be hugely affected by these human 
rights concerns, President Santos appeared more sensitive to them especially when 
these human rights concerns led to economic cost. A key moment took place 
when the US Free-Trade Agreement was put on hold linked to concerns over 
human rights violations and the US started slowly reducing their unequivocal 
support to the Colombian military.326 This slight shift in a key ally, and its main 
support in its war against ‘terrorists’, had an impact on the Colombian 
government. President Santos started feeling the political pain of the war on 
terror. He was much closer than President Uribe to the international liberal 
business elite.  There is also an increasing feeling within government ministries 
that the war was limiting their ability to act, both in terms of particular areas of the 
country that were ‘out of reach’ but also in terms of developing infrastructure, 
roads, connectivity.327 There is a strong business component to President Santos’ 
perception of the government’s political stalemate: “Santos realized that the 
biggest obstacle for a stronger economic development in Colombia is war.”328 The 
government started feeling the political costs associated with their military 
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strategy. It is the political component of the stalemate that led the parties to realise 
they had reached a dead end. 
ii. Insulating themselves: the FARC’s political perception 
The counter-terrorism framing of the conflict politically de-legitimised the FARC 
in the eyes of many external observers.  But to what extent did the FARC feel 
politically de-legitimised? There were differences between the national and local 
impact of proscription which need to be explored to understand how the FARC 
were able to insulate themselves from perceiving the political pain of proscription.   
Politically, the FARC were already discredited following the collapse of the 
Caguán negotiations in the eyes of Colombian public opinion, but President Uribe 
made strategic use of the post-9/11 environment to reinforce this idea. As we saw 
in Chapter 6, proscription helped de-legitimize and isolate the FARC symbolically 
and materially both at the national and international level. It made the construction 
of their political relations nationally and internationally much more challenging.  
It was not just that the FARC were ‘terrorists’ that could not be negotiated 
with but also that because there was no conflict in Colombia, just a democracy at 
war with a bunch of terrorists, the FARC became seen as the main problem – if 
you get rid of the FARC you get rid of the problem. As the two contrasting 
paragraphs at the opening of this chapter make apparent, while in the lead-up to 
the Caguán Colombians marched against the conflict as a whole, calling on all 
armed actors to negotiate, by Uribe’s second term, people were marching just 
against the FARC.  
What is clear is that Uribe has beaten the FARC politically. This has 
been a political victory, public opinion is completely against the 
FARC. The marches in 2006 and 2008 for peace were mainly against 
the FARC (and against hostage taking). The polarization in the 
country has become more extreme.329  
 
President Uribe had succeeded in diminishing the FARC politically, and 
proscription played an important role in that process. But did the FARC 
themselves perceive this shift? Luis Eduardo Celis points out that though 
“Political pressure increases in 2002 with the terrorist framing” and the feeling 
was widespread that the FARC could be “politically defeated”, “the FARC has 
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created a self-perception from their direct relationships with peasant-farmers.”330 
Their increased isolation meant that they had been interacting with people with a 
similar world-view. The FARC were able to insulate themselves from feeling the 
political pain. The FARC continued to believe they represented the interests of 
peasant-farmers and that they played an important political role. As one member 
of the FARC put it: “In rural areas we are the new power, where the government 
has never been, we represent justice, the power, legitimacy, we are the ones who 
help with productive projects. (…) People see that and support us.”331   
The ‘terrorist’ label had a differentiated impact at the national and the 
regional or local level. While the terrorist framing clearly dominated nationally 
and in urban centres, at the local level in the countryside and in the FARC’s 
historical strongholds, it does not appear to have had a similar impact. One high-
level UN staff said, “In the countryside whether or not they are called terrorists 
doesn’t change things much”.332 Similarly, looking at the region of Nariño, a 
border region where the FARC have had an a historical presence, Idler and 
Paladini Adell (2015:135) argued that local level stakeholders “define their 
agendas based on their understanding of everyday people’s necessities, and not 
based on the rhetoric of the armed struggle and the terrorism/counterterrorism 
dynamics.” So, while proscription dominated the narrative and framing at the 
national level as we saw in Chapter 5, and it pushed the FARC towards political 
isolation nationally, it had the affect of restricting the armed group to much more 
localised interactions. These localised interactions in turn were not as focussed on 
the terrorist framing, so the FARC’s actual self-perception was not particularly 
affected.333 
However, one aspect that did appear to shift the perspective of the FARC’s 
leadership level on their political role was the generational changes within the 
organization. Compounded by the targeting and killing of key leadership figures 
and the desertion of key mid-ranking FARC cadres, the FARC leadership started 
to become painfully aware that the younger generations were not as political. 
They were struggling to fill the mid-level positions with the necessary political 																																																								
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and military training and inclination. While the senior leadership of the FARC at 
this stage was mainly comprised of ideological Marxist-Leninist commanders 
who had joined the group in the 1960s and 1970s, the rank and file joined in the 
2000s when the group had already compromised its ideological basis by 
depending substantially on drugs and kidnapping to fund their fight.  Each FARC 
cadre had to have both political and military training – there was no separation 
between the two - and the armed group had found it increasingly difficult in 
practice because new recruits did not all have political inclinations: “For young 
people, managing weapon is much more attractive than political debate” (Ferro 
Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002: 82). These younger FARC leaders appeared to be 
less ideologically inclined. Sources close to the FARC said that these new leaders 
also had less links with local communities and struggled more to gain their respect 
(quoted in International Crisis Group 2012). 
With the FARC it is possible to say that at its top there is an important 
group that can be describes as ‘believers’.(…) The problem is at the 
mid-ranking and base level, where the training of new combatants is 
not contributing to the generation of new ‘believers’. (Ferro Medina & 
Uribe Ramón 2002: 92) 
 
The possibility of a negotiated solution to the conflict became more 
appealing to the FARC in the context of trying to salvage what political capital 
they still had: “There is a big difference between the Secretariat and the rank and 
files. The ideological part of the FARC saw negotiations as the only way forward 
[they want to] leave with some kind of legacy.”334  So, it is possibly more the risk 
of completely losing their political character rather than the FARC feeling 
politically de-legitimized by proscription per se that played an important part in 
the FARC Secretariat’s assessment of its situation. That, coupled with the intense 
military reversal and the realization that they could no longer win the war, meant 
the FARC started perceiving a hurting stalemate in 2008. The FARC’s perception 
of the mutually hurting stalemate is epitomised in the words of Marcos Calarcá: 
“They haven’t been able to win and we haven’t been able to win – there are no 
winners, no losers.”335 
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Even though the FARC is the classic example used in the literature of a 
highly hierarchical and monolithic organization, it appears that dialogue within 
the group was essential in bringing about this deep change in strategy:  “The 
FARC had an internal dialogue and decided that they want to get out but by the 
big door, not through the window.” 336 Generally speaking, a decision of this 
importance will be made by finding consensus at the leadership level and then 
communicated to the troops. There was opposition to the idea within the 
Secretariat of the EMC; certain leaders were reluctant. Iván Marquez, for 
example, remained unenthusiastic for a long time even though he later became 
part of the FARC’s negotiating team in Havana. There was also a large difference 
of opinion between those that had left the country and those that had continued 
fighting the war in Colombia. Those that stayed and bore the brunt of the military 
onslaught buttressed by proscription, figures such as Alfonso Cano, Timoleón 
Jiménez, Pastor Alape or Pablo Catumbo, had come to recognise that the FARC 
did not have a military future.337  
Here again leadership change played an important role in ripening the 
situation. Alfonso Cano played a central role. Interestingly, he had been against 
the decision to enter into negotiations at the time of the Caguán because he 
thought the FARC still had the ability to gain more from the battlefield.338 This 
shows that there is no such thing as fixed preferences and individuals being 
squarely in the ‘hawk’ or ‘dove’ camp within armed groups. Instead it is more 
helpful to think about armed groups as the sum of its part, as an ‘institutional 
equilibrium’. All my interviewees with in-depth knowledge of the FARC said that 
Alfonso Cano led an internal process by consulting with others until he managed 
to get unity around the idea of entering peace negotiations.  As one FARC leader 
noted: “I feel there was a shift towards peace through a strong debate.”339 The 
FARC had a systematic discussion at the leadership level weighing-up their 
different options looking at their political and military reality, exploring their 
international and regional space. There was a complex shift of a quasi-relative 																																																								
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minority who wanted to enter into negotiations led by Cano that had started 
strengthening with this thinking starting to trickle down to the rank and files. One 
member of the FARC remembers “an internal communiqué (circular) from 
Alfonso Cano in September 2010 where he gave some elements [of an openness 
to peace negotiations]“.340  
By 2008 both the FARC and the government were starting to feel the pain 
of a mutually hurting stalemate with military and political components. But why 
did it take another two years for the FARC and the government to enter into pre-
negotiations and another two to enter into formal negotiations? Part of the answer 
lies in understanding that a party feeling a hurting stalemate is not enough, it also 
needs to envision a way out. But with President Uribe and the framing of the 
conflict as a war against terrorists there was no way out. 
3. No Way Out (2002-2010):  
President Uribe started off his presidency reframing the armed conflict as a war 
against terrorists. During his inaugural address President Uribe (2002) painted the 
picture that would define his two terms, that of a democratic state under attack 
from terrorists: “When a democratic State provides effective guarantees, even if it 
comes to do so gradually, any violence against it is terrorism. We do not accept 
violence as a means of attack on the government, or as a means of defence. Both 
are terrorism.”341  
This was covered extensively in Chapter 5, but it is worth re-stating that the 
international proscription of the FARC legitimised this shift in discourse. 
President Uribe was able to reframe the conflict as a war against terrorists and 
even banned the use of the words ‘armed conflict’ to describe the situation in 
Colombia. By denying the existence of the armed conflict, peace negotiations with 
‘terrorists’ become unthinkable. By de-politicising the FARC the only option that 
remained open for the group was to surrender and demobilize (similar to the 
experience with the paramilitaries). The possibility of peace negotiations under 
Uribe was based on the logic of “subjecting the FARC to justice and not 
negotiating the basis of the state”.342 Throughout his presidency, Uribe maintained 																																																								
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the prerequisite that the FARC should accept a ceasefire (Villarraga Saramiento 
2013) building on the idea that a ‘terrorist’ group, which is ‘holding-up’ society 
needs to give-up its weapons if it wants to talk.343  
The only avenue being explored throughout President Uribe’s two terms is 
the possibility of a humanitarian exchange, a swap between hostages held by the 
FARC and FARC prisoners held by the State. Under much international pressure, 
President Uribe mandated and in turn demoted a number of intermediaries 
including representatives of the Catholic Church, Hugo Chavez and Piedad 
Cordoba to facilitate an exchange. But people closely involved with this process 
concluded that President Uribe never had any real intention to come to an 
agreement and that the debate around the humanitarian exchange was a way of 
superficially demonstrating to the world his good intentions.344 In the words of 
Monseñor Luis Augusto Castro, President of the CCN and mandated 
intermediary, “President Uribe never took seriously the idea of ending the war 
through dialogue. It was about killing the last guerrilla.”345  
Even if the government had wanted to enter into peace negotiations with the 
FARC, it no longer had any room for manoeuvre. It had created its own policy-
straight jacket by convincing the public and international opinion that the 
Colombian government should not negotiate with ‘terrorists’. So, the government 
had no way out of the reliance on a military strategy, they were neither willing nor 
able to negotiate. The other side of the coin is that the FARC ended up with no 
partner to do business with, so there was no inter-party way out. According to the 
FARC, “For many years under Uribe there was no direct contact between the 
FARC and the Colombian government. Only towards the end he contacted us but 
it was towards the end of his mandate, it didn’t make sense, better to wait.”346 
This can be explained by the fact that the FARC did not consider President Uribe 
to be a valid interlocutor as he denied the existence of the armed conflict and of 
the FARC’s political condition. When Timoleón Jiménez, who succeeded Alfonso 																																																								
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Cano as leader of the FARC, later reflected on why negotiations were never 
seriously attempted with President Uribe, he said: “With Uribe it was not possible 
because of his blatant disregard of our political condition” (Jiménez quoted in 
Lozano 2012).  
So the FARC itself could not envision a political future under President 
Uribe. One of the FARC’s four conditions vis-à-vis the government to initiate a 
peace negotiation was that the government should “Recognize our political 
character and stop signalling us as “terrorists”” (FARC quoted in Villarraga 
Sarmiento 2013:68). As we saw in Chapter 5, the FARC minded the label. Not so 
much because they accepted the ‘stigma’ – indeed, they ‘rejected’ it. Yet, it still 
had the effect of taking away their legitimacy, their political recognition 
externally. Materially as well, their politics were banned and pushed further 
underground. They were increasingly isolated from broader Colombian society 
and internationally. There was no space for them to do politics. It is important not 
to forget that the decimation of the Unión Patriótica in the 1980s, the FARC’s ill-
fated attempt at creating a political party, is a deep wound they carried. It created 
much distrust in the possibility of political participation, they were not convinced 
they would receive the necessary security guarantees. This is especially the case in 
a context where being signalled as a ‘terrorist sympathiser’ often led to the killing 
of individuals with political affinities with the FARC. The FARC believed they 
had no political future, so they had little incentive to enter into a dialogue process 
with President Uribe. The FARC itself could not see a way out with President 
Uribe. 
In a context where there is no inter-party nor intra-party way out, there is 
also no alternative to this situation because there is no space for civil society 
actors to act as intermediaries - unlike in the lead-up to the Caguán. Because of 
proscription, any links with the FARC was criminalised, and civil society could 
not establish direct contacts with the group inside or outside Colombia. As 
Maurico García-Durán noted: 
Listing changed the contact with civil society – because of the risk of 
being considered a terrorist actor. The construction of political 
relations became more complicated for the FARC. Interaction became 
mediated through groups and individuals that had been closer to them, 
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people who knew them from [the time of] Casa Verde and [the] 
Caguán.347 
 
This applied not just to Colombians but also to foreigners. The case of Jean-
Pierre Gontard, the Swiss emissary who was prosecuted for contacts with the 
FARC mentioned in Chapter 6, is a case in point. Beyond the direct engagement 
with the listed group that was prohibited, any action construed as dialogue with 
them was also very much discouraged. A senior UN staff member recalled that:  
It did not stop us working on peace but it was a conception of peace 
that has nothing to do with it. It was about peacebuilding (post-
conflict) rather than peacemaking.348 
 
Contacting the FARC outside Colombia, as had been the case in the lead-up 
to the Caguán with the CCN in Costa Rica, for example, was impossible because 
of the material implications of proscription. After the international proscription of 
the group, the FARC had to shut down all its offices abroad. They lost contact 
with civil society networks and governments. Marcos Calarcá who had been 
representing the FARC in Mexico at the time said that “they started going against 
our international commission with capture orders from Interpol”349. They no 
longer had voceros, or spokespeople, whom third parties could contact and engage 
with. 
Under President Uribe’s two terms there was no way out of the military 
confrontation. Even though both conflict parties were showing signs of feeling the 
mutually hurting stalemate they had nowhere to go.  Proscription made it 
impossible for the Colombian President and the FARC to initiate peace 
negotiations. 
4. Creating a Way Out (2010-2012) 
Before being elected President, Juan Manuel Santos had felt the political and 
military costs of the war against ‘terrorists’ in Colombia. Now elected, he found 
the policy-straight jacket, tailored during President Uribe’s tenure based on the 
idea that the Colombian government should not negotiate with ‘terrorists’, itchy 
and tight fitting. He decided to unfasten it and slowly started fostering the way 
out. But in 2010, public opinion in Colombia and factions in the government and 																																																								
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the military were completely against the idea of negotiating with ‘terrorists’350 as 
we saw in Chapter 5. Undeterred, he started slowly shaping the possibility. In his 
inaugural address, President Santos said he held the “keys to peace”. His brother 
in his memoires of this period reflects that it is an interesting and audacious 
statement in a moment when public opinion “does not want to hear about terrorist 
groups they consider cornered and practically liquidated” (Santos Calderon 2014: 
19). 
i. ‘Linguistic ceasefire’ 
An important component of the way out was President Santos putting in place a 
‘linguistic ceasefire’ as described in detail in chapter 5.  This linguistic ceasefire 
had three main components: President Santos (1) recognised the armed conflict; 
(2) stopped using the ‘terrorist’ label to describe the FARC; and (3) uncoupled the 
actor from the acts. This ‘linguistic ceasefire’ annulled the symbolic effects of 
proscription. It helped the government start fostering the political space to launch 
a negotiation in Colombia by unpicking eight-years of denial of the armed 
conflict. President Santos was also sending direct signals to the FARC that he 
recognized them politically as a party to this armed conflict. In sending a clear 
signal to the FARC about his “seriousness” (Hernandez 2014), Santos was making 
use of what Jonathan Powell (2014) characterised as ‘megaphone diplomacy’ in 
lieu of direct contact. 
At the same time, Santos sent a first letter to the FARC through an 
intermediary in which he explicitly recognized the armed conflict. According to 
Carlos Lozano, a long-time intermediary to the FARC:  
This letter is the one that convinces Cano that one can trust Santos. It 
was difficult to think that a process with Santos was possible because 
he came from the Uribe government and he had been saying that 
Uribe was the second Liberator of Colombia. It seemed impossible. 
But this letter makes Cano say “man this is important.”351  
 
These steps went a long way in convincing the FARC that the government was 
willing and able to negotiate. The FARC had clearly stated in their 
communications that a key reason they decided to enter into a negotiation with 
this particular government is the fact that Santos took seriously the recognition of 																																																								
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the ‘armed conflict’. That in essence is “the real break with the Uribista 
agenda”.352 This is what helped foster the inter-party component of the way out. 
But the armed group itself also needed to perceive a way out – a political 
future. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ went some way in giving them a sense of the 
political landscape being normalised. If they were no longer described as terrorists 
and were re-contextualised in the armed conflict and re-politicised then a political 
future seemed more likely. As Ivan Marquez, the FARC chief negotiator in 
Havana, said in his address to the European Parliament (by Skype) in January 
2016: “This [removal from the terrorist list] would take away a serious obstacle to 
normalization of Colombian political life and would ensure the process of 
reintegration of former rebel fighters into civil life.”But this change in language 
and discourse, which annulled the symbolic effects of proscription, was not 
enough. The FARC also needed to see the possibility of a concrete political 
future.  
ii. Political landing strip 
This can be seen as an instance of a “political landing strip” which enabled the 
proscribed armed group to envision another path to achieving its goals. As set out 
in Chapter 4, there are three main levels to the political landing strip: 1) 
international level; 2) national level; 3) local level. Each of these will be explored 
in turn. Interestingly, most of the actors that played a role at these different levels 
were either not aligned with the ‘global war on terror’ or found ways of 
circumventing the proscription regimes.  
Internationally, the armed group needed to have countries or examples of 
armed groups that have made successful political transitions and were 
ideologically similar. In the case of the FARC, this role was played by the left-
wing governments who got to power in Latin America in Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Cuba, El Salvador and Bolivia. At a time when the FARC were starting to feel at 
risk of losing what they had gained, the political changes in the region showed 
them that there were other “valid political paths for revolutionaries” apart from 
the armed struggle. 353  The coming to power of left-wing governments in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador and Bolivia gave them new prospects. You also 																																																								
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had at least five governments in the region that included ex-guerrillas such as the 
FLMN in El Salvador for example. These governments, which are ideologically 
close to the FARC, show them that “there is an alternative that is not the 
alternative of war so they start seeing that there is a possible horizon.”354  
In interviews with the FARC, they highlighted the important role played by 
Latin American countries: “The conjecture in Latin America played a role, having 
a number of progressive neighbours helped, it is not the same being surrounded by 
friends and democracies that consider that we have principles and are fighters 
[luchadores]”.355 The FARC were particularly enthused by the Venezuelan model, 
the idea that a revolution can be reached through elections.356 President Chavez of 
Venezuela played a particularly important role in this process (Lozano 2015). As 
Chapter 6 noted, President Chavez helped bring the FARC around.  In a state of 
the union speech given on the 11 January 2008, President Chavez asked for the 
belligerent status to be granted to the FARC and demanded that the European 
Union and other Latin American countries remove the FARC from the lists of 
terrorist organizations (CNN 2008). But Chavez also had directed specific 
messages towards the FARC, stating that the time for armed action was over and 
invited them publically to enter the realm of normalized politics. The FARC 
themselves acknowledged that “Comandante Chávez played a fundamental role in 
allowing this process to start”.357  
At the national level, Colombian@s  - a collection of Colombian civil 
society actors and intellectuals - played an important role. While Chapter 5 noted 
the role they played in the FARC’s self de-vilification, and Chapter 6 noted how 
they allowed the FARC to release hostages in an important confidence building 
measure with the government, here we explore the role they played in allowing 
the FARC to engage in a form of public political conversation. In a context where 
civil society organisations, academics and journalists could not be seen to engage 
the FARC in conversation let alone dialogue, Colombian@s succeeded in evading 
the contact ban by starting a public epistolary exchange with the FARC. This 
letter exchange was an innovative way of circumventing the proscription regime. 
As Danilo Rueda from Colombian@s said, the letter exchange “facilitates a 																																																								
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dialogue that is not possible to do directly because of the legal persecution” 
(quoted in Hernández Delgado 2012: 455). Moreover, “The epistolary exchange 
was a means to protect the group of people involved in Colombianos and 
Colombianas por la paz because it is a way of publically presenting what was 
being done”.358  
They sent their first public letter in September 2008 engaging the FARC on 
the possibility of a humanitarian exchange and hoping to “generate a democratic 
debate over issues of peace and war in Colombia” (Colombianos and 
Colombianas por la Paz 2008). Colombian@s were very candid about their views 
on hostage taking which they described as “inhumane” (Colombianos and 
Colombianas por la Paz 2008b) and asked the group to give-up the practice. In 
response to the Colombian@s request, the FARC acquiesced and answered that 
“frankly the perpetuation of these methods is neither within our ideology nor our 
principles”. 359  Colombian@s succeeded in engaging the FARC in a public 
dialogue over a period of two years. This gave the FARC a platform to have 
political exchange and conversation at the national level. Between September 
2008 and 2012 the group had exchanged 45 letters with the FARC. These 
exchanges led to the release of forty hostages and to the FARC announcing in 
February 2012 that they would renounce the use of kidnapping (Hernández 
Delgado 2012). 
Finally, at a local level, the groups that are the FARC’s natural habitat, that 
are trusted by the FARC, start getting organized as grassroots civil society 
movements with the formation of the associations of peasant-farmers 
(Associaciones Campesinas de las Zonas de Reserva Campesina) and political 
movements such as the Marcha Patriotica. These groups had often born the brunt 
of stigmatization and attacks for being terrorist-sympathisers, but they were 
essential in creating a ‘political landing strip’ for the FARC. As one interviewee 
put it:  
These groups come in with a new discourse saying there is a need for 
peace. They consider themselves with the same ideology as the FARC 
but do not share the armed strategy. They start showing the FARC that 
a political path is possible.360  
 																																																								
358 Carlos Lozano, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
359 Jímenez, T., 2012, ‘Comunicado: Carta a la Señora Marleyna Orjuela, ASFAMIPAZ, Bogotá’, 
Commandante del EMC, Montañas de Colombia, 3 March. 
360 Padre Francisco de Roux, Personal interview, June 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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A range of interviewees with in-depth knowledge of the FARC concurred in 
saying that, from a political perspective, it was very important that these 
movements developed.361 One United Nations official said that they decided to 
support and fund a number of the organizations that are affiliated to these social 
groups, such as the peasant movement organizations (LANZORC, AZCAMCAT) 
and Caguán Vive, for example, in order to send a message to the FARC that there 
was a space for political and social participation. 362 
In essence, these movements allowed the FARC to see a political way out at 
the national and sub-national level. They can “play the role of political platform, a 
kind of landing strip for the FARC”.363 The FARC did not affiliate themselves 
directly with these groups in a post-agreement scenario. But in the pre-negotiation 
phase they played an important role in showing them the possibility of a political 
option and for them to know they had a social-political platform with support. 
 
Conclusion 
The FARC were battered and weakened militarily ahead of the Havana 
negotiations and proscription played an important role in this by underpinning the 
Colombian military both symbolically and materially. Yet, the FARC only show 
signs of perceiving this shift and acting on it from 2008 onwards. Proscription 
also appears to have helped convince the government that the war could be won 
militarily, thus clouding its perception of the military component of the mutually 
hurting stalemate.  
There is no such things as an ‘objective’ mutually hurting stalemate, it is 
down to each conflict parties’ perception of it. Crucial to this perception is the 
political component of the stalemate that led the parties to realise they had reached 
a dead end. In the case of the government, there were a number of political costs 
associated with the counter-terrorist strategy being pursued, which actually led the 
government to realise that their strategy was no longer sustainable politically and 
economically. In the case of the FARC it was not the political de-legitimization 
that came hand in hand with proscription per se, it was more the risk of 																																																								
361 Fernando Sarmiento Santander, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia; Gimena Sánchez-
Garzoli, Personal interview, April 2014, Washington D.C.; Teófilo Vasquez, Personal interview, May 
2015, Bogotá, Colombia; Senior UN staff, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
362 Senior UN staff, Personal interview, October 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
363 Fernando Sarmiento Santander, Personal interview, May 2015, Bogotá, Colombia. 
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completely losing their political identity which led to a shift in the institutional 
equilibrium within the group. 
Proscription had a deep impact on the way out. The reframing of a war 
against ‘terrorists’ meant that there was no space to negotiate with them. 
Proscription played a key role in politically de-legitimising the FARC and 
ensuring they could not envision a way out. It also ensured that unlike before 
9/11, there was no space or possibility for civil society or other actors to engage 
with the armed actors and help foster a way out. Proscription also became a policy 
straight jacket for the government and the only way to overcome it was to redress 
the rhetoric and discourse around the conflict and the FARC, which was described 
as a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. This helped foster a sense of inter-party way out. But, to 
be able to envisage a negotiated exit the FARC also had to perceive a political 
future. This was described as a ‘political landing strip’ where actors who were 
either not ‘aligned’ with the proscription regime or were are able to circumvent it 
played a crucial role. 
The next chapter will bring together the analysis of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to 
assess the overarching effect of proscription on the pre-negotiations between the 
Colombian government and the FARC. It will also reflect back on the analytical 
framework and apply it to the case of ETA and the Basque country to assess its 
applicability to other cases. 
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Chapter	Eight	
The effect of proscription on initiating peace negotiations 
 
Introduction 
This thesis was born out of a desire to understand how international proscription 
affects negotiations and peace processes. Because of the lack of scholarly research 
on the topic, the scope was narrowed to the particular effect proscription has on 
the pre-negotiation phase of peace processes. A key contribution to the literature 
was the development of an analytical framework to study its effects. The 
framework explored the material and symbolic effects of proscription and how 
they have affected three key pre-negotiation dynamics, namely the move from 
vilification to de-vilification, going from a situation of asymmetry to perceived 
symmetry and from feeling a mutually hurting stalemate to envisioning a way out. 
Chapters five, six and seven formed the heart of the thesis’ empirical analysis. By 
comparing and contrasting pre-negotiations before and after international 
proscription and 9/11, these three chapters assessed how each of these central 
dynamics were affected in the case of the Colombian government and the FARC.  
The aim of this chapter is to bring together insights from the analytical 
framework and the Colombian case studies and explore their applicability to 
other, similar cases. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section the 
chapter draws together key findings of the comparative analysis of the two pre-
negotiation processes between the Colombian government and the FARC, honing 
in on the effects of proscription on the initiation of peace negotiations. In the 
second section, the thesis’ analytical framework is applied to the case of the 
Basque country. Through a broad-brush analysis based mainly on secondary 
sources,364 the chapter examines the effects of proscription on the initiation of 
peace processes in a different context. The conclusion assesses the robustness of 
the analytical framework and its applicability to other similar cases before 
																																																								
364 Mostly on Teresa Whitfield’s excellent work, in particular her 2014 book, Endgame for ETA, in which 
she details and analyses all previous peace negotiations in the Basque country and ETA’s unilateral 
transition. I also bring in some insights from my past practitioner work in the region and a couple of 
personal interviews with relevant parties. 
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broadening out to some general findings on the effect of proscription on the nature 
of peace itself. 
 
I. The effect of proscription on the pre-negotiation between the Colombian 
government and the FARC 
While the labelling of opponents in conflict is widespread and mainly reflects one 
party’s judgment, international proscription, by creating a category with 
international recognition, leads to material and symbolic implications, which in 
turn affect the processes of pre-negotiation. Bringing together the analysis of the 
three core empirical chapters allows us to asses the effects of proscription on the 
initiation of peace negotiations in the Colombian context.  
1. Material and symbolic effects of proscription 
Asset-freeze and travel bans are the two essential material keystones of 
international proscription regimes. These measures are implemented in the hope 
of denying listed armed groups the means of waging war by cutting their 
resources and affecting their ability to operate internationally. In the case of the 
FARC in Colombia, proscription had little material effect on the armed group’s 
access to resources as the group did not depend on diaspora money and had 
alternative sources of funding (mainly based on the drug business). The travel ban 
did not seriously affect the ability of the FARC to move around. It was more the 
banning of the group itself, particularly in Europe, which affected its movements.  
The symbolic impact of proscription was the most important. This confirms 
much of the recent findings in the sanctions literature.  The FARC were deeply 
de-legitimised by the listing internationally and nationally. Though they rejected 
the label it stuck. International proscription shaped the meta-narrative of how the 
Colombian conflict became understood – a fight against terrorists. The listing led 
to the political and social exclusion of the FARC, their ‘symbolic banishment’ (de 
Goede 2012). While this finding is relatively unsurprising, what this analysis also 
shows is that alongside the de-legitimisation of the armed group, international 
proscription legitimised the government to such an extent that it affected the type 
of war being fought and the possibility of resolving it peacefully. Because 
international proscription legitimised the idea that the FARC should be fought as 
‘terrorists’ it led to specific counter-terrorism strategies that were supported 
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internationally. It also deeply de-legitimised the idea of dialogue with the armed 
group.  
This shift in the international environment had severe material implications 
in terms of military and intelligence support to the government in the case of 
Colombia because of the particular role of the US. Similarly, the international 
illegalisation of the group itself and the criminalisation of its membership and 
support meant the FARC had to shut down their offices abroad and were no 
longer able to operate internationally. This was particularly apparent in Europe 
where they had previously enjoyed a certain level of support. This shows the 
importance of studying the material and symbolic effects of proscription in 
interaction particularly because the most important material effects did not come 
out of the explicit material components of proscription – for example the asset 
freeze and travel ban – but were consequences of the symbolic reframing of the 
conflict as a war against ‘terrorists’. 
2. Comparing pre-negotiations before and after 9/11 key findings  
The two cases stand in sharp contrast to one another. In the lead-up to the Caguán 
negotiations, pre-negotiations between the Colombian government were very 
direct, led by the highest levels of leadership on both sides, the period of pre-
negotiation itself was short, the de-vilification was almost immediate. 
Furthermore, all initial contacts were public, took place in Colombia and were 
widely advertised. Civil society and third party actors were able to be in contact 
with both parties. There was a huge mobilisation for peace. In the lead-up to 
Havana the pre-negotiation was protracted, taking two years, and was completely 
indirect - the leaders of both parties only met publically two years into the actual 
formal negotiations.  The whole process was kept secret and took place abroad, 
keeping the FARC isolated from civil society and third party actors.  
This thesis does not argue that all these differences can be boiled down 
solely to international proscription; these processes are incredibly complex and 
dynamic. However, the analysis made apparent that proscription did deeply 
influence these processes. One of these was the timing and sequencing of the pre-
negotiation dynamics. The actual pre-negotiation in the context of proscription 
took much longer. One central reason was that a step was added to the process of 
de-vilification. In the context of proscription a ‘linguistic ceasefire’ had to be put 
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in place before normal de-vilification could happen. But the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ 
also became a central component to establish perceived symmetry and for carving 
a way out for the government and the FARC.  In other words, in the context of 
proscription, the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ became a central pre-condition for the 
initiation of a peace process. 
Linked to this, it became apparent that while the inclusion of the FARC in 
the broader war on terror and international ‘terrorist’ lists was straight forward for 
the Colombian government and greatly bolstered their efforts at reframing the 
conflict as a war against ‘terrorists’, it became much harder to reverse. The 
extreme vilification of the FARC took on a life of its own, creating a policy 
straightjacket for the government and blocking the way out.  It made it harder for 
the government to shift its strategy. Because this thesis was focussed on the pre-
negotiation phase it only scratched the surface of this effect. While, President 
Santos was able to initiate an official negotiation thanks in large part to the 
‘linguistic ceasefire’, the extreme vilification of the armed group continued to 
have an impact during the actual negotiations, and in the relationship between the 
government and the public at large. This is exemplified by the rejection of the 
peace referendum in October 2016. It has also remained an issue for the on-going 
transition of the listed armed group into political life and for longer-term 
reconciliation efforts in Colombia. 
Another effect of proscription has been the heightened asymmetry between 
the government and the armed group. International proscription bolstered the 
government to such a degree symbolically and materially that the conflict against 
the FARC stopped being seen as one between similar parties. In contrast to the 
lead-up to the Caguán where there had been no hesitation on the part of the 
Colombian government to foster a sense of symmetry with the armed group ahead 
of the negotiation, in the context of proscription, there was huge reticence to do 
the same thing. Moreover the FARC were very limited in their efforts to ‘borrow’ 
power internationally because of proscription. Just enough indirect and discreet 
parity of esteem was established to get the FARC to the negotiation table, using 
sidestepping strategies that did not entail political recognition such as having the 
President’s brother act as a negotiator. But the government remained dominant 
and firmly in control and refused to have a bilateral ceasefire until after the final 
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agreement was signed. Proscription appears to have put the burden of proof in 
terms of confidence building measures squarely on the listed entity.  
This extreme asymmetry fed in directly to the impact proscription had on 
the classic conflict resolution paradigm of ripeness - the mutually hurting 
stalemate and the way out. The expectation would be that proscription would 
make the listed armed group hurt – thus fostering ripeness. The FARC did indeed 
suffer from the heightened military pressure symbolically and materially 
underpinned by proscription. However, this did not explain their transition. What 
had the biggest effect on the FARC’s leadership was the risk of completely losing 
their political identity. Proscription also worked against the mutually hurting 
stalemate because the government was strengthened to such an extent that it 
delayed them feeling any pain. It is only when they realised that the political costs 
and particularly the economic costs of the type of warfare that they were engaged 
in were not sustainable that they start exploring the way out. But the way out was 
blocked because of proscription.  
With proscription there was no space either for civil society or third party 
actors to help foster a way out. The involvement of third parties had always been 
sensitive in Colombia, but proscription made it increasingly difficult. In the lead-
up to Caguán the type of third parties involved included high-level UN 
representation and government representatives. In the lead-up to Havana the only 
third party actors involved could be typified as weak or biased third parties, 
mainly representatives of the Church, or actors closer to the armed group. All 
these actors played a crucial role in helping the FARC envision a political future – 
creating a ‘political landing strip’ for them. These actors were able to get around 
the challenges of proscription by interacting indirectly with the FARC through 
epistolary exchanges or pastoral dialogues. There was no high-level UN 
representation or government representatives with clout. The only governments 
involved were ones that had opted out of the international proscription regime 
(Norway, Venezuela and Cuba). This was very much a case of third parties being 
involved in spite of proscription. 
The FARC were deeply de-legitimised at the national and international 
level, which made the construction of their political relations very difficult. At the 
same time, the FARC’s increased isolation meant that they had developed a self-
perception from their limited relationships with peasant-farmers, which meant 
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they were able to isolate themselves from feeling the political pain of proscription. 
So, while the terrorist framing dominated internationally, and nationally in the 
urban centres, at the local level in the countryside and in the FARC’s historic 
strongholds the terrorism framing did not take hold in the same way. This 
differentiated impact of proscription at multiple levels is something that could be 
explored in much more depth. 
The intensive study of one case with two pre-negotiation phases on either 
side of 9/11, and the international listing of the FARC as terrorists, allowed the 
thesis to isolate the central effects of international proscription on the initiation of 
peace processes post-9/11. Analysing the main differences between the two 
phases and across the one case was important to understand in detail the central 
dynamics at play. This can also help us understand a larger class of cases. To 
assess the applicability and usefulness of analytical framework developed, the 
chapter turns to briefly applying it to a very different case that also fits the 
research design: the case of the Basque country and the conflict with ETA. 
 
II. Applying the framework to the Basque country 
The Basque conflict has its roots in General Francisco Franco’s military 
dictatorship. ETA was a violent secessionist organization created in 1958. Ever 
since its emergence under Franco’s rule it was treated and labelled as a terrorist 
organization by the Spanish government but certain sectors of the Basque 
population saw it as the (violent) expression of a political conflict. There was also 
a broader social and political movement to this struggle, the Nationalist or 
Abrazale Left, which included a political party called Batasuna. 
Every elected leader since the democratic transition in Spain had publically 
rejected the idea of ‘negotiating with terrorists’ even though all of them did just 
that with the exception of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018). Three 
significant peace negotiations took place between the Spanish government and 
ETA:  
• January-March 1989 in Algiers with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez; 
• between 1998-1999 in Geneva with Prime Minister José María Aznar; 
• between 2004-2006 with Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.  
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All of them broke down before reaching an agreement. The failure of the last 
attempt sparked a unilateral process of dialogue within the Abrazale Left and 
ETA, which led to ETA declaring a permanent end to its violence in October 
2011. 
This section cannot do justice to analysing and dissecting all these different 
pre-negotiation attempts, and will instead focus on sketching out the effects of 
international proscription using the thesis’ analytical framework homing in on the 
post-9/11 context. Before doing so however, it is important to briefly outline some 
key pre-9/11 pre-negotiations dynamics.  
1. Before 9/11 
Unlike in Colombia with the FARC, pre-negotiations with ETA, even before 9/11, 
were never open, direct or fluid. Because the armed group was considered to be a 
terrorist organization nationally, every leader had publically proclaimed they 
would refuse to negotiate with terrorists. All the initial contacts with the armed 
group were indirect, through intermediaries, held abroad and secret. Moreover, 
every Prime Minister had to make a public case to initiate negotiations and receive 
the backing of Parliament.  For example, in 1987 the Spanish Congress allowed 
the government to have ‘technical non-political talks’ with ETA, which became 
known as the Madrid Pact. This set the stage for the pre-negotiation process, 
which culminated in the Algiers negotiations between January and March 1989.  
There was broad consensus across the political spectrum. Both main 
Spanish political parties, the Partido Popular (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), 
were aligned on the issue of how to deal with ETA. For example, after the Geneva 
talks broke down and ETA put an end to its ceasefire in November 1999 the two 
main parties closed ranks against ETA and produced an anti-terrorism pact. In 
December 2000 the political parties reaffirmed their commitment to defeating 
terrorism without making concessions in what became known as the ‘Pact for 
Freedom and Against Terrorism’. 
But, while ETA had been considered terrorists in Spain for a long period of 
time, internationally the group had a certain level of support and wide-ranging 
contacts, particularly in Latin America and with other national liberation 
movements (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015). Moreover, the Abrazale Left and in 
particular, Batasuna, the political wing, could operate freely in Spain and across 
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Europe. Batasuna operated like any normal political party.  They had not been 
proscribed or made illegal and in fact even had elected representatives in the 
European Parliament. 
2. After 9/11: material and symbolic effects of proscription 
While pre-9/11 the terrorism framing of ETA was already present in Spain and the 
Basque country at a domestic level, 9/11 changed two fundamental things. First, it 
led to the international proscription of ETA. It was no longer just Spain calling 
them ‘terrorists’ but the international community as well. Second, it allowed the 
Spanish government to also proscribe the political branch of the Abrazale Left, 
and to do so internationally, which was unprecedented.  In the words of a 
representative of Batasuna, after 9/11 “Aznar took advantage of that scenario to 
strengthen both Spain’s anti-terror domestic policies and the international 
cooperation on the fight against the Basque movement.” (Elejabarrieta Diaz 
2015:153) 
Similarly to the FARC, post 9/11 the fact that ETA had been on the US 
terrorist list since 1997 took on new meaning. It was incorporated into the broader 
‘war on terror’ as Prime Minister Aznar became a key ally to George W Bush by 
sending troops to Iraq. The armed group was also placed on the EU terrorist list in 
2001. This was a significant diplomatic victory for the Spanish government as it 
was the “first time all 15 member governments have labelled ETA as such” (BBC 
2017). 
Another deeply significant shift post-9/11 was that the whole political 
movement was proscribed both nationally and internationally. The ‘global war on 
terror’ was used by President Aznar to further broaden the counter-terrorist 
legislation in Spain, including permanently banning Batasuna and other Abrazale 
Left organisations in March 2003 (Heiberg cited in Haspeslagh and Dudouet 
2015: 111). The law on political parties in Spain was amended in June 2002 to 
ensure political parties could not offer ‘tacit support of terrorism’. The 
amendment thus made it a requirement for political parties to explicitly condemn 
ETA. Batasuna was not prepared to do so which rendered the party illegal. 
Banning a political party was a drastic measure and it directly “challenged 
freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and effectively disenfranchised 
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those individuals – some 10-15 per cent of Basque voters in this instance – who 
constituted its electorate.” (Whitfield 2014:103-104) 
Not long after Batasuna was made illegal in Spain, the political party was 
also included in the EU and US terrorist lists in mid-2003. So international 
proscription affected not only the armed group but also its associated political 
party:  
The decision to ban Batasuna represented the culmination of the 
counter-terrorist policies pursued by Aznar and clearly favoured the 
police and judicial defeat of ETA. It would help secure the party’s 
addition to the terrorist lists in the EU and the United States in mid-
2003 (…) it also confirmed that Spain was ready to give up on any 
prospect of dialogue with radical nationalism. (Whitfield 2014:105) 
 
Similar to the FARC, the direct material implications were not so 
pronounced for the Abrazale Left movement. At the international level the effect 
was limited. According to a member of the Abrazale Left, their funding was not 
affected by the asset freeze.365 Indeed, the armed group did not depend on a 
diaspora as most of the money was raised locally in the Basque country either 
voluntarily or through a ‘revolutionary tax’. Similarly, their travel across Europe 
(except for Spain) was not affected, though they were unable to travel to the US.  
The effect was huge symbolically. The international proscription of ETA 
and Batasuna greatly increased the Spanish government’s legitimacy 
internationally and domestically. In particular, the EU listing of Batasuna, which 
had been resisted earlier by a number of member states, shifted the dynamics 
considerably: “What the EU list did was to give legitimacy to the Spanish 
government”.366 It also deeply de-legitimised the Basque independent social-
political project internationally. While national and international proscription did 
not bring about the disappearance of the political party, it affected it significantly.  
The symbolic de-legitimization also led to material effects. The EU 
proscription in particular succeeded in isolating Batasuna from mainstream 
political actors (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015). In the European Parliament arena, for 
example, they were only able to remain in close contact with Sinn Fein because all 
																																																								
365 Senior member of Batasuna, Personal interview, August 2012, Bayonne, France. 
366 Ibid. 
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other mainstream political parties who were non-nationalists refused to be in 
contact or associated with them while the party was listed and illegal.367  
Moreover, the material implications that came out of the symbolic reframing 
of the conflict as a war against terrorists were more pronounced. The police and 
judicial cooperation with EU countries in the government’s efforts at defeating 
ETA were greatly bolstered. It also had concrete material effects on members of 
Batasuna. The 2002 law on political parties in Spain, which banned Batasuna, 
complemented on-going police action against ETA. According to members of 
Batasuna, they could no longer operate easily: “Proscription has also created 
difficulties for the Basque movement to carry out internal debates and discussions, 
but it did not prevent them from happening.” (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015: 161). 
There were financial implications as well as once Batasuna was made illegal it 
could no longer receive public subsidies for political parties. Moreover, the 
increased policing compounded by proscription succeeded in putting an end to 
ETA’s lucrative kidnapping and racketeering business (Whitfield 2014:100).  
3. Vilification 
We saw above that the terrorist framing of the conflict long pre-dated 9/11 in the 
Basque context. While there is no space to do an in-depth discourse analysis on 
both sides to trace the (de)vilification processes, it is clear from secondary sources 
that the vilification of ETA was already extreme pre-9/11. All Spanish 
governments denied the existence of the armed conflict, ETA was considered to 
be criminal, irrational, without principles and just a bunch of terrorists that could 
not be negotiated with.  
At the same time, because every government did negotiate with ETA pre-
9/11, we also see clear attempts at de-vilifying ETA during pre-negotiation 
phases. This is similar to the Colombia case and confirms much of the literature 
on the need for de-vilification ahead of negotiations. We even see attempts at 
putting in place a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. Every time Spanish governments 
embarked on talks or dialogue with the group, they “implicitly accepted the 
existence of a conflict of some sort” (Whitfield 2015: 5). Not just a fight against 
terrorists but an armed conflict with two sides. They used the ‘terrorist’ tag less 
frequently and start using other epithets. For example when Prime Minister Aznar 																																																								
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addressed ETA as the ‘so-called Basque National Liberation Movement’  
(Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015; Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015) using this descriptor for 
the first time. Or when Prime Minister Zapatero addresses Ortegi, the leader of 
Batasuna, as a ‘man of peace’ (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015).  
But, while the rest of the political establishment broadly accepted Prime 
Minister Aznar’s attempts at a ‘linguistic ceasefire’ with ETA pre-9/11, the 
picture was completely different post-9/11. Even though Prime Minister Zapatero 
tried to get international support for his policy shift in favour of dialogue and he 
received a mandate in May 2005 from the Spanish Parliament to pursue dialogue 
with ‘those who want to abandon violence’, he came under intense attack. When 
Prime Minister Zapatero tried to modify his discourse to shift public opinion 
towards the possibility of negotiating with ETA, the main opposition party 
(Partido Popular) did not support this shift and even took the extreme step of 
breaking relations with the government in 2006. Polarization in the country had 
become more extreme - Zapatero was assailed as a traitor to ETA’s victims and an 
enabler of terrorist violence (Whitfield 2015).  
The role of terrorist victims associations will be explored further below, but 
what is worth noting at this stage is that ETA’s use of violence against politicians 
and the terrorism label post-9/11 deeply impacted “the minds of Spanish citizens” 
and had strengthened structures like terrorist victim’s association (Currin quoted 
in Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015: 115).  
The level of polarization (fed by the state’s official media strategy) 
has become so acute in the last few years that it would be challenging 
to get the public to follow this discursive reversal and the paradigm 
shift that it underscores. (Rios quoted in Haspeslagh and Dudouet 
2015: 115) 
 
In the pre-9/11 environment, when the two main political parties remained 
broadly aligned on the issue of ETA, when the government of the day shifted its 
discourse towards the group it was broadly accepted by the other parties. In the 
post-9/11 environment, the vilification of ETA and the broader Abrazale Left 
movement in Spain had become so extreme that when Prime Minister Zapatero 
tried to shift it he was unable to do so. His ‘linguistic ceasefire’ was so 
vociferously rejected by the opposition party and by the public it never took hold. 
The government was unable to bring the group back into the realm of ‘normal’ 
politics so that further de-vilification of the group could effectively take place. 
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The policy straight jacket the government had created since 9/11 was too tight.  
This shows the importance of the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ as a necessary condition – 
without it taking hold further de-vilification of the proscribed groups could not 
take place. 
4. (A)symmetry 
International proscription led to clear symbolic and material limitations for the 
armed non-state actor and its political affiliates meaning that the Spanish 
government was very much in a dominant position post-9/11. While the Spanish 
government received explicit support through the international proscription of 
ETA the real game-changer in terms of the battle over legal and status asymmetry 
was the international listing of Batasuna in 2003 by the US and the EU. This was 
unprecedented for an unarmed political party. By succeeding in getting his vision 
of ‘terrorism inside the European Union’ (Aznar 2002 quoted in Elejabarrieta 
Diaz 2015: 153) or ‘Basque terrorism’ accepted by international actors, Prime 
Minister Aznar was able to associate the whole Abrazale Left political-social 
movement to terrorism. This deeply de-legitimised the movement as a whole and, 
in the case of Batasuna, as we saw above, put an end to its contacts with 
mainstream, non-nationalist, political parties in Europe. 
In terms of resources and capacities asymmetry the Spanish government 
was also in a dominant position post-9/11. Its police fight against the listed armed 
group was bolstered by giving legitimacy to a series of exceptional 
counterterrorism measures and increased intra-EU cooperation on intelligence and 
arrests, particularly by the French government and police. However, the 
asymmetry was not heightened to the extent it had been in the case of the FARC 
in Colombia because there was no equivalent to Plan Colombia or US military 
support. It was more a case of increased intelligence and police exchange and 
cooperation. By 2003, the Spanish government bolstered by the support of EU 
member states, particularly France, had already seriously affected ETA’s 
operational capacity. While in the late 1990s ETA conducted approximately 80-
armed actions a year, by 2003 this had plummeted to 20 a year – yet ETA still had 
the capacity to kill on a sporadic basis (Whitfield 2014).  
Apart from the international arena where the government won a major battle 
in terms of its legal status, the Spanish government also ‘borrowed’ substantial 
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moral power politically at a domestic level from the victims of terrorism 
associations. The ‘victims of ETA’ became a vocal anti-terrorist lobby and 
political force that played a complex and sometimes controversial role (Whitfield 
2014: 85). Prime Minister Aznar had himself been victim of an ETA attack in 
1995. Between 1996 and 2004 Aznar deliberately placed victims of ETA at the 
centre of counterterrorist policies, which helped legitimize those policies because 
of the moral authority carried by these victims (Whitfield 2015). But as we saw 
above, the role played by some of these victims’ organization took on a life of its 
own and was able to undermine Prime Minister Zapatero’s efforts towards 
dialogue with ETA. They also had a disproportionate influence over the 
government of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.  
The disparity in power between the Spanish government and ETA was 
significantly heightened by 9/11 and international proscription. The proscription 
of Batasuna which deeply de-legitimized the whole Abrazale Left movement and 
the strength of the ‘victims of ETA’ buttressing the government, made it 
impossible for successive Spanish governments to initiate a negotiation with ETA 
without the group effectively having to acknowledge defeat.  Proscription in the 
Basque case led to an insistence that terrorists should be offered no concessions in 
exchange for disarming (Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015). By effectively asking 
ETA to surrender, no parity of esteem or perception of symmetry could be 
established.  
5. Ripeness: the mutually hurting stalemate and the way out 
Neither a mutually hurting stalemate nor a way out between the Spanish 
government and ETA emerged. Explaining what led to the negotiations between 
Prime Minister Zapatero and ETA in 2005, Teresa Whitfield (2015) concluded 
that there was no mutually hurting stalemate between the parties. Rather it was a 
case of a mutually enticing opportunity (Zartman 2005)- both sides could see the 
benefits of negotiating – which is similar to the Caguán negotiation in Colombia. 
International proscription played a role in this process, mainly by 
postponing the military pain of the stalemate for the government and by blocking 
the way out. Despite the lack of a mutually hurting stalemate on the part of the 
government, ETA experienced a unilateral hurting stalemate that was political as 
much as military. Because international proscription had such a negative impact 
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on the way out between the parties, we saw an innovative unilateral transition on 
the part of ETA and the Abrzale Left who created their own way out with the help 
of international third party actors and Basque civil society and political parties. 
But this no-negotiation scenario meant that a large number of issues remain 
unaddressed  – and that some form of a peace process is still needed. 
The Spanish government’s security and policing strategy against ETA were 
greatly bolstered by proscription’s symbolic and material implications. Successive 
Prime Ministers received increased legitimacy for their campaign against the 
armed group and its political wing and concrete intelligence and policing support. 
This is similar to the period under President Uribe in the Colombian case, where 
the ‘unconstrained side’ (Grieg and Diel 2012) was so emboldened that it 
postponed their feeling of military pain.  
But, unlike the Colombia case, there has not been political pain associated 
with the strategies pursued. While the government’s counter-terrorism strategy did 
weaken the protection of human rights and the institutions responsible for their 
protection (Whitfield 2015), it did not lead to direct political pain for the Spanish 
government. The proscription of ETA and Batasuna at the EU level in particular 
offered the Spanish state a high level of protection against human rights criticism. 
One illustrative example of this dynamic was the report on Spain by Theo Van 
Boven, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council in Geneva in 2004. In his report, Van Boven stated that allegations of 
torture and ill treatment were not fabrications (quoted in Whitfield 2014: 127). 
The Spanish government took direct steps to discredit Van Boven’s work, they 
walked out of the session and succeeded in convincing all EU member states not 
to participate in the session. Asked whether this reaction was standard, Van Boven 
said that no country had reacted so strongly and that EU states could be very 
protective of their ‘own’ (Van Boven quoted in Whitfield 2014:128). The listing 
of Batasuna and ETA at the EU level gave the Spanish government’s counter-
terrorism strategy increased legitimacy and protected it against any criticism 
within the EU. 
Not only did the Spanish government not perceive either military or political 
pain to lead them to feeling a hurting stalemate, there was also no way out. The 
proscription of Batasuna in particular effectively banned the political expression 
of the Abrazale Left movement. This deeply complicated any efforts for Basque 
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or Spanish political actors to meet with them let alone have sustained dialogue 
with them (Whitfield 2014). Coupled with the extreme vilification of the whole 
Abrazale Left and the role played by the ‘victims of ETA’ movement, the policy 
jacket tailored was so tight that the Spanish government was not in a position to 
pursue a negotiation even if they had wanted to.  This case differs from that of the 
Colombian government and the FARC. For a period of eight years under 
President Uribe there was no way out, a situation that was deeply linked to 
proscription.  Under President Santos it was possible to identify a way out thanks 
in large part to the ‘linguistic ceasefire’. In the Basque case this was not possible.  
During Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s terms in office (2011-2018) no 
negotiations with ETA have taken place nor have there been any pre-negotiation 
contacts. Prime Minister Rajoy stayed true to the adage of ‘not negotiating with 
terrorists’.  To a certain degree the role played by the ‘victims of ETA’ continued 
to explain the reticence of the Rajoy government to engage with ETA even though 
it had effectively unilaterally disbanded after 2011 (Whitfield 2015). There was 
no possible way out between the Spanish government and ETA and proscription 
played a major role in this dead end.  
So, what explains ETA’s unilateral transition away from violence? And 
what was the effect of proscription on this process? ETA’s ‘unilateral’ hurting 
stalemate appears to have been deeply political and its perception of its way out 
affected by intra-party dynamics within the broad Abrazale Left movement.  
While state security policies compounded by proscription post-9/11 weakened 
ETA, they did not play the biggest part in the group’s transition away from 
violence (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015; Currin and Rios quoted in Haspeslagh and 
Dudouet 2015:113; Whitfield 2014). ETA’s transition should be understood 
through a “combination of factors: the pressures exerted upon the group by anti-
terrorist policies and social opposition, but also an unusual unilateral peace 
process.” (Whitfield 2014b). 
There was, of course, a military component to ETA’s stalemate. They felt 
weak, with so many members imprisoned and they were struggling to operate or 
recruit.  As a result they came to realize that they could not win militarily: 
By early 2010 an internal intelligence report described ETA as being 
‘at the edge of the abyss’. At this point some 310 alleged members of 
ETA had been detained in Spain and France since the end of the 
	 228	
ceasefire and the organization was struggling with recruitment. 
(Whitfield 2014:195) 
 
But the political pain they felt was even more intense. Here the intra-party 
dynamics played a crucial role. The fact that both the military and the political 
branch of the Abrzale Left movement were proscribed internationally meant that a 
range of actors within the Abrazale Left movement felt the pain differently along 
the lines of Pearlman’s (2010) ‘composite actor approach’. Because of Batasuna’s 
increased isolation the political and social movements within the Abrazale Left 
felt the pain more intensely than the military branch that was more used to the 
stigma and the isolation.  
The Abrazale left became deeply concerned about being internationally 
branded as ‘terrorists’, very much in line with the typology of stigma rejection 
(Adler Nissen 2014). This was further strengthened by the Madrid train bombings 
of 2004. The fact that ETA was initially blamed for the attacks instead of Al 
Qaeda, made the political branch reflect and want to distance themselves from that 
type of violence. According to a member of the Abrazale Left, they thought theirs 
was not “the same random violence”. 368  Then, after the collapse of the 
negotiations with Prime Minister Zapatero in 2005, there was a unilateral process 
of dialogue within the Abrazale Left movement. They came to the realization that 
“violence was preventing the Abertzale Left from bringing the political process to 
a new phase” (Elejabarrieta Diaz 2015:159).  
While the political currents in the Abrazale Left movement had shifted 
towards feeling the military and political pain, by the mid-2000s the institutional 
equilibrium within the whole political-military apparatus had not yet shifted. 
Proscription and the illegalization of Batasuna did not succeed in pressuring ETA 
to transition.  If anything, according to Teresa Whitfield (2014:161), it actually 
strengthened “ETA’s hegemony over the nationalist left.” The political wing 
could not make a successful case for a political path vis-à-vis the armed wing, 
because proscription made any process of discussion amongst political parties 
impossible and it was hindering efforts to resolve the conflict. There was no way 
out. By proscribing Batasuna, it disenfranchised a sector of the electorate 
infinitely larger than could be directly linked to ETA.  																																																								
368 Senior member of Batasuna, Personal interview, August 2012, Bayonne, France. 
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There was no inter-party way out for ETA. The armed group had no partner 
to do business with. However, the Abrazale Left succeeded in fostering their own 
intra-party way out by creating their own ‘political landing strip’ through “intense 
political activity, assisted by the discreet engagement of international actors and 
concluding with the return of radical nationalists to electoral politics” (Whitfield 
2014b).  
The situation was blocked at the national level, so the political landing strip 
only happened at two other levels: the local level and the international level. At 
the local level in the Basque country, civil society and political parties have 
played an important role. Since the late 1980s voices have been emerging in 
support of non-violent political solutions in the Basque country (Telledis 2011). In 
particular, the social movement Elkarri (1992-2006) and its successor Lokarri 
have “enabled civil society to play a role of ‘social mediator’” (Haspeslagh and 
Dudouet 2015: 112) by convening social forums and major conferences bringing 
together different political parties and social actors, leading to several inter-party 
draft agreements. The illegalisation and international proscription of Batasuna led 
to the radicalisation of the moderate circles within the Basque nationalist 
movement (Telledis 2011:187; Heiberg 2007:45).  These civil society movements 
engaged with the more radical fringes and made the case for dialogue and non-
violent politics. These social movements helped create political space within the 
Basque region for the Abrazale Left, yet this was still not equivalent to being able 
to participate in elections.  
Batasuna, as we saw above, had realised that violence was working against 
the Abrazale Left politically. In February 2011, for the first time, the party 
actively distanced itself from violence by explicitly rejecting political violence in 
the Charter of Sortu, the successor party to the banned Batasuna. It was only later 
on that year that they were able to participate in regional elections under the guise 
of Bildu – the successor party to Sortu - after a last-minute approval by the 
Constitutional Court. This shift allowed the Abrazale Left to return to democratic 
politics. Bildu won 25 per cent of the vote, which was a much stronger result than 
the Abrazale Left had ever secured. According to Teresa Whitfield (2015), this 
electoral victory ended the internal debate within ETA. The institutional 
equilibrium shifted in favour of a unilateral transition away from violence now 
that the group could see another path to achieving their goals – a political way out. 
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Internationals played a limited yet an important role in ripening the ETA 
situation.  Because of international proscription mainstream European political 
parties shunned Batasuna. As noted above, the only groups willing to meet them 
were other nationalist movements with similar trajectories. In this case, however, 
one of those groups was Sinn Fein. Indeed, ties between Basque nationalism and 
Irish republicanism are long and deep (Whitfield 2015). The isolating effect of 
proscription in this case pushed the group towards an actor, Sinn Fein/IRA, which 
had itself made the transition into a non-violent political actor. This had a 
beneficial impact on Batasuna’s transition and its condemnation of violence 
(Haspeslagh 2013).  
Moreover, while the involvement of international third party actors had 
always been a sensitive issue in the Spanish context with a preference for weak 
mediators (Whitfield 2014), their involvement became more challenging. 
Batasuna was able to remain in contact with a number of international conflict 
resolution organisations such as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Berghof 
Foundation, Conciliation Resources or the Carter Centre as well as certain 
prominent individuals in the peacemaking world such as the South African lawyer 
Brian Currin or the Irish Catholic priest Father Alec Reid.369 The government on 
the other hand refused to engage with these third party actors. The focus of these 
actors in a context where the government had explicitly rejected the possibility of 
negotiations had been to edge ETA and the Abrazale Left towards non-violence 
(Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015). This was exemplified by the Aiete conference in 
October 2011. The carefully orchestrated event brought together international 
leaders, such as former UN Secretary general Kofi Anan and Gerry Adams the 
leader of Sinn Fein, to call on ETA to declare a definitive ceasefire. Days after the 
conference, ETA declared a definitive end to their armed activity.  
Third party actors and Sin Fein played a crucial role in helping ETA move 
away from military confrontation. They effectively became an interlocutor for 
ETA in the absence of the government and created the political and practical 
space for ETA to end their military strategy. How is it that these actors did not 
feel constrained by international proscription? It is possible to think that the 
INGOs and individual peacemakers felt less constrained by the proscription 																																																								
369 Brian Currin was a South African lawyer who played a key role in establishing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa; Father Alec Reid was a catholic priest who had played an 
important facilitation role in the pre-negotiations of the Northern Ireland peace process. 
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regime in the Basque context, compared to the Colombian context, because they 
saw themselves as engaging with the political, non-armed wing as opposed to 
being in contact with ETA directly even though both were listed. But proscription 
was still an impediment for these actors.370 Though the Spanish government 
somehow tolerated these weak third parties, later on a number of these 
international actors, who had been in close contact with the Abrazale Left, such as 
Brian Currin for example, came under attack (Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015). 
Members of the International Verification Commission (IVC), set-up as a 
mechanism for ETA to hand in their weapons unilaterally, were forcibly flown to 
Madrid to testify before the National High Court for ‘contacts with terrorists’ 
(Basque Permanent Social Forum 2017). 
In the absence of a ‘linguistic ceasefire’, the political landing strip became 
the most important avenue for the listed groups to transition. This unilateral 
process led to ETA giving-up on its armed struggle and even handing in weapons. 
In April 2017, 3.5 tons of arms, explosives and ammunitions were handed in to 
the French authorities by the IVC (Basque Social Forum 2017). This however 
does not mean that there is no need for some sort of peace process with the 
Spanish government. The lack of a process at the national level has been deeply 
felt. Not just because this is a political problem for which some form of 
peacemaking between actors is necessary (Whitfield 2015). But, as the difficulties 
surrounding ETA handing in its weapons illustrate, at a very practical level there 
needs to be some sort of process to deal with the consequences of the conflict. 
ETA’s unilateral transition can be understood as a type of protracted pre-
negotiation in which the proscribed entity had to fully commit to a process of self-
de-vilification and building confidence with its opponent.  This included declaring 
the permanent end to its violence and getting and international commission to 
verify the end of their armed activity. 
In the case of the Basque country, international proscription has impeded a 
peace processes between the Spanish government and ETA. While efforts at pre-
negotiations between the parties were already challenging pre-9/11 because the 
terrorism framing of the conflict had already taken hold, they became impossible 																																																								
370 At the time, I was working as Head of Policy for Conciliation Resources and this engagement with 
members of Batasuna sparked multiple internal conversations on the possible legal and political 
implications of engaging with an entity proscribed by the EU and the UK. Moreover, it also led the 
organization to actively work on the issue at a policy level through a series of workshops and advocacy 
towards the EU and the UK to allow for this type of engagement with proscribed entities. 
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after 9/11. One key factor has been the proscription not only of the armed group, 
ETA, but also of Batasuna, the political party of the Abrazale Left. While the 
material effect of proscription had little impact at the international level in terms 
of asset freeze and travel bans, the symbolic implications (and its associated 
material effects) were colossal for the Abrazale Left. The whole movement was 
deeply delegitimised and isolated resulting in concrete material difficulties. At the 
same time it bolstered the Spanish government to such a degree that it stopped 
them feeling a hurting stalemate. Moreover, by entrenching the idea that ETA and 
Batasuna were terrorists that could not be negotiated with and by uplifting the 
‘victims of ETA’ to an untouchable status, the government made it impossible for 
itself to shift its strategy. No ‘linguistic ceasefire’ could hold and no perceived 
symmetry could be created between parties. The only way out was for the armed 
group to unilaterally end its armed strategy, as a prelude to a possible future peace 
process with the Spanish government. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of the Basque case shows that the analytical framework can be 
applied to other (similar) cases. With more time and space the investigation could 
be deepened significantly and much more detail added from primary sources, but 
already by applying it in a light-touch way, mainly to secondary literature, the 
analysis was able to assess the impact of proscription on the Basque peace 
process. This illustrates the potential usefulness of the thesis’ innovative 
framework to study the effect of proscription on the inception of peace processes. 
The Basque case shows that the contrast between the pre- and post-9/11 
scenarios might not be as pronounced as was the case with the FARC in 
Colombia. In the Basque country the ‘terrorist’ framing was already deeply 
established at a national level. What 9/11 and international proscription did was to 
embed this characterisation and give it international legitimacy. But even in this 
case, the analysis showed that international proscription had a deeply detrimental 
effect on the possibilities of negotiations between the Spanish government and 
ETA. 
There were two other dimensions that were different from the Colombia 
case and played central roles in the (lack of) pre-negotiation process in the Basque 
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case: (1) the international proscription of a political party; and (2) the role of the 
victims of terrorism. While the analytical framework was able to pick up on these 
dynamics thanks to the intra-party dimension, a further refinement of the 
analytical framework could make these more explicit. In the case of the FARC, 
for example, because it did not have a political wing, the analysis was focussed on 
understanding how proscription affected differently those in the FARC leadership 
or the leadership of Alfonso Cano in getting the institutional equilibrium to 
change. But in cases where an armed group has a political wing there might be 
different dynamics at play when the political wing is not listed internationally. For 
example, in the case of Hezbollah, where certain countries only list the military 
wing, others also list the political wing. 
The framework allowed us to look not only at the intra party dynamics but 
also at both parties in interaction. This was useful to understand how proscription 
affects the dynamic interaction between parties and is particularly worthwhile in a 
context where much of the literature on ‘terrorists’ only looks at the armed group 
in isolation. This literature fails not only to understand the armed group in its 
wider context, but it also fails to take into consideration the effects of counter-
terrorism policies on state actors as well as on the dynamics of peace processes. 
This thesis shows that international proscription affects the state as much as the 
armed group. 
International proscription has re-shaped how peace negotiations can be 
initiated, making pre-negotiations longer and more protracted. But even beyond 
pre-negotiation, it is also clear that it has had a qualitative impact on how peace is 
defined and pursued. By taking sides against the armed group, international 
proscription has led to a counter-terrorist framing which has put the burden of 
change on the listed armed group. The next chapter assesses the contribution of 
the thesis to a range of scholarly literatures and highlights future research avenues 
and policy implications.  
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Chapter	Nine	
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
Though politicians claim not to negotiate with ‘terrorists’, they do. This 
contradiction lies at the heart of the thesis.  The work explored how international 
listing of armed groups as ‘terrorists’ affects negotiations and peace processes. 
The specific question I set out to answer is how international proscription affects 
the pre-negotiation phase or the way in which conflict parties get to the 
negotiation table. The answer, as Chapter 8 made apparent, is complex and 
multifaceted but it is clear that proscription influenced pre-negotiation deeply, 
making it harder and more prolonged. In particular it affected the timing and 
sequencing of peace processes. The ‘linguistic ceasefire’ became a necessary 
condition not just for de-vilification but also for creating a sense of symmetry and 
the establishment of a way out. International proscription also distorted the classic 
conflict resolution paradigm of ripeness and deeply reduced the space for third 
party intervention.     
Because this thesis is exploring an emerging field of academic study, this 
concluding chapter will do three things. First it will highlight the contribution 
made by the thesis to a range of scholarly debates. Second, it will explore some of 
the possible future research avenues sparked by the work. Finally, the chapter will 
turn to consider the policy implications of this research. 
 
I. Contribution 
The thesis produced insights on international proscription, an understudied 
phenomenon, and developed an analytical framework to study its effects on the 
initiation of peace processes. Because it straddled a number of scholarly 
literatures, this thesis offers theoretical contributions to a range of debates. It also 
suggests an approach to studying the effects of proscription by taking 9/11 as a 
critical juncture. Moreover, by applying the framework to two pre-negotiations 
with the FARC in Colombia the thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the 
study of peacemaking in Colombia. 
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1. Theoretical contribution 
The thesis provides insights to a number of strands of literature covered in 
Chapter 2. Most directly, it contributes to the nascent scholarship studying 
proscription and peacebuilding, most of which had focussed on the impact of 
proscription on third party actors or peacebuilding actors (Haspeslagh 2013, 
Birkeland 2014, Haspeslagh and Dudouet 2015, Hayes et al. 2015). It confirms 
that proscription makes the engagement of third party actors with listed armed 
groups more challenging. The case studies showed that only weak third parties or 
the ones that had opted out of the international proscription regimes where 
effectively able to play a role during the pre-negotiations. It also adds to this work 
by showing how these third parties, particularly civil society actors, found 
innovative ways to overcome these challenges through epistolary exchanges and 
pastoral dialogues with the proscribed group for example. 
Moreover, this thesis broadens the perspective and shows that beyond third 
parties, proscription also had deep effects on the actors themselves, which in turn 
affected the central dynamics of pre-negotiation. For example, when it came to 
(a)symmetry, proscription deeply altered the power relations between the parties. 
The burden of proof was shifted to the proscribed armed group who was either 
effectively asked to surrender or had to put in place all the confidence building 
measures vis-à-vis the government. This made the establishment of a parity of 
esteem challenging in the case of Colombia and impossible in the Basque country. 
This heightened asymmetry, underpinned by proscription, also had an 
impact on the government - the ‘unconstrained side’. Because its legitimacy was 
bolstered to such an extent at the international level, the government’s perception 
of a mutually hurting stalemate was clouded. Moreover, having built up the image 
of a ‘terrorist’ organisation internationally and nationally, the government created 
a policy straightjacket for itself that was so tight fitting it ended up with no room 
for manoeuvre and thus no way out.  
This thesis shows that international proscription goes beyond shaping the 
“kind of peacebuilding possible” (Hayes et al. 2015:44), it actually shapes the 
kind of peace that is possible between actors. It alters the relationship between the 
conflict parties and thus the central dynamics of pre-negotiation.  
By developing an analytical framework to study the effects of proscription, 
the thesis contributes to a more systematic analysis of the phenomenon. The 
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application of the framework to Colombia and the brief Basque case showed that 
the symbolic effects of proscription were most pronounced. This confirms much 
of the findings from the work on sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2000 Biersteker, 
Eckert, Tourinho et al. 2013). However, by looking at both material and symbolic 
effects in interaction, the thesis also showed how the symbolic effects created new 
material implications as Chapter 8 made apparent. This point would have been 
missed by an approach that only focussed on the symbolic effects, like the 
constructivist literature on labels (Bhatia 2005; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 
2005; Russell 2005; Renner and Spencer 2012). It is thus crucial to study the 
symbolic and material effects of proscription in interaction.  
As a type of targeted sanction, the study of proscription should be of interest 
to the sanctions scholars. This thesis offers them a better understanding of how 
sanctions affect non-state armed actors, which had not been the focus of their 
work. Moreover, because they failed to look at sanctions as a dynamic process, 
they had shown little interest in understanding what targeted actors actually need 
or perceive. This thesis illustrates the importance of understanding how both 
parties perceive and understand proscription’s material and symbolic effects. 
While most of the securitization literature had focussed on the constitutive 
side when it comes to the study of proscription – i.e. how lists come together 
(Bourne 2018; Jarvis and Legrand 2016, 2017, 2018), one securitization author, 
de Goede (2012), had highlighted the productive power of lists. While she 
explored their effects only at an individual level, this thesis broadens the focus to 
the armed group but also to the dynamic interaction between the group and the 
government, as well as third parties. Because the securitization approach is one-
sided, it does not help us understand the relational dynamics between actors. This 
thesis brings a relational focus to the study of proscription. By anchoring the 
analysis in the peace and conflict literature it allowed for an analysis of both 
conflict actors and their relationship and interaction. This enabled the thesis to 
bring to the fore the key effects of proscription on intra- and inter- party relations 
to understand the ways in which proscription affect the central pre-negotiation 
dynamics. 
The analytical framework was squarely rooted in the peace and conflict 
literature. But because pre-negotiations are under researched compared to actual 
negotiation processes, new light was shed on a phase of negotiation that is often 
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shrouded in secrecy. More specifically, the thesis critically revisited and extended 
central ideas of the pre-negotiation literature namely vilification, symmetry and 
ripeness, drawing out key components of these dynamics. It also added new 
concepts such as the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ and the ‘political landing strip’.  
The work thus follows in the footsteps of critical terrorism studies scholar 
Harmonie Toros (2008, 2012) by placing the study of terrorism and the ‘terrorist’ 
label in the context of the conflict and peace literature. Toros (2008, 2012) argued 
that the terrorist framing forestalls non-violent approaches. This thesis adds to this 
work by shedding light on how this happens but also on how negotiations do still 
take place with groups considered ‘terrorists’. By developing the idea of the 
‘linguistic ceasefire’, this thesis offers a way of understanding why certain 
conflicts remain stuck in the ‘terrorist’ framing while others emerge from it. The 
analysis of the two cases, one where the ‘linguistic ceasefire’ took hold 
(Colombia) and one where it did not (Basque country), albeit briefly, illustrates 
the contribution of this thesis to understanding why negotiating with an 
internationally proscribed group was possible in one context, but not in another. It 
also adds a linguistic approach to the study of peace and conflict. 
2. Research design: 9/11 as a critical juncture 
The thesis makes the case that 9/11 is a critical juncture when it comes to the 
study of international proscription and the ‘terrorist’ label. As Chapter 3 made 
clear, it was after 9/11 that the UN Security Council used Article 51 of Chapter 
VII, on the right to self-defence, for the first time following an attack by a non-
state actor. UN Resolution 1373 set proscription regimes against non-state actors 
at the heart of the multilateral agenda. The ‘terrorist’ tag was no longer just a label 
used by belligerents against each other, but the whole international community 
now stood behind this particular label with clear symbolic and material 
implications. This thesis argues that there is something specific about being 
labelled a ‘terrorist’ post 9/11 that leads to a form of extreme vilification.  The 
emergence of the international proscription regime post 9/11 has imbedded an 
understanding of what terrorism is and who should be considered a terrorist which 
has deeply shaped the meta narrative and how conflict are understood as well as 
how they can be resolved. 
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The research design used in the thesis can be particularly useful to liberal 
peace literature (Richmond 2003; Richmond and Franks 2009; Franks 2009; 
Richmond and Telledis 2012) which has suggested that orthodox terrorism 
discourse had been used when there was no real interest in dealing with the root 
causes of conflict. Having failed to take 9/11 as a critical juncture into 
consideration, the work of Richmond and Franks (2009) for example, did not give 
a persuasive account of why the ‘terrorist’ discourses was successfully shifted in 
Northern Ireland (pre-9/11), but in none of the other four case studies (post-9/11) 
which they studied.  
3. Empirical contribution on Colombia 
As the main case study and the detailed empirical analysis was on Colombia the 
thesis offers a rich empirical contribution to scholarship on the country. Based on 
over fifty personal interviews and a discourse analysis of 335 statements by 
successive Colombian governments and the FARC over twenty years, the thesis 
offers new primary sources for the study of the Colombian conflict. Moreover, 
getting a multiplicity of perspectives, even from the FARC itself, is rare and 
challenging in a context as polarised as Colombia. The fieldwork having been 
conducted in Colombia and Cuba, during the on-going negotiations, offers a rare 
glimpse into a key moment in the country’s history. Moreover, as the late Virginia 
Bouvier (2009) pointed out, much of the focus on Colombia has been on violence, 
with some notable exceptions.371  This thesis offers a counter-point to this 
literature, contributing a detailed analysis of peace and peacemaking in particular. 
Having highlighted the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis 
and how they relate to on-going academic debates, the chapter now turns to 
reflecting on ideas for future research. 
 
II. Future research avenues 
Because the thesis focussed on an under explored phenomenon, the research 
generates a range of possible new research avenues. Some are about applying the 
analytical framework to a range of new cases, others are broader and relate to 
other qualitative and quantitative research avenues. 																																																								
371 See Téllez, Montes and Lesmes (2002), Gonzalez Posso (2004), Rojas and Meltzer (2005), Chernick 
(2007, 2012), García-Durán (2004, 2006), Bouvier (2009), Saramineto Santander (2011), Hernández 
Delgado (2012) and Mitchell and Rojas (2012), Karl (2017). 
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The brief application of the analytical framework to the Basque conflict 
showed its potential to interpret the effects of proscription on other peace 
processes. It could be applied to a range of other conflicts where the armed group 
has been listed as a terrorist organisation. Having adapted the work of Rebecca 
Adler-Nissen (2014) on the reaction of stigmatized states in world politics to the 
case of non-state armed groups, the thesis explored how armed groups may react 
differently to the ‘terrorist’ label. It could be particularly interesting to apply the 
framework to cases where the listed entity has embraced the stigma as a badge of 
honour, which has been the case of some listed Islamist armed groups for 
example, assessing whether differences in armed group reaction changes the effect 
proscription has on the dynamics between the armed group and the government. 
The analytical framework could also be adapted to look at the effects of 
proscription on other phases of peace processes, beyond pre-negotiation. One 
possible avenue for research would be using the material and symbolic effects of 
proscription as a basis for honing in on other central dynamics at play during 
negotiations and in the post-agreement phase.  Another possibility would be to 
adapt the framework with levels of analysis so it can differentiate the impact of 
proscription at the international, national and local levels. 
It would also be worthwhile to investigate more specifically how the 
embedding of proscription post-9/11 in the international system affected 
international mediation actors. By embedding proscription regimes, inter-
governmental organisations like the UN and the EU have taken sides and lost 
impartiality? Has this affected their potential roles in mediation processes? Have 
certain regional actors who have developed listing regimes, such as the EU or the 
African Union, been more affected than others? Do they now engage listed actors 
on very different terms? 
There is also a promising research avenue in the concept of the ‘linguistic 
ceasefire’. Future work could assess how wide and deep it needs to be. Is it just an 
elite-level pact to get negotiations off the ground? What about the broader public? 
How far and by whom does it have to be ‘accepted’ for it to take hold? Does it 
have to be accepted by the broader public to positively influence the post-
agreement transition? In which cases would it not work? In the case of the Basque 
country, we saw how difficult it was to mobilise in the face of opposition from the 
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victims of terrorism associations. This also points to the broader questions on the 
effects of proscription on the politics of victimhood in conflict transformation.  
If qualitatively the study of this subject is very recent, quantitatively it is 
non-existent. There are no datasets on proscription regimes or statistical analysis 
looking at the relationship between the listing of armed groups and peace 
processes. One avenue that could be a good starting point and an interesting test 
for this thesis is to look at whether proscription delays the onset of negotiations. 
Has it taken longer to get negotiations off the ground in a post 9/11 context, as 
this research would suggest? 
Finally, there is a whole methodological and ethical strand of work that 
could emerge looking at what it means to research proscribed groups:  the ethical 
challenges involved, but also the limitations faced and the impact it is having on 
the knowledge we are generating on listed armed groups. These all have clear 
policy implications, which the chapter now turns to. 
 
III. Policy implications 
This thesis has direct implications for policy. It showed that proscription had a 
qualitative impact on the way in which wars against listed armed groups have 
been and are being fought and the possibilities of resolving them peacefully. 
International proscription makes pre-negotiations longer and more protracted in 
effect re-shaping how peace processes can be initiated.  
As a central counter-terrorism tool, proscription is now so deeply embedded 
in the UN system, and so widely embraced by a range of global actors, that 
international actors have in effect taken sides against these listed armed group. 
International proscription has bolstered governments in conflict contexts to an 
extreme degree and made international policy lose sight of a central conflict 
dynamic: namely state violence. Western governments and international 
organisations have found themselves aligned with and supporting dubious military 
and policing strategies often accompanied by human rights violations.  
While the objective of proscription is to contain security threats, it has not 
succeeded in ‘hurting’ listed armed groups in material terms. Proscription did not 
have important material effects on the listed armed groups in the two cases 
explored in terms of funding or international travel. To be effective, policies 
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would need to be tailored to individual circumstances but proscription regimes 
“stresses uniformity rather than variation” (Pillar 2003: 150). Moreover, 
international proscription has meant the ‘unconstrained side’ is led too believe 
there are no limits to its military options, leading to a prolongation of wars. This 
should spur a re-think and a reassessment of the actual impact of proscription on 
the targeted entities and the ‘unconstrained side’ in conflict contexts. 
While proscription does appear to be a successful strategy when it comes to 
stigmatizing and de-legitimising an armed group, this research illustrates that it is 
also incredibly hard to rollback and makes engaging the listed armed group in 
peace negotiations that much harder. The label sticks and even when the 
‘linguistic ceasefire’ allows negotiations to get off the ground, the deep de-
legitimisation of the armed group, and often the whole socio-political community 
associated with it, makes it near impossible to reverse. This affects the group’s 
possibility of transforming into a non-violent political actor.  It can also 
disenfranchise large sectors of the electorate, as was the case in the Basque 
country. 
Proscription is also changing the types of third party interventions possible: 
how directly actors can engage with certain groups, whom they can engage with 
and where they can engage.  But effective peacemaking requires an understanding 
of all stakeholders in a conflict, including armed groups, whether on a terrorist list 
or not. Proscription regimes are problematic as they criminalize contact or 
dialogue with listed entities. Instead, international policy should be supporting 
these resilient and adaptable third party actors rather than criminalizing their 
contact with listed groups. Indeed these are often the people who play an 
important role in edging armed groups towards non-violence. 
The breadth and depth of research on proscribed groups is also being 
affected. This is having an effect on the quality of interventions in any given 
context because there is simply less knowledge on these groups, which limits our 
understanding. In academia, research on listed groups is being increasingly 
discouraged by ethics committees in UK universities, less fieldwork is being done 
and funders are increasingly wary of supporting this type of work (Dumasy and 
Haspeslagh 2016). This thesis was only possible because the UK government does 
not list the FARC, so field work was approved by the university’s ethics 
committee. It would have been much harder to justify personal interviews with 
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ETA or members of an Islamic armed group. If this thesis shows anything it is the 
importance of getting the perspective of the proscribed armed group itself. 
One fundamental problem with proscription regimes is that they criminalise 
the actor and not just the acts of terrorism. It is this amalgamation between actors 
and acts that needs to end. By focussing just on the acts, international policy could 
consider both the violent actions of armed groups and those of the state. By 
shifting the focus away from the actor towards the acts it would condemn terrorist 
acts placing them in a broader arsenal of possible warfare tools, instead of turning 
the armed group itself into being just terrorists. By separating the act and the actor 
change, and thus peace, become possible.  
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